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ABSTRACT

This paper is intended to clarify the nature of and justify home economics education. Part 1 contains an explanation of the approach to conceptualization of home economics followed in the remaining three parts of the report. Part 2 provides an initial categorization of home economics and of education as personal service professions. Topics discussed in this section are distinguishing between disciplines and professions and distinguishing between personal service and impersonal service professions. Part 3 focuses on home economics as a profession and as a field of study. It examines the historical conceptualization of home economics as a profession and a personal service profession, the presuppositions and theoretical considerations on which a conceptualization of home economics is based, problems or questions with which home economics deals, and the mission and subject matter of home economics. Part 4 is devoted to a conceptualization of home economics education which evolves from deliberations in earlier sections of the monograph. Topics covered in this final section include the concept of education, the aims of home economics, questions significant to home economics education, home economics education and social studies, and home economics and vocational education. (MN)

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What is Home Economics Education?

by
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[redacted]

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PREFACE

To distinguish anything from something else, A from B or home economics education from any other field, we have to do so within some kind of conceptual framework. To do otherwise would be as dogmatic and futile as in the case of two children arguing about whether a certain dog is a poodle in a conversation which goes: "'T is," "'T isn't," "'T is," "'T isn't," and so on until one or both become tired or resort to some authority. In such an approach to determining what something is, there is no appeal to reasons which pertain conceptually to the qualities of a poodle (or to the qualities of home economics education). Obviously, the conceptual framework for distinguishing home economics education from other fields is more complex than that for distinguishing a poodle from other dogs. To the extent that the conceptual framework is oversimplified or inadequate, the conceptualization of home economics education is inadequate. To the extent that the effort at conceptualization is undisciplined, the conceptualization is confused. Empirical research does not dissipate conceptual confusion; we have to discipline our mental efforts by not only being critically reflective about what the field should be but also about the underlying assumptions and theory which justify the conceptualization we construct. This is philosophic reflection.

To understand home economics education is to have a conceptual scheme which raises knowledge of what it is above a collection of disjointed beliefs and which provides meaning, thereby transforming our outlook upon and within our field. To seek such a conceptual scheme as a rationality for home economics education requires that we not be whimsical, capricious, expedient, or piecemeal in our beleifs about the field or in our actions concerning the field. Nor can we be arbitrary for to specify a set of beliefs about the field without their justification by reason and evidence fails to provide the rationality being sought. To seek to clarify rationally a field which has been in existence for over a century, we cannot ignore its history for meanings have already been established and, in their evolution, meanings may have become enriched and clear or they may have become intellectually impoverished and distorted. People create meanings and, in the evolution

4

of a group of people (such as home economists or educators or home economics educators), changes in meaning occur. There is no certainty that such changes represent progress in clarity or rationality. It is because of the need to enrich the meaning attached to the nature of a field of study and to correct the distortions which occur, that scholars continuously re-examine the rationality of their respective fields.

Home economics education, like many other fields including the broader profession of Education, has become predominantly technical in its rationality (the rationality of cause-effect or means-end). Many home economics educators are aware of this and of the dangers involved; they are also conscious of the contradiction between this dominant rationality and what we say we are. This monograph seeks to point up alternative forms of rationality and the intellectual and moral flaws of the one-dimensional thinking (i.e., of the dominance of technical rationality). This is a complex area and the monograph cannot do a complete analysis of this problem but references are cited for readers not already acquainted with them.

It has not been characteristic of home economics educators in the past few decades to argue rationally about what the field should be. Consequently, I anticipate that an approach which seeks to develop a reasoned conceptualization of the field will not be looked on favorably by some who would prefer one line or, at most, one paragraph. There may also be those to whom self-criticism (meaning the criticism of our conceptual scheme and our practice) is considered self-flagellation; this is a defense mechanism for rationalizing maintenance of the status quo. On the other hand, there may be some who seek out the latest in revisionism, to whom revising an intellectual orientation is a superficial change of fashion to be adopted with the same degree of intellectual effort as a change in style of clothing from one season to another. We presume to be educated but these practices in our field are unscholarly and even anti-intellectual; they do (and thay have done) damage to home economics education. However, I know and I have faith that there are those in the field who do not subscribe to the above practices. These are people who do seek clarification and justification of our field through disciplined and enlightened effort, who do subscribe to open, reflective, mutuality of understanding, and for whom establishing validity claims through self-criticism in open communication is not personally threatening. It is because of that knowledge and faith that I have made the effort.

The effort is not intended to provide a blueprint for home economics education nor a final conceptualization. What has been attempted is intended to encourage action based on serious and critical reflectiveness not only about what is written here but about what others may contribute in writing or speaking. The idea and the practice of continuous examination of the underlying rationality of the field require that those who do so continuously grow in their own conceptual schemata. This involves growing in an adequacy of theory but, since such examination requires our own interaction in dialectic thinking, talking, and acting together (rather than being adversaries) and since the consequences of what we do affects those we would "serve," it also involves our growing in moral consciousness. I hope that others in the field will also provide us with statements of a reasoned and theoretically justified conceptualization of home economics and home economics education for the same kind of critically reflective examination I welcome to this effort.

I have learned a great deal in the process of writing the monograph. I am aware that there is much more to be learned for there are parts of the paper with which I am not satisfied. It is hoped that those who read the paper will contribute to my further learning regarding its conceptual detail and organization. There are places where expression could have been polished for greater clarity and the whole could have been revised for succinctness; had more time been available to me, I would have sought to do these things.

Now, it is appropriate to make some preliminary comments about the parts of the paper and their relation to one another. In Part I, I have tried to present what is involved in a conscious and rational conceptualization of the field. This is done because many professionals tend to be oriented toward empirical research whereas the intellectual task required of us is not one which can be dealt with empirically. The remainder of the paper provides a chain of reasoning in the organization of concepts culminating with a statement of what home economics education can justifiably be conceptualized to be.

Part II provides an initial categorization of home economics and of Education as personal service professions. The analysis here reflects a number of principles which have bearing on more detailed conceptualization of each of these fields and, therefore, of home economics education. Without it, we are likely to run into flaws in conceptualization resulting from the failure to distinguish between disciplines and professions and between personal service professions and impersonal service professions.

Part III is focused upon home economics as a profession and as a field of study. It builds upon but extends an earlier publication, Home Economics: A Definition. Since home economics education is part of the larger profession of home economics, this section is logically part of our rationale. In Part III, in addition to documenting the categorization of home economics as a personal service profession from historical literature in the field, presuppositions and background theoretical perspective are presented. Following these assumptions and systems of concepts, consideration is given to the problems or questions with which home economics deals, the mission and the subject matter of home economics. Emphasis is given to the problems with which home economics deals for time did not permit full treatment of the subject matter. Further, clarity about the problems or questions is needed before there can be clarity about subject matter.

In reading Part III, especially the section on presuppositions about the family and, later, the section on the family in historical-social-cultural context, a certain caution is advisable about the intent of each. Presuppositions about the family are stated in the context of what the family can be (which can be verified from historical study of the family and empirical studies of particular families). These presuppositions are not based on historical evidence of what the family in modern society and in our culture now is; it is the section on the family in historical-social-cultural context which presents the situation regarding the family as it now is. Without recognizing these differences in intent (which I may not have made clear in the text itself), the reader might consider the two to be unintended contradictions.

In Part IV, a brief statement of the conceptualization of education is presented. This could have been in a separate part or chapter but, since readers do have access to more detailed analyses, it is included as a section in Part IV. Aspects of the concept of education form part of the rationale for home economics education and are included to avoid gaps in our reasoning. The greater proportion of Part IV is devoted to concluding where the line of reasoning has taken us, i.e., to a conceptualization of home economics education which deliberations in earlier sections of the monograph make justifiable intellectually and morally.

All that remains is for me to tell how this paper came to be and to acknowledge the support received. Originally, the writing was to have been done as a one-quarter time assignment for my last nine months at the University of Minnesota. Due to various other professional commitments during that time and to the fact that the kind of thinking the paper requires is not something that can be done in ten to fifteen scattered hours per week even when I had them, I was unable to complete the paper in the time expected of me. It would have been possible to grind out pages but not to take a fresh, reflective look at the field in which I have worked for almost fifty years. I am not a professional philosopher but those who are tell me that, even for them, the activity of philosophizing requires time and conditions for clarifying, sorting out, organizing, and critically reflecting about the ideas involved and the positions taken. The paper has been completed after retirement. I am especially appreciative of the encouragement given by Professor George H. Copa, as Director of the Minnesota Research and Development Center, and the help provided through his office in securing copyright permissions and seeing that the manuscript was made ready as camera-copy for printing. He should not be held responsible for the content of what is here, however.

Marjorie M. Brown
Yachats, Oregon
September, 1980

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Preface iii

Part I. INTRODUCTION: AN APPROACH TO CONCEPTUALIZATION OF HOME ECONOMICS EDUCATION 1

- Nature of the Question Pursued 2
- Nature of the Product of Inquiry 3
- Mode of Inquiry 10
- Significance of Conceptual Clarification and Rational Justification of Home Economics Education 14

Part II. HOME ECONOMICS AND EDUCATION: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 17

- Distinguishing between Disciplines and Professions 18
- Distinguishing between Personal Service and Impersonal Service Professions 20
- Summary 28

Part III. HOME ECONOMICS AS A PROFESSION AND A FIELD OF STUDY 31

- Home Economics Historically Conceptualized as a Profession 32
  - Reference to "profession", service, or action 32
  - Nature of problems with which home economics is concerned 33
  - The source or nature of knowledge for the profession 34
- Home Economics Historically Conceptualized as a Personal Service Profession 37
  - Tasks which home economists set for themselves 37
  - Interests served 40
- Orientation of Home Economics as a Personal Service Profession 41
  - Presuppositions and brief theoretical considerations on which a conceptualization of home economics is based 43
    1. Regarding human beings 44
    2. Regarding society 46
    3. Regarding the family 49
    4. Regarding knowledge and the relation between knowledge and practice 52
  - Problems or questions with which home economics deals . . . 56
    1. Formulation of problems 56
    2. Categories of action in the family 61

Page

3. The family in historical-social-cultural context 66
4. Implications for the problems of families 77

The mission of home economics 82

The subject matter of home economics 83

Part IV. HOME ECONOMICS EDUCATION: A CONCEPTUALIZATION 89

The Concept of Education 90
What Home Economics Education Seeks To Do 100

Home economics education as part of home economics . . . 101
Home economics education as part of education 104

Questions Significant to Home Economics Education 108

Questions concerning problems of the family 109
Questions concerning the educational program 109

Knowledge Appropriate to Home Economics Education 116
Kinds of Inquiry Appropriate 119
Home Economics Education and Social Studies 121
Home Economics Education and Vocational Education 125
Concluding Comments 130

Notes 133

10

Part I.

INTRODUCTION: An Approach to Conceptualization of Home Economics Education

As the title of this paper suggests, its purpose is to seek clarification and justification of the nature of home economics education. Clarification demands conceptual detail and orderliness. However, since some ways of dealing with conceptual detail and ordering are more intellectually defensible than others, there must also be rational justification for the particular conceptualization arrived at. Further, since our conceptualization of home economics education affects what we do in practice and our practice affects the lives of other people as well as our own, there must also be moral justification of the position taken and a clarity of moral direction in that position. Before undertaking an attempt at the tasks inherent in the purpose of the paper, it is important to understand what these tasks entail.

Lasch was speaking of social criticism but his words also describe a problem in other forms of scholarship as well. Effort at scholarship "suffers from a disregard of established traditions of inquiry. It takes the form of isolated perceptions that shine for a time and then fade in the glare of the latest revisionism."[1] Such an approach is trendy in that it seeks merely to satisfy the desire for novelty. Ideas are presented and interpreted as nothing more than the personal views of the writer or speaker (or the view of a group of persons) as if there were no established intellectual criteria for guiding and judging any presentation of ideas. Sometimes what is sought in reading a presentation of ideas about a complex question is a set of simple ready-made answers for which the reader or listener does not have to engage in disciplined mental exercise. The expectation is often one of sorting out what is said in terms of pre-existing positions or views, missing nuances of meaning and, thereby, misrepresenting what is in reality said. Scholarship in the clarification and justification of home economics education can be none of these things. It must make use of established traditions of inquiry rather than be mere expressions of personal opinions of the writer (speaker) or reader (listener). These traditions are not limited to those used in scientific inquiry; they exist also for reasoned analysis, synthesis, and judgment. It is necessary to use the standards of inquiry appropriate to the particular intellectual task (and there are intellectual tasks besides empirical ones). There can be no simple ready-made answers to the question, "What is home economics education?" which will accomplish the tasks of clarification and justification. Nor can we accomplish these tasks by holding to pre-existing positions to which we hold with blind persistence.

Because the intellectual and attitudinal frames of reference used in seeking to clarify the nature of home economics education and to justify any conceptualization of the field are so significant, this first part of the paper is devoted to a brief statement of the approach deemed necessary. Documentation is provided for the reader who wishes to explore in greater detail. Attention is given to the following:

What kind of question are we pursuing when we ask, "What is home economics education?" and when our intent is to clarify and justify the nature of the field?

What should the result of our inquiry provide (given the above question and intent)?

What is the nature of the process used in seeking to answer the question?

Nature of the Question Pursued

If we raise the question asked in the title of the paper with the intent of seeking clarity and justification, we are not raising a factual question. If it were a factual question, we would collect data through one or more means of observation to determine what home economics education in fact is as it is professed or as it is practiced. If we are seeking clarity, to pursue the question as a factual one would not increase our comprehension; it might instead only confuse us, especially if there are existing contradictions in beliefs and in practice. Further, knowing in fact what is professed and practiced does not justify home economics education since both belief and practice would still remain to be evaluated by some appropriate set of criteria. In this presentation, statements about what home economics education is are not intended as factual statements about what is the case. Instead, the intent is one of conceptual definition of home economics education in which the reader is asked to distinguish between analytic thinking and factually based thinking. The presentation is one of what home economics education could be. Further, because some ways of conceptualizing a field of endeavor are more intellectually and morally defensible than others, there is a normative aspect in the reasoned conceptualization, i.e., the presentation is also one of what home economics education should be. An illustration can be made with stating a conceptualization of science. The following is an oversimplified statement of the meaning of science but it should suffice for the purpose of this example. When we say that science is a branch of study concerned with demonstrated truths or observed facts systematically classified and organized more or less under general or theoretical principles and which includes trustworthy methods for the discovery or verification of new truths in its own domain, we are not claiming that, in fact, all that is done in the name of science is consistent with this conceptualization. In fact, much that is done in the name of science is not science; it does not meet the criteria for what science should be. This is our reason for being critical of the nature and the methods of particular activities or knowledge claims purporting to be science. Sometimes people who claim to engage in scientific activity have an inadequate or distorted concept of science. Similarly, in home economics education, if the conceptualization of the field is inadequate or distorted, we could expect to find what is done in the name of home economics education to vary and analysis of the meanings underlying what is done to show contradiction.

The question being asked is a question of concept in that we are seeking a definition for clarity of meaning, i.e., for how the field of home economics education is to be conceptualized.[2] Further, as previously indicated, since some ways of conceptualizing are more defensible than others, there is also implicit the value question, "What should home economics education be?" That is, we are asking what conceptualization of home economics education will meet appropriate intellectual criteria and will provide us with a morally defensible approach to practice.

Nature of the Product of Inquiry

What will the product of our inquiry be like if we are seeking conceptual clarity and a sense of intellectual and moral defensibility of our field in theory and in practice? We are not seeking a pre-determined answer to our question, "What is home economics education?" However, we are engaging in inquiry which must provide us with more than empty words. It must help to increase our understanding of the possibilities of home economics education and to enhance the quality of communication within our field. In accomplishing both these ends, the product of our inquiry must also seek to improve the rational foundations of what we believe and do.

To point up the desirable nature of the product of inquiry, it is helpful to examine what it can not and must not be, given the question and the intent of the inquiry.

1. It can not be a dictionary-type definition.

2. The inquiry and its product can not ignore the history of the field.

3. It must not be an arbitrary and unreflective statement of belief about what home economics education could be and should be, i.e., it must not ignore or treat lightly established intellectual traditions for inquiry.

4. It must not lose sight of the basic presuppositions and the underlying values which form a defensible intellectual and moral foundation for the field, i.e., it can not be attuned merely to the immediate and expedient issues which home economics education faces.

Let us consider each of the above points in some detail in an effort to clarify the nature of our inquiry.

1. The product of our inquiry must not be a mere definition of a term: "home economics education." Questions of concept are not questions about use of words; instead, questions of concept ask us to become self-conscious about our own conceptualization so that we can see how to use the definition in practice. For example, the dictionary definition of science given above is inadequate for those who would practice science; that is, one can not take that definition alone and become an instant scientist. We must see clearly and coherently what it is that we seek to do in home economics education, what questions are significant to the field, what is appropriate as knowledge.

Sometimes people consider the question of "What is home economics education?" to be a simple one and, on this basis, demand a simple answer. There are purposes which may be served by a simple answer, but if our purpose is clarity and adequacy of conceptualization, the short question is far from being a simple one. We are dealing with ideas mentally constructed through the examination and organization of numerous and diverse other ideas. We can not reach consensus about the meaning of our field without exploring with depth and interconnectedness the "ideas in our heads." And the ideas in our heads themselves need clarifying and examining. There are a great many important issues embedded in any foundational assumptions upon which our field is based. These must be consciously identified, clarified, knowledgeably and critically examined and a position taken, this position to be followed by action. Conceptual analysis is a detailed exploration of ideas in the unfolding of layers of meaning. Wilson has said, "...we get the impression of a tangled ball of string which has to be carefully unwound, of a great pile of objects which have to be sorted, or of a large country which has to be mapped."[3] It is impossible, therefore, to disassociate the result of the inquiry from the process of inquiry for the former would be meaningless without the experience of going through the thinking process and the substantive ideas which form the product of our thought. We are accustomed to reports of the product of scientific inquiry which carry us through the substantive theoretical base and the process of thought by which the results were obtained; only the most naive of readers or listeners would accept the results of research without comprehension of their meaning as reflected in the substance and process from which they were drawn. We are engaged in philosophic rather than scientific inquiry here but the point is equally as important. Not only is our question a complex one; in seeking an answer, the product becomes detailed and complex as well as somewhat lengthy.

2. The inquiry and, therefore, its product can not ignore our history, especially the history of home economics. People in an academic field or a profession can not collectively abandon the basic tasks (or the conceptual focus of those tasks) historically linked with the field of study without creating moral and intellectual chaos within the field. Sociologists as a group can not decide to practice physics in the name of sociology instead of studying human society. To do so would be to be incompetent in the practice of physics and confusing about what sociology is. Architecture does not shift from the service and study of designing buildings to medical service and study to prevent and treat human disease and illness (in the name of architecture). Long and serious study is necessary for competence in any profession or academic field. Expedient or whimsical shifts in the focus of the tasks and of what is to be studied for performing these tasks leads to conceptual and moral confusion and to incompetence. In professional fields serving society, such confusion and incompetence lead to loss of confidence on the part of the public.

To take a historical perspective is to be concerned with continuity, with a beginning as well as with a sequel. So viewed, examining home economics education is continuous; such continuity is necessary if the process is an intellectually open one. There is sometimes an attitude that once something is defined, the matter of what it is is conceptually closed. To hold that the whole matter is closed with a definition given at a particular point in history is apparently to assume that we can not over time have experience which leads to new insights and new knowledge which, in turn, improve our perspective and enhance seeing how our definition is to be used in practice. History of any of the academic fields shows changes in conceptualization of the field by those who work in it, changes in intellectual perspective, and changes in norms and personal orientations. This is not to say that every change in perspective on the nature of the field represents progress in the intellectual history of that field. Kuhn has shown how revolutions in conceptual perspective in the natural sciences are socially and politically determined within a particular science.[4] Social and political determinations are not always rationally or morally defensible. For example, Sarason has pointed out how many professionals, in securing grants of funds for the "war on poverty", acted professionally to maintain the status quo instead of seeking to relieve the basic conditions underlying poverty.[5] In his analysis of the engineering profession, Perrucci (1971) pointed out how the professional societies in engineering, influenced by industry, have moved to control engineering education to maintain engineering specializations tied to the needs of industry. Perrucci shows how such action within the profession undercuts having a "profession that not only has the technical skills to deal with societal problems, but also has both a strong commitment to serve human welfare and the independent power to determine the way in which its talents are used."[6] On the other hand, in Political Theory and Praxis: New Perspectives, there is evidence of efforts in political science of attempts "to bring some order out of an apparent moral, political, and conceptual chaos."[7]

To ignore history, to treat each decade as discontinuous with those that have gone before and with those to come, is to be blind to how intellectual and social change occurs. We can give lip service to new ideas without recognizing how we distort them because of our earlier ideational orientation. Within a field of study, those with a historically established ideology battle with those who propose a new perspective; the battle lines are drawn socially and politically as well as intellectually. Home economics education is what it is today because of its intellectual-social-political history; what it becomes depends, historically, on what we make it.

3. The product of our inquiry can not be an arbitrary statement of belief about what home economics education can and should be. Thus, we can not merely stipulate a meaning (or legislate one); it is essential that the endeavor to become self-conscious about conceptual meaning be a rational one, i.e., one in which we bring reason to bear in an orderly but spontaneous way. Such an endeavor is, therefore, an open and reflective one as opposed to a

dogmatic or arbitrary one. For the effort to be open does not imply that one meaning is as good as another but that the meaning is never closed to reasoned examination. At the same time, when there are competing beliefs about meaning, these are judged by criteria of rationality (about which more will be said later) in an effort to determine which belief, if any, is rationally compelling. Such endeavor is necessarily an active one for the person seeking meaning; i.e., it is not a passive one of merely taking in information from other people but one in which the cognitive need for rationally compelling insight directs an alert examination of ideas. The endeavor is enhanced by the depth, clarity, and scope of our existing knowledge or ideas. For example, reflecting on home economics education is enhanced by our existing knowledge about classifications of fields of study, about conceptions of knowledge, about modes of inquiry, and about conceptions of the relation between theory and practice.

The concept of rational is applied to actions, attitudes, beliefs, dispositions, and mental states of people. For a belief to be rational, it must be grounded in reasons which meet certain criteria. For an action to be rational, what is done is done for reasons which meet the criteria of rationality. Thus, we can speak of action as being rational only in relation to the reasons for doing what is done or of a belief as being rational only in relation to other beliefs that are held; we can not correctly consider what is done or the content of what is believed as being rational out of the context of the reasons of the actor(s) or the believer(s). However, all reasoning is not rational, for even people who are in an irrational state may have and state reasons for a belief. A rational conclusion about what to do or what to believe is a cognitive claim the person makes that a particular belief is true or that a particular action is best and that the reasons advanced justify the legitimacy of that claim. A rational justification of the legitimacy of a particular claim (conclusion) must meet the general criteria of relevance, adequacy, and coherence.

The criterion of relevance requires that the reasons must be logically related to or pertinent to the conclusion. Since beliefs, attitudes, and judgments of what to do have substance, relevance requires that the subject matter of the conclusion be pertinent to the subject matter of the reasons. To draw a conclusion about the aim of home economics education from reasons which deal substantively with the eating habits of the cobra or which deal with the availability of Federal funds for certain activities does not meet the criterion of relevance. To be relevant, reasons in which a belief about the aim of home economics education is grounded must pertain to some set of conceptions about education, about home economics, about persons who would be educated, about knowledge, and about the good life (since presumably home economics education contributes to the good life). To meet the criterion of relevance, the process of reasoning used must involve intellectual procedures and norms appropriate to verifying or justifying deliberately the particular kind of belief. Beliefs about matters of fact are not verified or justified by the same procedures and norms as beliefs about the meaning of symbols (analytic beliefs) or beliefs about what is of value or worth.[8] A belief held as the result of certain events or conditions which are independent of any appropriate deliberate intellectual process is an irrational belief. For example, to hold that the subject matter of home economics has a particular focus as a result of psychological or social pressures the believer feels (e.g., to conform to popular beliefs, to evade thought, to protect the self from possible criticism or reprisal) is to hold an irrational belief about the subject matter of home economics. One common fallacy of irrelevance is decision in which we fail to make any decision at all; such a refusal to decide an issue may itself determine the outcome since others may well make up our minds for us. People outside home economics education may well determine what home economics education is if we refuse to engage in a rational process of deciding within the field what it is to be. Relevance requires that we not succumb to believing that which is psychologically pleasant to believe even when the truths we must face are unpleasant ones and the arguments we must examine are unpalatable.

The criterion of adequacy requires that the reasons appealed to as grounds for our beliefs not neglect one or more important factors or some part of the truth necessary to support the belief. Having sufficient factual evidence to draw a factual conclusion is concerned with adequacy of reasons as is making sure that the evidence or the reasoning is not one-sided. Irrationality in the use of one-sided evidence is reflected in empasizing the immediate results of an act at the expense of its long-range effects, in basing an act on expediency at the neglect of the moral issues involved, in pointing to advantages or accomplishments at the neglect of disadvantages or failures. Adequacy of reasons requires that we take all the issues into account rather than oversimplifying. While clarity and brevity are very desirable, we are irrational when we seek to achieve them through condensed thinking and statements at the expense of clear interpretation or warranted inferences.

Coherence as a criterion for rational justification of a cognitive claim is concerned with the consistency or harmony of ideas. Thus, the ideas with which the reasons of an argument deal must be consistent with one another and with the ideas in the conclusion. For example, we can not rationally hold the belief that home economics education has something unique to contribute to education unless we ground this belief in reasons which are consistent in that they show this uniqueness. However, consistency goes beyond a single argument to apply to arguments about other matters regarding home economics education. To illustrate, we can conclude by an appropriate rational process that home economics education has a certain purpose or aim but hold beliefs about the educational process to be used or about the content of learning which are inconsistent with the aim we espouse. Consistency demands that we not resolve intellectual issues about the field separately or in isolation lest we be irrational in holding contradictory claims or beliefs. To be coherent, there must also be consistency between what we believe and what we practice, between what we say and what we do.

4. If conceptual clarification and intellectual and moral justification of home economics education are of concern, our inquiry can not be one which merely examines separate current or expedient issues. It would be possible to limit our considerations of issues to those which have expedient or immediate consequences (e.g., in the procurement of supporting funds or to guide in an impending national study of the effectiveness of programs of home economics education). Such consequences are relevant but attention for the purpose of this inquiry is devoted to root considerations which have bearing across time and specific concerns. These root considerations involve those related to the intellectual foundations of the field as well as those related to practice. Of necessity, the rational grounds of a field must be concerned with certain fundamental issues which may not be identical with the immediate or current political issues which members of the profession identify. Fields of study, including professional fields, have inherent in them certain basic questions which must be answered rationally by the persons who consider themselves scholars in the respective fields. These are foundational issues which underlie consideration of more specific issues such as whether home economics education is vocational education. To approach the task of clarifying and justifying a conceptualization of home economics education by considering root

issues rather than approaching it in terms of addressing pressing current issues about the field out of context of the historical and philosophical foundations of those issues is necessary at this point in our history if we appeal to criteria of rationality. For example, first, it would be possible to deal with individual immediate issues and yet have their separate resolutions be inconsistent or even to have them mutually contradictory. Second, any current issue must be resolved by appealing to some rationale or set of principles if the resolution is to be a rational one. The question then arises as to what rationale is legitimate and, given different issues, what overarching rationality, if any, makes the separate rationales coherent? There is nothing wrong with addressing specific issues and, obviously, this needs to be done. At this point in time, however, we in home economics education need to do some conceptual sorting out and organization in order both to recognize clearly what the issues are (as distinguished from what they appear to be) and to find intelligent solutions to them. Third, to deal with current issues separately and out of context of any historical conceptualization of home economics and home economics education ignores the consequences such an ahistorical approach would have.

Mode of Inquiry

Sometimes people are impatient with considering and understanding the process and method by which conceptualization of the field is to be examined. However, the process of thought and the method for conceptualizating a field must be as intellectually defensible as the procedure for conducting a scientific experiment. Our interpretation of the findings of a scientific experiment and our acceptance of those findings as scientifically defensible rest upon the underlying thought process and method used. Similarly, our interpretation and justification of a conceptualization of home economics education depends upon the process of thought consciously used and the procedure followed although the process and procedure differ from that of an experiment. It is necessary, therefore, that this process be described and that the procedure followed be made public, understood, and used by those seeking to clarify and justify a meaning of home economic education.

As has already been pointed out, the question on which inquiry is focused in the present study is not a factual question but one of the conceptual meaning of home economics education which would clarify and justify what to do in practice. Such a question is appropriately investigated by the philosophic method of dialectic. Among the disciplines and intellectual traditions, it is philosophy which seeks to clarify concepts, to criticize and justify beliefs and practices, and to organize concepts into coherent overarching frameworks for attacking problems. These are the business of philosophy just as it is the business of physics to provide causal explanation for the behavior of atoms. Philosophizing is something which all of us can do, although, admittedly, it helps to learn to do it well. Philosophy has no subject matter of its own, i.e., no particular set of phenomena to study and no particular conceptual areas to claim. This does not mean, however, that it is a parasitic field. Rather, it is a necessary ally in any field of study to serve as a constant reminder of our tasks, of what it means to know, of what human beings are as individuals and as societies, of what is good and just.

"Dialectic" comes from a Greek word meaning to converse. As a mode of inquiry, it is concerned with the open and critical examination of the interconnectedness of ideas. It makes free use of analogy and proceeds by reasoning from familiar and generally accepted ideas. The logic involved is not a formal logic, i.e., logic empty of subject matter, but is the logic involved in seeking understanding through dialogue. To use dialectic as the mode of inquiring into the conceptual meaning of home economics education, we are using a mentally active procedure rather than an inert one of merely taking in information. Dialectic does not have a series of steps or a prescribed procedure to follow. It does not follow a formula nor does it seek to capture truth in a formula. In his introduction to Freire's Education for Critical Consciousness (an example of dialectic thinking), Goulet comments that to engage in dialectic thinking "is to decree the obsolescence of cherished concepts" and "to 'move beyond' the past without repudiating it" at one's new levels of critical consciousness.[9]

Socially, dialectic is a process in which we collaborate through dialogue among ourselves, each seeking to understand the other's ideas but permitting and encouraging reasoned dissent. It is socially open to all of us as active participants in the process of reasoning. Politically, therefore, it is an equalitarian process which does not depend upon the information-giving of an expert. Each of us has something to learn and each of us has something to teach. However, authority lies in the rationally compelling nature of our beliefs in light of their underlying reasons. We are, therefore, self-critical recognizing that merely having beliefs does not justify them. True consensus becomes the basis upon which our reasoned beliefs about home economics education becomes acceptable. But consensus is more than mere agreement with a set of words; it requires common understanding of what is meant as well as agreement that what is meant is intellectually and normatively acceptable.

Dialectical reasoning has several aspects. One of these involves examining different ideas for the purpose of discovering an underlying common meaning. For example, different learned fields of study may be examined for qualities they have in common. This phase of dialectic aids in the discovery of conceptual categories, e.g., the qualities home economics education is to have if it is to be categorized as a learned field of study.

While general or common meaning furthers understanding, it is not sufficient, for we need also to make careful distinctions between ideas. Therefore, dialectical reasoning also involves examining what appear to be identical cases for the purpose of discovering important differences which enable us to make discriminations. For example, social studies and home economics education may be examined to distinguish between them when they are often considered to have the same interest in study of the family. Or, as another example, learned fields of study in which practitioners seek to provide service to society may be distinguished from those which, as "pure" disciplines, seek knowledge for its own sake.

There are points at which the network of ideas must be examined since each part of the network can be reasonably acceptable only in the larger context of the remainder. In this aspect of dialectical reasoning, the effort is to construct a logically coherent system of ideas. There may be renunciation of inconsistencies or, on the other hand, a logical reconciliation which reformulates and reinterprets apparent contradictions. Renunciation would occur in rejecting a concept of educational process inconsistent with the conception of human potentialities presupposed. Reconciliation would occur, for example, if two conflicting views of knowledge were reformulated into a more comprehensive theory of knowledge in which both views could reasonably be shown to be necessary for different purposes. This consistency in the larger context of the network of ideas is concerned with intellectual consistency. However, dialectic is also concerned with consistency between philosophic beliefs and real life. Thus, it may focus on consistency between beliefs and actions, between theory and practice, between word and deed. Such concern for vital consistency is also broader in that it may reveal the inadequacy or limitations of our theory or system of beliefs for action or practice. For example, holding a behavioristic conception of the human organism as a mechanism universally responding to reward and punishment does not hold up as true in real life where many persons obviously have motives far stronger than desire for approval or concern for other extrinsic reward and stronger than fear of punishment.

The aspects of dialectic method described above are not used in a particular sequence. Examining different cases for a common meaning is complementary to examining apparently identical cases for distinctions; each, as indicated earlier, serves a different purpose in clarifying meaning. To look for consistency in the larger conceptual context or between the conceptual system and life goes on as common meanings and distinctions are sought but it may also be a separate aspect of dialectical thinking guiding the selection and organization of concepts examined.

The rationale for home economics education presented here seeks to use the method of dialectic. While the paper is written by one person rather than being the record of a conversation among several people, its development is dialectic in several respects. For one thing, it is the result of the author's exchange of ideas with colleagues (both within and outside of the field) over a long professional lifetime. Second, in the writing of such a paper, any serious writer "converses with himself", even engaging in reasoned dissent with a position taken. Self-criticism occurs, for example, in recognizing that a particular line of reasoning fails to make a belief rationally compelling or that two positions, previously viewed as contradictory, are not inconsistent when viewed in a more comprehensive framework. Third, the procedures of dialectic reasoning (e.g., examining different ideas to discover underlying common meanings) are used and presented in the paper so that the reader can engage in the same dialectical procedures in examining what is written. Finally, the proposed conceptual framework presented here is offered, not that it be "the last word", but to provide a basis for further dialectic discussion within the profession. The proposal here, too, must be viewed in historical context. What is presented is not merely a personal judgment about what home economics education could and should be; effort is made to observe established traditions of inquiry and where there is failure to do so due to lack of competence or of time, it is hoped that the future will see correction of these flaws through further dialectic and use of appropriate intellectual standards.

Significance of Conceptual Clarification and Rational Justification of Home Economics Education

Without a conceptual scheme which provides a rationality for home economics education, intellectual problems and tensions occur within the field and about the field. It is no secret that home economics eduators currently hold conflicting and unclear conceptions of the aim of home economics education, of the questions with which it should be concerned, of knowledge relevant to the field, of appropriate procedures and norms of inquiry. These conflicting and unclear conceptions are apparent not only to persons within the field but also to persons in other areas of education. Alert students of home economics education are often aware of mutually contradictory beliefs presented (orally or in the literature of the field) as if the beliefs were part of a coherent system of ideas. For example, some people hold that home economics education is presumably to help people act in more enlightened ways about certain aspects of home life, making better value judgments about what to do in solving important human problems in the home. Yet, these same people may claim that the making of value judgments and discussion of what problems are important are matters which are themselves outside the realm of rational consideration. Sometimes, beliefs about delivery of educational programs are contrary to the stated aim. For example, the aim cited above is stated as if accepted but curriculum becomes limited to the teaching and learning of technical skills good for given ends and devoid of attention to value judgments about the ends involved. As another example, home economics teachers are expected to understand the everyday lives of families and the personal qualities of students; yet, the mode of inquiry used to build knowledge in areas of human understanding superimposes the researcher's own conceptual frame of reference as a strait jacket shutting out nuances of meaning different from those of the researcher.

Such intellectual contradictions produce tensions which can not be resolved without an adequate rationality for the field. It is no superficial agreement for the sake of appearance with which we are concerned here; rational agreement requires probing beneath the surface intellectually and is tolerant of reasoned dissent in the process of seeking agreement. Shallow protests regarding loyalty to the field are professionally detrimental for they irrationally ignore the conceptual mushiness creating the intellectual problems and tensions.

Practice in the field in the development and implementation of curriculum, evaluation of programs, conduct of research, and education of teachers is also affected by the lack of a rationality for the field. Teachers of home economics are concerned about what constitutes curriculum in home economics and they are challenged in their own school systems to distinguish between home economics and other subject matter areas. In the evaluation of programs, what criteria serve to distinguish good home economics programs from the mediocre or poor ones? What kind of research is needed, e.g., does the practice of continuously using surveys of opinions or of existing conditions provide an adequate base of knowledge for direction and service in home economics education? Is scientific knowledge the only kind of knowledge adequate for professional practice in home economics education?

Lack of an adequate rationality for home economics education also affects how we feel about ourselves and how we relate to those we presume to serve and to the remainder of the educational community. Many within the field are concerned about performing their professional tasks with defensible understanding and judgment. These concerns range from feelings of inadequacy to irritation and futility. Whether it be the substitution of frenetic activity and immediate results for intellectual quality and long-range effects, defensiveness about self-criticism, depending on direction from others, engaging in bandwagon practices, or whether it be an atmosphere which rewards anti-intellectualism, these are evidences which concern those who see the need to develop an adequate and coherent conceptual system for clarifying home economics education. Consciousness of such problems is reflected in the comment currently popular, "We tend to react rather than to act," implying that we should become more aggressive. However, action is not necessarily intelligent nor does it necessarily solve problems within home economics education. Many recognize that the aggressiveness needed is an attack on the intellectual and moral foundations of our beliefs and our practice and not mere social assertiveness.

Part II.
HOME ECONOMICS AND EDUCATION:
A Preliminary Analysis

From its beginning as an organized field of study over a century ago, home economics has been considered a profession. Nosow has pointed out that it has been so considered by those in the field who sought to provide a socially needed service and by those who have been recipients of that service.[1] Education, too, has been and is recognized as a profession.[2] To classify a field of endeavor as a profession indicates that, among fields of endeavor, it has certain characteristics which place it in a particular category. Much has been reported in sociological study of the professions which indicates characteristics by which society distinguishes professional from non-professional endeavor.[3] Professions, as conventionally defined, are certain occupations which have attained a morally worthy kind of organization. Moral worthiness comes from having a depth of theoretic knowledge and from using this knowledge to provide a service beneficial in the functioning of society. Further, this knowledge is not to be applied routinely but used wisely and ethically in professional judgment and action in each case the professional meets in practice. Recruitment and admission are controlled in order to have practitioners who are able and of suitable temperament. The esoteric nature of knowledge and the importance of professional judgment free the profession from external control as long as practice in the profession is judged to be morally worthy.

It is characteristic of professions that admission to them requires an extended period of study in order for practitioners to master and to use knowledge which is theoretic in nature and relevant to the area of practice. Placement of education for the professions in schools or colleges of the university which is also the seat of discipline-oriented study has, hopefully, been mutually beneficial. However, it has also led to certain distortions and misconceptions which can be illustrated in home economics as well as in Education. (To distinguish the professional field of Education from other uses of the term "education", the former is here written with the capital E.) Not least among these distorting influences has been the status accorded socially within the university to the "basic disciplines". Unreflectively, some university faculty both within the professions and with the "pure" disciplines, consider the good professional specialization as one which very closely resembles a "root discipline". Not only do such a belief and the reward system accompanying it distort the relation between theory and practice; they also result in a misconception of the nature of knowledge that is needed for practice in the professions, especially in the personal service professions. It seems appropriate to do some conceptual sorting out for understanding of both home economics and Education as professions and as fields of study in the university. The analysis which follows in comparing home economics and Education with other fields of study will not yield understanding of the uniqueness of either home economics or Education among the professional fields. What it should do, however, is help us to see more clearly what distinguishes the professions from other fields of study and, within the professions, to distinguish between what Halmos has called "personal service professions" and "impersonal service professions".[4] It is appropriate to remind ourselves that the analysis is not one of factual data about universal or predominant characteristics observed but one in which we are concerned with requisite qualities.

Distinguishing Between Disciplines and Professions

If we compare such fields of study as physics, biology, psychology, and sociology with mechanical engineering, space technology, medicine, social work, Education, and home economics, there are a number of differences which distinguish between the two groups.[5]

1. The first group is oriented toward a discipline or a limited "pure" area of disciplined intellectual endeavor. The second group is oriented toward action, i.e., toward doing something of service to society or to some segment of society. Such fields as those in the second group are often called "professions" in that they seek to perform some mission of service. In order to perform this service, however, some body of knowledge is drawn upon for use in the affairs of those who are served so that disciplined intellectual endeavor is involved; disciplining of that intellectual endeavor does not, however, follow the same interest or pattern as in the "pure" disciplines (as will be shown later).

2. There are also differences in the kinds of questions or problems with which each group is concerned. For the group with a professional orientation, the questions arise from sources external to the profession in that such questions are problems which members of society have or which some segment

of society has and with which help is needed for solution. Such problems are important in that their solution relieves certain pressures or satisfies certain needs or certain values. These problems are not generated in a single "pure" discipline and their solution is not found in a single discipline. For example, problems of health and disease with which medicine is concerned are not problems merely of anatomy and physiology; their solution lies also in biochemistry, philosophy, the social sciences, and often even branches of engineering. Problems of action on human nutrition or human malnutrition are not merely problems of biochemistry; they are problems which cut across other disciplines including economics, psychology, cultural and social anthropology, political science, and philosophy. The formulation and the solution of such problems in mission-oriented fields or professions, therefore, are interdisciplinary concerns.[6] The solution of such problems is important to society and their impact broad. On the other hand, in such fields as physics, biochemistry, or sociology, questions or problems are generated within the particular discipline. As questions, they are of interest and importance because their solution adds to intellectual understanding in the particular field of study rather than because of their practical significance. (It may seem strange, therefore, that many of the "pure" disciplines had their origin in concerns or problems of society. For example, bacteriology came into being as a result of Pasteur's efforts to help winemakers find a solution to the spoilage of wine and, later, to provide practical help to people concerned with the souring of milk and the spoilage of food.) Because problems from a disciplinary view are formulated as solvable within the particular discipline, their scope is narrow as is the impact of their solution.

3. Activity related to knowledge differs in the two groups of fields of study. Within the "pure" disciplines, knowledge generation is oriented toward research and the production of new knowledge. Interest in problems solvable within the discipline tends (and has tended) to lead to narrowly specialized interest and fragmentation of knowledge within the discipline.[7] There is increasing abstractness and remoteness of the work of the individual disciplinarian and less emphasis within the discipline on the organization of existing knowledge. On the other hand, in mission-oriented fields of study, emphasis is on the organization of existing knowledge to solve those problems of society to which the profession is committed. This existing knowledge is appropriated from whatever disciplines have something relevant to contribute to the solution of the set of problems; that is, each problem is viewed in its whole context rather than in fragments. There is less emphasis on the search for new

are safer and more economical to operate than the existing ones. However, such service is impersonal in that what is done is not professional action upon the person of the client.

Such a difference between the personal and the impersonal service professions involves a difference in the relationship between professional and client which must be understood in recognizing the difference in the nature of the tasks with which each is concerned.

In the case of the personal service professions, the relationship is one of reciprocity. Professional service is rendered to clients (whose person is to be changed) with the recognition that as human beings, clients are "active beings, capable of reflection on themselves and on the activity in which they are engaged", and capable of looking objectively at reality, of apprehending it, and of transforming it.[9] Therefore, the professional does not act in a messianic role of the change agent; instead, solution to the client's problems (i.e., changes in the client) are sought by communicative dialogue between professional and client in which each is expected to search and reflect critically. The attitude is one of mutual respect, trust, love, and unity in devotion to transforming reality related to the problem of concern.

In the case of impersonal service professions where the major task is not one of changing the person of the client, the relationship between professional and client is impersonal in attitude. The task of the professional involves bringing his/her expertise to the problem identified by the client to analyze the problem situation, to search for a solution, and to tell or persuade the client that the proposed solution is desirable (perhaps even to manipulate the interpersonal situation in the act of persuasion). The professional is in the role of expert or knowledgeable authority. While the client specifies the ends desired, the professional provides the technically correct solution, thinking about the client but not with him/her in seeking the solution.[10]

2. In providing professional service, those who practice space technology and mechanical engineering are approached by or employed by administrative groups usually in government or industry to find a means to accomplish ends which are determined by administration. For example, a mechanical engineer will be approached with a request to design a machine which will do x and y but not do z; x, y, and not z are specified or given ends. The mechanical engineer provides his professional service by using his knowledge to design the machine which will do what was specified by administration in goverment or industry. The interests served, therefore, are the interests perceived by persons in

knowledge but this interest exists where there are gaps in the knowledge needed for solution of problems of action with which the profession is concerned.

Distinguishing Between Personal Service and Impersonal Service Professions

I have been careful to avoid calling the professions "applied sciences" because the term is inappropriate for some. To make that point clear, we can compare different professional groups. If we compare space technology and mechanical engineering on the one hand with medicine, social work, Education, and home economics on the other, there is a difference (1) in the kind of tasks which professionals set for themselves, (2) in the interests served, and (3) in the kind and the organization of knowledge used in providing service.

1. The tasks which members of all professional fields set for themselves are action-oriented, as has been pointed out. However, these action-oriented tasks may be distinguished from each other when engineering, for example, is compared with medicine, Education, and home economics. Those in the latter group set for themselves tasks of bringing about changes in the person(s) served. Halmos has referred to those professions whose principal task is to bring about changes in the body or personality of the client as "personal service professions" and to those which do not set for themselves such tasks as "impersonal service professions."[8] The case with medicine is obvious. With Education and with home economics, the task is one of bringing about changes in personality, e.g., changes in the way the client thinks, changes in the system of concepts which he/she uses in interpreting and acting upon the self and the environment. While physical changes (e.g., in physical health, in overt action, in outward appearance) may occur also, these physical changes are brought about by the client as a result of his/her perceptual changes fostered (perhaps) by the professional in Education or in home economics. On the other hand, in engineering the principal tasks of concern are impersonal in that they focus on changing environmental conditions or in creating material products. While these changes brought about by engineering are likely to affect the lives of persons, it is not the principal task to bring about changes in persons themselves. Members of the impersonal service professions may direct their service toward benefiting members of society as when the automotive engineer is intrinsically motivated to design cars which

controlling managerial positions in industry or in government even when persons in such positions claim to act in the public interest. The process of promoting technological change through research and development is thereby institutionalized with control vested in administrative decision-makers. There are those who are concerned that the engineering profession is not committed to serving societal problems and who seek to change the profession in that direction, e.g., Perrucci cited in Part I.[11] This would, of course, shift the focus of interests served and make the engineering profession less technical in orientation. However, engineering would still not be a personal service profession since engineers do not set for themselves the task of bringing about changes in the body or personality of those served.

On the other hand, such professional groups as those in medicine, social work, Education, and home economics provide personal services where the ends to be served are presumably in the interest of those served and of the larger society. Such ends are examined and judged within the profession in collaboration with those persons served. Further, the ends must be judged for their moral defensibility on a case-by-case basis because the conditions in each case vary. For example, a physician and the client or client's family, knowing that human life may be prolonged indefinitely in many cases through medical technology, may judge differently a case where prolonging life is meaningless beyond the body's performing only certain vital physical functions and a case where prolonging life provides opportunity for the patient to recover fully or in part to lead a meaningful life. Such professions presumably meet that criterion commonly established for occupations to be classified as professions (as distinguished from semi-professions or non-professions): freedom from bureaucratic control. Such freedom enables professionals to participate in the determination of ends to be served through professional practice. In other words, such professionals determine with clients what to do in the interest of clients and society as well as how to do it so that the interests served are not merely technical. Determining what to do is, in reality, determining what should be done for there is no problem of what to do unless it is assumed that doing some things would be better than doing others. Thus, professionals in medicine, social work, Education, and home economics (as well as certain others) are faced with value judgments about what ought to be done. Such judgments (which are often called "practical") are moral judgments in that they concern not only one's own values but the values and lives of other people. In the process of making practical (moral) judgments to guide action as a professional, it is necessary to formulate, for the particular case, what goals or end states of action are desirable.[12] The professional can not legitimately maintain the myth of moral neutrality, for what is done professionally does intervene in the lives of those "served".

Since action of the professional affects the lives of other persons, it is morally obligatory to have those who are involved participate in determining what goals or end states are desirable. Thus, the medical patient and his/her family are consulted in determining, given the particular conditions, what the goals of professional action in the particular case will be. There may be instances when immaturity, distorted reason, or incapacity to judge morally on the part of others involved may require the professional to be more authoritative or to disagree out of his/her own ethical concern. However, the intent is to seek rational agreement on the goals desirable in the action to be taken. The point is that having the obligation to make moral judgments because of the nature of professional activity does not establish the professional as sole judge of what is best; to do so would be to take a stance of arrogance as a professional expert and create a technocratic social organization. Sarason documents the loss of trust in professions and growth of an anti-professional attitude in modern society which have resulted from the assumption by professionals that they have a corner on wisdom and only they can solve problems.[13]

In recent years professions such as medicine and Education have been criticized for becoming technical in orientation.[14] Many criticisms arise out of concern that such professions must not abdicate the responsibility of moral judgment either by turning that responsibility over to controlling (often hidden or unrecognized) interests by default or by entering into deliberate exploitation. They also arise out of a concern for the citizen's or the individual's rights to participate in determining goals and values of action which affect him/her, i.e., as criticism of the arrogance or domination in the professionals why deny those rights.

3. The kind of knowledge and the organization of knowledge needed for professional service differs between the personal service professions and the professions providing impersonal service. Professionals such as those in engineering, space technology, and horticulture work with physical or natural elements and objects. The designing of a machine, for example, requires knowledge of physical materials and of physical principles involved in design (weight, shape, velocity, gravity, etc.) together with mathematical theory

which makes possible quantitative calculations and specifications of the physical principles in design. The horticulturist, seeking to develop a plant strain which will be resistant to certain diseases, will make use of such knowledge as that from plant genetics, plant pathology, and cellular chemistry. The "pure" disciplines from which these two professions draw are various natural sciences. Knowledge of causal explanations allows prediction of certain events or conditions from known causes; it also allows control of given events and conditions by initiating (or eradicating) their cause(s). For example, stability in movement of a machine can be controlled by such causal factors as location of the center of gravity and the relative amounts of weight in various parts. Knowledge is, therefore, organized in a means-end relationship or in what may be called technical rules, e.g., to accomplish X, do Y, or to prevent A, do B. Such use of scientific knowledge is rightfully called "applied science" or "technology". Knowledge of causal explanation from relevant sciences is applied (or converted for application) to reach given ends. Such knowledge is technical (how-to knowledge) in that knowledge is used rationally for the purpose of producing a certain object or accomplishing a certain end.

Knowledge for personal service professions such as medicine, social work, Education, and home economics must be viewed in a different light. Obviously, there is need for knowledge of technique and for skill which enable the practitioner to intervene, i.e., to provide medical service, to educate, or to provide social service. However, the humans who are acted upon in such professional service are different than the metal (or other material) acted upon by the mechanical engineer. One difference lies in the professional's understanding of the nature of the subject matter: understanding the human capable of thought and self-initiated action as distinguished from understanding a metallic substance. A second difference lies in the moral significance of the human being acted upon professionally and of metal acted upon professionally. Each of these differences must be explored in order to address the nature of knowledge required in the personal service professions.

First, I will explore briefly what it means to understand humans individually or in social groups.[15] Personal service professionals are not only concerned with their own action; they are concerned also with the action of those they serve. A physician, in treating patients, is concerned with what the patients do in taking care of themselves, in carrying out recommended treatments, or in responding to diagnoses made. A social worker is concerned that the client change from action which is irrational, self-destructive, or socially harmful to a new mode of action. The educator seeks to bring about action (including speech acts) more clearly based on knowledge and understanding, on reason, and on commitment. To understand the action of those served, it is essential for the professional to recognize that the practices or overt acts of clients as actors can not be separated from the "ideas in their heads" and from the values or goals to which they subscribe. What people do and the beliefs, values, attitudes, and opinions they hold are mutually related; there are meanings the actor holds implicit in what he does and certain meanings or motives (e.g., friendliness) imply his doing certain things (e.g., shaking hands, expressing concern about the person with whom he seeks to be friendly). Further, these beliefs, values, attitudes, and opinions held are not _merely_ personal (although they _are_ personal); they are embedded in the cultural and social reality with which the person as actor is familiar. This cultural and social reality is shaped by intersubjective rules and distinctions in which one person as a subject seeks to understand the conscious meaning or intent of another subject. Such meanings are not mere psychological states but are historical in nature in that they are part of the history of a particular social group as well as the history of the individual member of that social group. Understanding such meanings is not accomplished by the study of physical properties of the person or by the study only of the physical act by the person apart from its subjective meanings.

To understand the meanings and motives attached to overt acts is a different type of understanding than understanding the _cause_ of certain overt acts. To understand the overt act (e.g., withdrawing from social encounter) in terms of causal explanation, we look for the cause in prior experience of the person (e.g., devastating rejection or ridicule by others). However, withdrawing from social encounter may be done for various reasons or motives including not only fear of rejection and ridicule but also a need to think things through for oneself, a desire for privacy, a wish to concentrate mentally on certain work done, and so on. However, each of these reasons or motives has its basis in cultural and social meanings. What constitutes social rejection or social ridicule differs in various cultures. Thinking things through in solitude is built-in in certain Eastern cultures so that there is social expectation to provide time for meditation. In some cultures, privacy is not valued and in some cultures, the ability to shut out distractions while working is developed. Any of these reasons which the actor has for seeking to be away from others constitutes teleological explanation, i.e., the actor's explanation of his own intent(s) or purpose(s), a self-interpretation of what he does in withdrawing from social encounter. To explain the cause of the overt act of withdrawing as earlier rejection and ridicule assumes that the meaning of withdrawal is avoidance of further rejection and ridicule. Such an assumption may well be a false one; to have true understanding of the act, it is necessary to understand the meaning the actor attaches to it (teleological), for without this understanding, the observer (the professional) may place a different and false meaning. For the professional to assume that he, as expert, has infallible knowledge of the meanings and intentions of the client is an arrogance based on non-social, non-cultural, and ahistorical conceptions of human beings.

Understanding the meanings and motives the client attaches to an act does not preclude understanding the cause(s) of the client's act or of his having those particular meanings or motives. Causal explanation enables the professional to predict what motives are likely to result from certain environmental conditions or events. Further, certain motives may be more desirable than others, e.g., a moral consciousness based on self-chosen ethical principals as distinguished from one based on egocentric deference to power or prestige. In such cases, causal explanation would enable the professional (a) to control environmental conditions by initiating those which foster development of the desirable motives in the client or (b) to advise the client who seeks to promote the desirable motives in himself or in someone for whom the client has responsibility for creating a social environment, e.g., a parent who has responsibility for creating a social environment for a child. The difference between understanding motives and meanings of the actor in a particular act (teleological explanation) and understanding causes of acts or of motives (causal explanation) is the distinction between understanding the person and understanding what caused the person to act as he does or to be as he is. The former enables the professional to understand the perceptions and self-perceptions of the client for, while there is a sense in which the identity of the person is like all other humans, as an individual he is different from all other individuals; the danger of professional stereotyping of clients is reduced by such understanding.

The mechanical engineer's understanding of a metal, such as steel, presents a different situation. Steel behaves by bending under certain amounts of physical stress but it does not act for it has no consciousness and no meanings and purposes of its own. To understand steel, the engineer understands its physical properties. To understand the behavior of steel in bending or not bending, it is necessary to look for causes in properties of the steel and in the conditions to which the steel is subjected. The designing of a machine to do x and y but not z requires such understanding on the part of the mechanical engineer. He will get no help in his understanding from the steel by seeking communication with it; however, teleological understanding of the meanings and motives of a person requires communication with him/her.

A second difference between professional action upon persons and professional action on physical things or natural objects was pointed out in the moral significance of each. This difference is obvious so requires little elaboration. Physical materials, such as steel and stone, are not sentient, i.e., they have neither sensory power nor feeling. Acting upon them produces no pain, no fear, no suffering, no joy, and no sense of satisfaction within the steel or stone. On the other hand, humans are sentient beings; action upon them produces both sensory and mental feelings. They experience both physical and mental anguish and both physical and mental senses of well-being. To act professionally in such a way as to cause pain or anguish needlessly or to threaten the sense of identity of a person (or the development of the identity) is generally held as morally wrong. To use and to manipulate metal for purposes of the mechanical engineer is acceptable; to use and to manipulate persons for the purpose of the personal service professional is morally reprehensible.

There are several implications of the preceding analysis for knowledge in the personal service professions. One is that knowledge of the positivistic sciences (natural or social) to which professionals of recent decades have been exposed is inadequate. Since the positivistic sciences are based on the presuppositions of mechanical functioning of what is studied and of value neutrality, such a mechanistic view is intellectually faulty when applied to human beings.[16] Since application of knowledge from the positivistic sciences presupposes prediction about and control of what is studied or treated, such a presupposition is intellectually faulty in the case of individual or social action (since humans are capable of directing or re-directing their own acts and since it confuses technical action and practical action); it is morally unsound in the manipulation of persons.[17] There must be knowledge from the interpretive sciences[18] and the humanities. Knowledge acquired in the personal service professions must enhance the fundamental characteristics of aspiring to be "personal, global, and synthesizing."[19]

Services rendered by the personal service professions are rendered to human beings each with individual personality or self historically formed in social-cultural context. Further, such services are rendered by an individual (or individuals) whose own personal and subjective orientation to social reality influences the professional service provided. This personal and subjective orientation of the professional comes from a global set of views he/she holds about human individuals, about human society, and about the relation between the two. In the service of persons to persons, this global set of concepts functions in the interaction of professional and client. The personal service professions seek to cultivate a global view of human relationships characterized by sympathy, confidence, and interdependence. It is recognized that unless the knowledge and technical skills of the professional are accompanied by the personal aspiration to help, by sympathy to those who need or seek help, by recognition of the significance of mutual aid in the search for solutions, professional service is impoverished if not a failure.

Not only is service of the personal service professional global in its foundation in overarching conceptions and attitudes, it is also synthesizing. It is psychologically synthesizing for the professional who unifies his/her knowledge, technical skills, personal values, and global views together with the social-cultural realities in which the professional service is embedded. This synthesizing takes place in the assessment of the particular problem situation involving the client(s) in social-cultural-historical context and in seeking of a solution to the problem.

Summary

The purpose of the foregoing analysis has been to clarify the nature of home economics and Education as professions or mission-oriented fields of study and, more specifically, as personal service professions. These points may now be summarized for both home economics and Education.

1. Both fields are oriented toward action (doing something) which is based upon disciplined intellectual endeavor; they are not oriented *only* to intellectual endeavor.

2. That action is concerned with solving problems which members of society have and which, therefore, are generated *outside* the profession (although their definition may be more clearly formulated *within* the profession). These problems are not generated or solved within a single discipline but require

interdisciplinary knowledge. They are not narrow problems but problems whose solution is broad in impact and important to society.

3. Being personal service professions, those who practice Education or home economics:

   a. Set tasks for themselves which bring about changes in the personality of clients.
   b. Carry out those tasks in ways which reflect reciprocity in relationship with clients, searching for solutions with clients, expecting critical reflection of both professional and client in an atmosphere of mutual respect, interdependence, trust, and love.
   c. Recognize the great moral significance and obligation in professional action.
   d. Make value judgments about the goals or ends to be accomplished in each professional act in the interest of the client and of society.

4. Emphasis is on organizing existing knowledge to solve the problems of concern. Such knowledge is selected from whatever disciplines have something to contribute to the solution of the set of problems. There is less emphasis on the search for new knowledge but this activity exists where there are gaps in existing knowledge which need to be filled in order to solve the problems of concern.

5. Knowledge required in home economics and Education should enhance the making of value judgments of ends to be served, of means to use in reaching those ends, and of values underlying existing goals and practices. Such knowledge includes not only depth of moral understanding but also knowledge which contributes to understanding the meanings and motives of persons as individuals in social-cultural-historical contexts; it also includes knowledge of causal explanation, relevant to the problems of concern, which provides a basis for technique or means to the ends justified as desirable.

6. As personal service professions, home economics and Education involve personal interaction between professional(s) and client(s). The quality of service provided has embedded in it not only acquired knowledge and skills but also the professional's presuppositions about human individuals, about society, and about the relation between the two. Therefore, objective knowledge and skills are not sufficient for the professional in personal service. The cultivation of global personal and subjective orientations which are

sympathetic, trusting, and interdependent toward other persons is essential as is the synthesizing of these global views with objective knowledge and skills.

Part III.
HOME ECONOMICS AS A PROFESSION AND A FIELD OF STUDY

In the preceding analysis in Part II, where the intent was to classify home economics and Education among fields of study, certain assumptions were made about home economics. These assumptions were (1) that home economics is a professional field rather than a discipline, and (2) that, among professions, home economics is a personal service profession. The first section of Part III is devoted to documentation of these two assumptions from the historical literature of home economics.

Following documentation of the two assumptions, the particular orientation of home economics as a personal service profession will be examined, again drawing upon and elaborating conceptualizations historically held. Unfortunately, the historical literature does not contain an elaboration of analysis of concepts and, historically from the Lake Placid Conferences to today, there have been contradictory meanings of home economics and a glossing over of concepts and the underlying rationality of the field. It is beyond the scope of this paper to deal with the contradictions. What will be attempted here is to select and organize certain conceptualizations which, when examined dialectically, are (hopefully) defensible by intellectual standards and procedures for a professional field of study. These conceptualizations are at different levels of generality. First, smallest in circumference, are conceptualizations peculiar to home economics: its aim, its questions, its subject matter. A more general level of conceptualizations is shared with other fields of intellectual endeavor concerned with the study of human individuals or groups. For reasoning persons, there is a logical relationship between the two levels whether one moves from the more general conceptualizations to those about the particular field or whether one recognizes that holding certain conceptualizations of the particular field involves making certain assumptions of a more general nature. Here the more general conceptualizations will be presented first since they are theoretical background upon which the ideas about home economics are based.

Home Economics Historically Conceptualized as a Profession

The concern here is *not to evaluate* home economics in terms of whether it has achieved professional status by some set of criteria or whether it is only a semi-profession.[1] The purpose is one of classification of the field historically in terms of the kinds of tasks home economists have set for themselves. That this is no mere academic exercise but one which gives direction to clear and adequate conceptualization of the field and, therefore, to practice has already been pointed out.

In his sociological study of home economics using thirty to forty years of the *Journal of Home Economics* as the primary source of data, Nosow found home economics to be a profession and to have achieved professional status (as cited in Part II). Examining earlier as well as later literature than did Nosow, Larson documented historically that home economists in the United States have consistently over time considered their field to be one of professional service.[2] Readers can go to these two studies as well as examine the documentation below, limited in amount since the main purpose of this paper is not one of historical study of home economics. What is done below is to cite from historical literature documentations of the professional orientation of home economics. Documentation is organized in the following categories according to emphasis: (1) use of the term "profession" or reference to service or action, (2) reference to the nature of problems or questions with which home economics is concerned, and (3) reference to the source or nature of knowledge which comprises home economics subject matter.

Reference to "Profession," Service, or Action

The term "profession" or "professional" appears throughout the historical literature of home economics in identifying the nature of the field. At the first Lake Placid Conference on Home Economics (1899), there was reference to home economics as "a new profession"[3] and, at the second Lake Placid Conference, to the "Professional School of Home and Social Economics."[4] In an editorial in the *Journal of Home Economics* in 1917, reference was made to "professional workers" in home economics.[5] In her presidential address in 1921, Mary E. Sweeney spoke of the "home economics profession."[6] Providing a clear-cut statement in 1935, Effie I. Raitt wrote, "We may use the term applied or professional to designate the group of subjects to which it (home economics) belongs, those whose basic philosophy for the integration of material uses the solving of human problems as criterion. Professional is preferred since it implies a broad cultural foundation in general education and a philosophy which is a comprehension of purpose and relationship."[7]

According to Edith C. Rowles in Home Economics in Canada, home economists in Canada have also considered themselves members of a professional group and the field as a profession.[8] While her study is one of the early history of six college programs in Canada offering degree programs in home economics, five were among the first to have such programs.

The objective of the American Home Economics Association, in various statements from 1909 to 1953, has been concerned with professional purpose: "to improve the conditions of living in the home" and "to cooperate in the attainment of the well-being of individuals and of families, the improvement of homes, and the preservation of values significant to home life."[9] "To improve" and "to cooperate in the attainment" have implicit in them an orientation to action and, therefore, professional purpose.

Home Economics: New Directions, A Statement of Philosophy and Objectives (1959) contains explicit reference to home economics as a profession and to home economists as professional personnel. It defines home economics further in terms of service and action: "Home economics is the field of knowledge and service primarily concerned with strengthening family life...."[10]

That home economics as a field is a profession is referred to not only explicitly by McGrath and Johnson (1968) but implicitly in the title of the report on their study of home economics, The Changing Mission of Home Economics.[11] Among fields of study, it is professions (as distinguished from pure disciplines) which have a mission of service or action around which the work of those in the particular field is organized.

More recently the professional orientation of home economics has been documented by Brown and Paolucci in "Home Economics: A Definition" and by respondents to this paper in the national and regional forums on "Home Economics Defined."[12]

Nature of Problems With Which Home Economics is Concerned

The invitation to the first Lake Placid Conference on Home Economics was sent out in 1899 to those already concerned with work in household economics. At that conference, "home economics" was chosen at the "title preferable for the whole general subject" viewed as pertaining to the "important sociologic problems of the home."[13] At the 1900 Lake Placid Conference, an address by Isabel F. Hyams described the work of one agency considered to be involved in household economics (The Louisa M. Alcott Club) as concerned with the "family...

and its problems." At this same conference, Henrietta Goodrich referred to the "professional school of home and social economics" as graduate work preparing professionals for work related to the "welfare of the home" as "part and parcel of the welfare of society."[14] Throughout subsequent Lake Placid Conferences, 1901-1908, reference is made to problems which the home and family experience as the focus of study in home economics.

Writing in 1911, Ellen H. Richards assigned to home economics the task of "endeavor to hold the home and the welfare of children from slipping away over the cliff."[15] Concerned with what she called the "ethical as well as economic meaning" of the home, emphasis was placed on the problems of social significance pertaining to the home: "Man has gained...control over nature, but then will he sit down before his own problems and say what are you going to do about it?"[16]

In citing Effie I. Raitt earlier, she was quoted as saying in 1935 that home economics, like other professions, integrates knowledge using "the solving of human problems as criterion."[17] These human problems, in the case of home economics, are related to "the end we seek--improvement of home and home life."[18] Professional awareness of "home problems" and alertness "to solving them" was the concern expressed by Katharine Alderman in 1948.[19] Jeanette A. Lee, in a paper entitled "The Search for Unity in Home Economics," pointed out that "...we contend that our unity stems from our concern with problems of the home and the family."[20]

Further documentation could be added but the above citations are typical of reference to the nature of problems or questions with which home economics is concerned. They reflect the mission-orientation of home economics as the resolution of problems of the home and family, i.e., problems or questions arising from sources outside the profession. They are problems to be defined and dealt with whole rather than in a single discipline. Their solution is accomplished through professional action which involves disciplined and informed thinking but which is not limited to disciplined intellectual endeavor.

The Source or Nature of Knowledge for the Profession

Home economists familiar with the history of their field are often prone to quote a definition (or part of it) formulated at the 1902 Lake Placid Conference. This particular definition deals with the subject matter or knowledge base of home economics.[21] It does not, by itself, clarify the full nature of home economics although other statements from the Lake Placid Conference Proceedings do throw further light on the perception of the field as a profession (and on conflicting perceptions). That 1902 definition says, in part:

> In forming a complete definition, ...it may be possible to consider home economics as a philosophical subject, i.e., a study of relation, while the subjects on which it depends, i.e., economics, sociology, chemistry, hygiene and others, are empirical in their nature and concerned with events and phenomena.[22]

There may seem to be confusion here in calling home economics "philosophical" and then indicating that it depends on the empirical sciences. Even if the framers of the 1902 definition were committed to the philosophical perspective of materialism (and there is evidence that they were), the statement is confusing. The position of materialism requires the unification of philosophy and science not in the sense of becoming one discipline but in the sense of unification in practice; philosophy is used to correct science and to keep scientific doctrines from becoming absolute or dogmatic. In being "the study of the laws, conditions, principles, and ideals which are concerned on the one hand with man's immediate physical environment and on the other hand with his nature as a social being" and of the relation between these two factors (as part of the 1902 definition indicates)[23], home economics would indeed involve philosophy as well as certain empirical sciences (some of which would not be listed since they had not become established in colleges and universities at the time.) However confusing or incomplete the above statement of definition may be, it does indicate the concern for drawing knowledge from several disciplines.

That knowledge for the profession of home economics is from a number of disciplines has been pointed out by other home economists over the years. Helen Atwater, in 1931, referred to the need for knowledge "from different underlying sciences and arts...applied in different ways by home economists in different lines of work."[24] The Committee on Philosophy and Objectives of Home Economics wrote in New Directions (1959): "Home economics synthesizes knowledge drawn from its own research, from the physical, biological, and social sciences and the arts and applies this knowledge to improving the lives of families and individuals."[25] Jeanette A. Lee, in 1963, wrote of "integration of knowledge across and among disciplines."[26] In Focus and Promise of Home Economics (1965), Selma F. Lippeatt and Helen I. Brown wrote the following about home economics: "Its uniqueness as a field of study lies in its integrative power, because it utilizes basic principles from many disciplines and applies them as a composite in solving the problems faced by individuals and families in day-to-day living."[27] Unlike some earlier writers, they recognized that there are aspects of human problems for which science is not applicable.[28]

It was Effie I. Raitt who, in 1935, stated very clearly the distinction between knowledge in the disciplines and in the professional fields, the latter being concerned with "subject matter integrated by the bearing, direct and indirect, ...upon the solution of human problems that occur within its specific field."[29] Further, she went on to say: "The philosophy for the integration of our subject matter is based upon function; therefore, we must state our objectives in terms of purposes rather than as units of subject matter to be mastered....We cannot claim for our field knowledge that does not function."[30]

In concluding this section, it can be pointed out that, as perceived by those in the field and by some outsiders who have made detailed studies of it, home economics has been historically conceptualized as a profession rather than as a discipline. It has been explicitly called a profession as well as explicitly distinguished from a discipline. It has been considered a field of service or action which distinguishes it from a discipline. Its questions or problems have been designated as problems of the society or, more specifically, problems concerning the home and family. Its subject matter has been recognized as derived from a variety of disciplines, the selection and organization of such subject matter determined by the problems which the profession seeks to solve.

To draw the above conclusion is not to say that there have not been (and are not now) conflicting views. These conflicting views need to be identified and evaluated but this task is beyond the scope of this paper.

Before leaving this section, two other points need to be made. One concerns the level of generality of the categories of profession and field of study. The second concerns the integration of knowledge or subject matter.

In referring to home economics as a profession, some people may object, saying that there are several professions in home economics, e.g., home economics education is one. The category of profession may, however, be used in a more general sense as when we refer to the medical profession although there are sub-professions within medicine. The same is true for the category of a field of study. Used at a high level of generality, there may be sub-categories or specializations in the broad field of study. The intent here has not been to refer to home economics as having only one category of professional practitioners or that integration of subject matter means having only one arena (such as a broad general field) of study. Problems concerning the home and family vary as do the solutions to those problems and the subject matter required by practitioners to seek solutions. Division of labor within the home economics profession, however, does not preclude the significance of a common general (but clear) purpose shared by the sub-professions. Neither does it absolve those in each specialization from integrating knowledge from various disciplines as needed for understanding and solution of the category of problems with which it deals. Such integration of knowledge is in conflict with the unrealistic idea that human problems have their definitions and solution in a root discipline. Problems of nutrition, for example, are not merely problems of biochemistry; they have their roots and their solution in social psychology, in economics, in politics, in psychology, in cultural anthropology, in philosophy, in history, and even in language communication.

Home Economics Historically Conceptualized as a Personal Service Profession

A second assumption made in the preliminary analysis (Part II) is that home economics, like Education, is a personal service profession as distinguished from an impersonal service profession or a technology. This point is a highly significant one and it must be clearly sorted out conceptually and in practice. Failure to distinguish between the two only results in blurring what home economics is in the minds of home economists as well as for the public. The distinctions between the two types of professions arrived at in Part II are used in this section as points to be documented historically.

Tasks Which Home Economists Set for Themselves

Personal service professionals set for themselves tasks involving changes in the body or personality of clients. They also have personal orientations or global views in perceiving those tasks which emphasize the "altruistic-cooperative-compliant-serving-helping-loving orientation in man" rather than a conception of human nature as egotistic, dominative, competitive, aggressive, exploitive, and manipulative.[31] In the history of home economics there have been members of the profession who have viewed the field as one of personal service.

The choice for home economists was put by Henrietta Goodrich in 1902. Speaking of achieving the purpose of home economics, she said:

> There are two lines of attack by which to accomplish this end. One is to create a home which shall be an organic and logical outgrowth of present industrial conditions and ethical standards... to "show that it can be done" and yet be eminently successful as a "home"! ...This is the objective way. It is undertaken by the interested few, its results if successful to be superimposed on the inert and as yet indifferent many.
>
> The alternative way of accomplishing the same end is to alter popular standards of living that men shall desire for themselves a higher standard. Let them distinguish for themselves those things that are vital to the home ideal from those that are merely superficial, traditional, accidental, and they will be willing to sacrifice the latter, if need be, and will demand as their desire and their right a fuller expression of the former.[32]

It is not clear in the literature as to which alternative Goodrich endorsed but she had quoted Emerson: "The key to every man is his thought....He can only be reformed by showing him a new idea which commands his own."[33] There is implicit in both the quotation from Emerson and in Goodrich's own words the intent in home economics to change people's ways of thinking and feeling (or personality) in order that those served would then direct their own action in matters regarding the home and family.

Something of the nature of tasks to be dealt with is also reflected in the name chosen for the field in 1899: home economics. The hope expressed in choosing this term was to keep the field from being "confused with the mere 'household arts' often taught under larger names."[34] It must be remembered that the term "economics" as used by early home economists had the classic meaning. From the Latin term "oeconomia", meaning household management, and from the Greek term "oikonamia", meaning the management or ordering of the household, the English term "economy" was derived. "Manage" has different meanings. One is to control or use judicious means to reach an end but another broader meaning is to conduct certain affairs (and there are modes of conducting affairs which are not the mode of controlling). While "household" in English refers to those who dwell as a family under one roof, early home economists added the word "home" to "economics" to emphasize the social unit or center formed by the family living together. The latter carries meaning concerning social ordering or organization of interdependent members with a distinguishable aim and norms of conduct. There is implicit in the social ordering of the family an emphasis on the mental processes to which social life is linked. Said Ellen H. Richards: "So long as the nurture of the human mind is best accomplished in the home, so long will the word Home stand first in our title."[35] These mental processes were not viewed as limited to the biological maintenance and reproduction of life but also included processes of determining what life is to be as "a good life." Said Thomas D. Wood in 1902, "The home should be considered the place where are to be developed and conveyed the precious qualities which are so vital to the continuity of the race and the progress of human society and civilization."[36] From Benjamin Andrews was this statement in 1907:

> The home and the family are not fundamentally a material thing.... I wish to point out simply the great extent of the mental in family life: it includes the habits, attitudes, and personal relations which give structure to family life and which provide control for the individual within the family; it includes, further, the feelings, appreciations, and personal values which constitute the satisfactions of family living.[37]

The tasks of home economics envisioned in choosing the name involved professional concern with the social-mental processes of family life.

That the tasks of home economists are concerned with personal service was later voiced by Margaret Justin (1929) in commenting on home economics curriculum: "There is a definite trend to ask regarding every part of the curriculum, 'How does this help the individual to become an integrated personality, able to stand the physical, mental, and social stress of our time?'"[38] In Home Economics: New Directions (1959), there are references to "helping families shape both the parts and the whole of the pattern of daily living" and to "developing perceptive, well-informed citizens with the ability and the will to further conditions favorable to effective living."[39]

The global view of helping those served by home economists was expressed by Alice Chown (1902) when she built upon certain quotations from Addington Symonds: "The essence of humanism consisted in a new and vital conception of the dignity of man as a rational being.... It was...partly an attempt to find the point of unity for all that has been thought and done by man, within a mind restored to consciousness by his own sovereign faculty."[40] Caroline Hunt, too, had voiced a similar global perspective on the tasks of home economics.

> An inward conception or pattern is the necessary forerunner of every attainment, and success in life is measured by the amount of correspondence between the deed and its mental concept.
>
> . . . .
>
> Progress comes when a man is sufficiently clear-headed to deduce from his own experience a correct conclusion in contradiction. . . . .
>
> The final test of the teaching of home economics is freedom.... If we have simplified one life and released in it energy for its own expression, just so far have we succeeded.[41]

Hunt also expressed a belief in humans as capable of "intelligent readjustment," of forming "values that can stand the test of reason," and of the individual as one who "can through cooperation with other individuals change social conditions and thus increase his own and other's freedom."[42]

Lita Bane, in 1928, spoke of "the conception of the home" to be held by home economists as recognizing "that the processes carried on in it are for quite other reasons than efficiency." She went on to say further:

> We will see the home as the place of abode of persons bound together by ties of affection, a place where affection of parents for one another, for their children, and among all members of the family is nurtured and enjoyed, where the immature are protected and guarded,...a place where altruism and other worthy traits are generated and cultivated....[43]

While the historical literature in home economics gives limited attention to details of the tasks of home economists, there are cases, such as those cited above, in which the personal service orientation is at least implicit.

Interests Served

In Caroline Hunt's biography of Ellen H. Richards, she reflects the concern felt by early home economists that the interests of families and of a free society were being threatened by industrial forces:

> The form of the home was being gradually but surely changed, not however, because of intelligent direction from within, but through pressure from without. The thoughtless were content to allow the changes to proceed, lead where they would, but the wise were anxious.[44]

Ellen H. Richards wrote of "endeavor to improve social and economic conditions" and "education of the social mind and conscience" to secure legislation "which places all competitors on a level where humanity is possible."[45]

According to Effie I. Raitt, "In the economic world we (in home economics) are allied to the consumer."[46] Katharine Alderman was concerned that what home economists do "really make for better homes the world around" and "contribute to the welfare of the world."[47] In *Home Economics: New Directions*, there is reference to part of Ellen H. Richard's Creed: "free the spirit for the more important and permanent interests of the home and of society."[48] The constitution of the American Home Economics Association in recent years contained the statement of the Association's object: "attainment of the well-being of individuals and families, the improvement of homes, and the preservation of values significant in home life."[49]

In all of the above, there is evidence of concern for the interests of individuals and families served and of the larger society. Unlike a technology, there is indication that home economists are to be critically conscious of the moral justification of ends sought as well as of means used to reach those ends. Thus, there is concern for more than mere technical rules (applied science) to produce *given* ends; there is concern also for human values and for equal consideration of persons with competing interests.

Orientation of Home Economics as a Personal Service Profession

So far attention has been given largely to classifying home economics among academic fields of study as established arenas of disciplined intellectual endeavor. In the historical documentation of home economics as a personal service profession, the particular focus of professional action (the home and family) and the end or purpose of that action (welfare or well-being of families and of individuals who live in or come from families) were identified. However, our exploration must go beyond this point for our clarification and justification are not complete; our concepts are still too vague for us to see clearly what the meaning of home economics is in practice. As Effie I. Raitt said in 1935, the use of such "fine-sounding phrases is futile without analysis, evaluation, conclusions, and formulation of procedures."[50] Our vagueness would only lead to being muddled intellectually and morally in both our theoretical formulations and our professional practice. It is necessary, therefore, that we examine in greater detail the problems or questions with which home economics is concerned, the purpose or mission of the field in relation to those problems, and the subject matter of the field. Before getting into these analyses, however, it seems appropriate to make explicit the presuppositions and theory which guide the analysis, the evaluation, and conclusions to be drawn. While some of the presuppositions and background conceptualizations are implicit in prior sections of the paper, it is appropriate to make them explicit at this point in order for our reasoning to be more coherent in the remainder of the paper.

Whether we are conscious of it or not, we make certain assumptions which must be true in order to take a valid position on something, including a position on what home economics is. We have to believe the presuppositions if we rationally hold a certain position. When we rationally propose or defend a position, our presuppositions become part of the rationale for our proposal or our defense. If our presuppositions are not true, then our position is not acceptable or worthy of consideration.

"Theory" has different meanings. To the person who uses the term loosely, "theory" means that which has not been verified as true. In the natural sciences and the positivistic social sciences, theory is a set of factual propositions about some subject which are linked logically with one another so that certain of the propositions are derived deductively from the others. This systematically organized knowledge is of relatively high generality. The validity of such theory depends upon whether the derived propositions are in agreement with actual facts. Theory is stored-up knowledge which serves as a conceptual framework for interpreting facts and for formulating new hypotheses. Theory, in this interpretation, has no real social function in human life; its only function is in the isolated area of investigation by which it came into existence. However, this type of scientific activity is only one part of the historical activity of mankind (from which it is not independent). A third meaning of "theory" is in agreement with the idea that theory is a configuration of knowledge of a relatively high level of generality (but not deductively organized). It is also in agreement that theory serves in the interpretation of sense experience and in the formulation of hypothesized relationships. However, in this meaning, "theory" is used as the basis for action, i.e., in the reasons which underly action. Therefore, theorizing is not only the work of the scientist. Every person who has a system of concepts, formed in his interaction with the social and natural world of which he is part, uses this pattern of concepts (sometimes not consciously) to guide his interpretation of what he sees and hears and even to guide what he sees and hears. These perceptions and interpretations enter selectively into his reasons for action and his assessment of the outcomes of any action. A theory is implicit, therefore, in any action. To grasp clearly the theory implicit in action with knowledge based on evidence and rational considerations (as distinguished from mere opinion or on views which are not substantiated) involves philosophic reflection.

It is the third meaning of theory which is used here in speaking of presuppositions and background conceptualizations. These are presented here as a pattern of concepts which form the rationale for what is written in subsequent sections concerning practice or action in home economics. The statements are not intended as some set of ultimate and absolute beliefs from which a conceptualization of home economics and of home economics education is deduced. As theoretical principles they are not important in themselves but they help in conscious guidance of the task of clarifying home economics at this time. They are conditioned historically as well as by this writer's ability to interpret contemporary conditions concerning the family, contemporary social factors, and contemporary views of knowledge.

Presuppositions and Brief Theoretical Considerations on Which a Conceptualization of Home Economics is Based

Because home economics provides services to human beings (even seeks to change persons) and, specifically, provides services in the interest of home and family, it is appropriate to make clear our presuppositions and beliefs about human beings, about society (human social organization), and about the family as a particular unit of social organization. Further, there must be some view of the relationship between or among the above categories and it is appropriate to make this explicit as each of the above areas is considered. Since knowledge is expected of home economists as professionals and since home economists frequently seek to change knowledge held by those served, presuppositions about knowledge or knowing are relevant to our pursuit. Because home economists engage in professional action (in the provision of service) and because they seek to change the action of those they serve, our presuppositions include those we make about action and about the relation between knowledge and action. It is not possible in this type of publication to provide the rationale of each presupposition. While verification is important and it is correct to question the reasons underlying each, this brief monograph necessitates our doing no more than identifying them.

1. Regarding human beings. Humans enter into relationships with other humans and with the world in which they live, i.e., they confront the world rather than merely have contact with it.[51] They have a thought-language, i.e., a system of signs used with conventionally established rules for the communication of thought as well as the formation and transformation of thought. Humans act in that what they do is done with certain intentions, meanings, or purposes, i.e., what is done is rule-governed. They do not normally behave in a mechanistic sense as a mechanical toy or an object of nature manipulated by external forces nor do they behave in a meaningless sense without intent. They are capable of work, i.e., of production, of action to accomplish certain goals. Further, they are capable of critical reflection on themselves and on their own action; they do not act out of mere reflex nor do they have a single pattern of reacting for under differing psychic circumstances they may react differently. They are affected by the natural and social environments in which they live but they also act upon their world to change it in ways which transform it; they do not merely adjust to things as they are.

As humans, they share certain psychological as well as biological needs. These needs are interpreted through cultural tradition although not by performing and preshaping to the culture at a given time and not in isolation from other individuals. Instead, needs are kept fluid and recognizable through aesthetic expression; through the procedure of consensus-seeking in the validation of norms and values in their society, adequate interpretation of needs is sought.

The human prefers happiness to suffering. But happiness is not mere pleasure and striving for happiness is not to be confused with seeking satisfaction of gross material needs. Even the satisfaction of such needs is guided in the adult identity by criticism of competing interpretations of needs using principles of rightness. Suffering does occur when basic human needs can not be satisfied so that happiness does require concrete conditions in which basic needs can be met, not separately but in unity (e.g., not the satisfaction of hunger for food at the expense of humiliation or loss of identity, not the satisfaction of love at the expense of losing autonomy). However, happiness lies not in preoccupation with the accomplished satisfaction of one's own needs. Happiness rests on doing that which brings enjoyment. However, the desire for happiness is illusory so that the concern is not with constantly thinking about the relationship to oneself as an individual, i.e., the personal enjoyment. Instead, concern is for the stuff of experience which brings enjoyment.

Underlying both personal and social struggles by which humanity has formed itself socially and individually and the effort to understand itself, there is the concern for reason as a source of freedom. That is, the will to be rational is the will to achieve autonomy and responsibility in the action of everyday life.

Such humanness is achieved historically by individuals in a process of transition from preoccupation with biological and self-gratification through different levels of consciousness to what is called "critically transitive consciousness" by Freire[52] or the "adult ego identity" by Habermas.[53] This process by which adult identity is achieved is one which depends upon development of cognitive elements of language, social norms, complex thought operations and understanding of the external world; however, it is not merely cognitive but a process of social interaction. It is not merely a process of maturation, i.e., it does not just naturally occur from something inside the individual which unfolds with age. It is a process in which developmental changes occur as a result of the interplay of individual capacities with the social-cultural and natural environments. These changes involve a transformation in the way the individual interprets and interacts with his world; they are not superficial changes but depth changes in personality formation. The process of development requires certain environmental qualities at appropriate timing or development becomes arrested. It requires socialization (i.e., integration of the self into a specific social system) and, later, in the individual's history, individuation (increasing independence of the self in relation to social systems). However, different forms of socialization result in different forms of identity. Socialization through a critically reflective process in which norms are examined in concrete situations leads to development of reflective capacity in the person being socialized and to individuation through the reasoned appropriation of norms to the individual. When socialization takes the form of external imposition of norms without involving the reflective thought and reason of the individual, the capacity for reflection is diminished and individuation is inhibited by adjustment or adaptation to social prescription. It involves not only cognitive aspects of communicative interaction but also the "ability to give one's own needs their due in these communcation structures," i.e., suitable interpretation and realization of one's own needs.[54]

Man is what he makes of himself, i.e., he is self-forming. However, what he makes of himself is accomplished historically through the interplay of his own capacities with the world in which he lives. He makes himself a free man when he accomplishes mature identity. He is not free because he can make any choice he pleases for his choices are limited by the reality in which he lives and each choice he makes forecloses other choices open to him in the future. He becomes free through the development of his own capacities in an appropriate form of social interaction. The social interaction necessary for the achievement of the autonomous and responsible self is that of a free society.

2. Regarding society. Society is made up of a variety of human organizations created and controlled through human action and, therefore, subject to re-creation or modification by humans; it is not a given, not some set of impersonal forces independent of human control. It is not a world of nature; it is a world of history and of human construction, i.e., of culture. Society is not a superordinate organization of individuals or of lesser social structures. Each of the variety of social systems (e.g., the family, the community, the state) is a system of action. Each engages in action which is purposive-rational in that certain objects are made or certain conditions produced to meet given ends. Each social system also engages in social interaction in the development of shared meanings, of consensus about values, of processes of social and political relationships. Social interaction and purposive-rational action are linguistically coordinated in the culture. Society, therefore, is a network of communicative actions.

Each society seeks to maintain itself by protecting the dominant interests and ideals.[55] This is reflected in the kind of personality or character structure depicted as ideal (e.g., in the arts, in the public sanctions of persons held up as heroes and heroines). It is reflected also in the social and political processes to maintain the existing social structure (e.g., in the economic reward system, in cultural norms regarding the degree and kind of participation by various categories of persons in the decision-making process, in the application of sanctions to those who question the status quo or who seek reform which goes to the root of social problems, i.e., seek radical reform.

Sometimes the patterns of culture within and among different social systems are in conflict; it is not merely that they differ but that such patterns are mutually exclusive in principle and that they compete for controlling power. As a variety of social structures created and recreated by humans, society is subject to human fallibilities as well as to human strengths. Among human fallibilities which may appear collectively in society is deception of oneself or of others. Such deceptions mask the real significance of certain beliefs and practices and lead, on the one hand, to contradictions in belief or between professed belief and practice and, in the case of deceiving others, to exploitation. Society then reflects collective false comprehensions (ideologies) and efforts to help the human condition which unintentionally or intentionally cover up efforts which are in effect damaging. If men and women are not critically conscious of their world (including critical reflection on themselves and their own actions), they take for granted the familiar norms and practices and lose awareness that there are other options.[56] In a changing society, without critical consciousness, they recognize that, historically, times are changing; they are carried along with the change but do not see its human significance and do not intervene by participating in giving direction to change. Thus, they come to be dominated unwittingly by the expectations of others or by their own false consciousness (false comprehensions, self-deception, distortion of reality). It is this way in which forces of organized domination within society come into existence and the fact of their domination is not perceived. The existence of a free society is interdependent with the development of the autonomous and responsible ego in individual personalities. While, in a concrete situation, there may be frustrating and constraining social conditions over which individuals have no control, changes in the social system can be effected which will, in turn, transform social conditions.

A free society is not a neutral society in which all values are personally relative, i.e., where each person's values, individually arrived at, are as acceptable as another's. Nor is it one in which all values are culturally relative in that any culture's values, whatever they may be, are acceptable. Such relativism ignores the existence of conflicting interests among persons or between cultures affected by basic decisions in a social system and it provides no rational means of resolving them. Freedom is assured only when there is a socially established, orderly process for determining the common interests or universal needs of those who will be affected by basic decisions and for seeking rationally motivated consensus on how those needs are to be met, given the conditions of the concrete situation. Consensus is rationally motivated, according to Habermas, when there is adequate knowledge of the conditions of the concrete situation and of the likely consequences of various actions, and when those who participate do not deceive others or themselves.[57] Such a process requires practical discourse (as distinguished from theoretical discourse) in which, through language, participants become both more clearly aware of their own and others' needs and more critically reflective about what should be known, what can be known, and what can and should be achieved in the concrete situation. It is in critical reflection that theory is brought to bear in reflective justification of the practical decision. It is the argument that is most rationally compelling in truth and rightness as revealed through rational argumentative discourse which justifies the practical decision of what to do in the particular concrete case.

A free society, then, is one in which there are in each set of concrete circumstances, socially organized arrangements which assure that basic decisions about what is right and just would meet with the agreement of all affected by these decisions if they were able to participate on a free and equal base. To participate in such basic decisions on a free and equal base requires free and equal personalities. To participate freely is not only to be free of the domination of others (including cultural dependence) but also to be free of self-deception and free of deception and manipulation of others. To participate on an equal base is not only to be of equal worth as a person, but to have corresponding or equivalent powers of insight, of communication, of critical consciousness, and judgment. Not everybody affected by the decision can participate on a free and equal base; the process of practical discourse in decision-making must determine that what is right and just would meet with the agreement of those persons if they were free and equal. Thus, basic decisions may not be in agreement with those who can perceive only their own self-interest, or who are dominated by irrationality, or who are too young to have developed the competencies of autonomous and responsible persons. What is important to recognize, however, is that there are no privileged exemptions from distorted perceptions, thought, communication, or action and autocrats may rationalize their own decisions by claiming incapacity of others to decide. The process of social interaction in practical discourse is an educative one in that participants come to have different conceptions of themselves, redefining their needs and desires. It is also a process by which participants become enlightened about aspects of their social situation which are repressive and what kinds of action they must take to free themselves from repression (external or internal). A free society makes use of the learning abilities of its members but it is also a system of self-learning about its own formative process seeking to foster the developmental possibilities of all its members.

3. Regarding the family. The family is a social organization of persons who form a unit living together in one household. As a human family, members are beings who engage in both individual and collective action. As a human organization, the family is a primary social structure in society. It is primary both in the sense of being first in the personal history of each individual and in the significance the family has in the lives of individuals and in relation to other social structures.

To the growing child, the family shapes how he/she perceives the world and the psychic means for trying to deal with that world. What these perceptions are is highly important in the life of the developing person as well as to those lives this person will touch in the future. The family unit provides a means of socialization and individuation and it is important both as to how these processes are carried out and as to their content. For the developing person to form a respect for authority as competence, it is important that socialization take place in an atmosphere where love and discipline are not separated, where nurturant figures (to whom there is loving attachment) and competent authority figures are the same. It is necessary, in order for individuation to take place, for independence from those nurturant and authority figures to be achieved in a social setting which engenders mutual respect and understanding of persons as individuals.

The family's significance in the growing child's development of internal value standards is increasingly recognized. In a society where there is confusion in values, the family can help in the examination of competing values. Where dominating societal interests seek to impose conceptions of value directly on the developing person, the family can protect or insulate the young (at significant points in their psychic formation) from those dominating interests. The home can be a place for confronting deep emotions and conflict and for communicative action where these emotions and conflicts are interpreted and dealt with openly. Children can observe, and at appropriate times, participate in the process of norm and value determination in the resolution of conflict. It can also be a laboratory for learning sound critique of actions and of existing norms. The family engages in productive action, i.e., in work or doing things within the family to accomplish certain goals; children can learn to assume responsibility for such work in the home, to appreciate the

58

service value and the satisfaction work can bring, and to make work itself nurturant of human rather than mechanistic qualities.

While the family's functions in the rearing of small children are highly significant, they are important to adolescent development also. Habermas has pointed out two major maturational crises in ego development: "the Oedipal phase and adolescence."[58] Within the family, sex roles are learned and the culture's powers in shaping the young person's motives are put to the test. The adolescent whose ego matures becomes able to see people in certain roles, including himself/herself, as persons with individual identity rather than mere role bearers and to realize that cultural norms can be mere conventions (i.e., not the conscious embodiment of principles). This he/she can do only if his/her psychic needs are recognized and "adequately interpreted in the symbolic universe."[59] The family can provide a system of communicative interaction in which the adolescent's needs are recognized and adequately interpreted in the exploration of concrete norms and actions for their underlying principles.

The family's role in responsibility to youth is not its sole significance. The family is also important because it can be the creator of love, the union of persons under the condition of preserving the integrity of each.[60] The giving and receiving of one another's aliveness (interests, understandings, knowledge, humor, sadness), the care and concern for one another, the responseiveness to one another's needs, the knowing and acceptance of one another are all qualities of loving which every human seeks and in which humans transcend animal instinctual characteristics. Such love includes the substance of romantic love between a man and a woman (not to be confused with the trappings of romance), love of parent and child, love of siblings for each other, as well as love of one's fellow man.

The family is a haven for persons of all ages when the larger society is or seems indifferent. It provides psychic associations with nurturant qualities as a place of refuge, of renewal, of satisfactions which are intimate and personal. There is a physical embodiment of this haven in the home. Here are the objects of everyday use; here also is the reification of deeds, events, and ideas in books, records, documents, works of art, furnishings. These things and their setting where daily tasks are carried out and where there is daily habitation give rise to the familiarity of the family and to parts of the world.[61] They are more than mere things; they are the transformation of intangible meanings into the tangible.

The family is also a social and political force. This force manifests itself not only in the effects upon individual personalities of its members who are also members of society; such a force is manifest in the cooperation of families to formulate community norms and values and to transform social conditions.

The above statement about the family is intended to convey the potential of the family in contributing to human lives. It is recognized that there are historical trends which restrain particular families in contemporary society from accomplishing qualities of family life which would contribute to human happiness. The creation of concrete conditions in the family which would and could assume the functions and qualities outlined above is dependent upon the psychic maturity of its adult members. It is also dependent upon the social process which surrounds the family and the culture which that process creates.

With historical social change, the family changes in reality and in how it is conceptualized. Such historical change is not inevitable in the sense that there is some mystic unfolding of determinate historical processes; changes in the family, like changes in society, are the result of human efforts, often unconscious ones. As with social change, changes in the family do not necessarily represent progress; the human condition may be worsened rather than made better. The family may neglect some of its functions vital to happy lives for its members and to the formation of a free society. Or, it may, because of false comprehensions or self-deceptions in its adult members, fulfill those functions poorly. In a society in which there is collective self-deception, these self-deceptions are reflected in social (including professional) pressures placed on the family. Those social pressures may subject the family to influences over which the individual family has no control. Collective self-deceptions of ideologies in society also may create self-deceptions in the family itself. The family seeks to live up to an ideal of what it should be imposed from false and contradictory comprehensions in society. In an urbanized and highly industrial and technological society, social forces impinge upon the family through so many avenues (the media, the street, various social agencies, work) that the family has difficulty in mediating such influences upon youth. Such direct imprinting of collective ideals from the society destroys the rational development of values in the growing person. It does so by removing the conditions specific to the phase of growth which are needed for conceptual detail and sorting out in the individual's internal struggle for identity. It interferes, therefore, with autonomous and responsible value determination (including criticism of the collective ideals) and the achievement of autonomy and responsibility.

4. Regarding knowledge and the relation between knowledge and practice. Knowing is an active process by the person who knows; it is not an inactive or docile acceptance of information. It is a conscious, personal process of searching, of appropriating to oneself, of comprehending, of reconstructing and using what is appropriated; it is not merely superficial intellectual mastery. It requires confrontation with the reality of what is to be known; it is not being filled with content by others in which ignorance is replaced by knowledge. This does not mean that we do not learn from and through other persons; it means that in interaction with those others, we are actively engaged in conscious thought so that our way of thinking about something changes. Through analytic dialogue with others in which there is critical reconstruction of the origin of knowledge (i.e., how we came to know a certain thing), self-reflection about our own way of thinking is made possible.

Knowledge is not "out there", something independent of the knower which pre-exists to be discovered; humans create knowledge. Knowledge is, therefore, a historical phenomenon in that it represents the thinking of particular persons at particular times. Thus, there is no absolute knowledge for it is always subject to correction and modification. Even the process by which knowledge is obtained belongs to a particular set of historical circumstances and this process, too, is subject to correction and modification. Knowledge is not, therefore, merely an accumulation of what is known through the ages; changes result in refutations of certain knowledge claims previously held and even in transformation of views concerning what knowledge is. Knowledge has its source in human sense perceptions but sense perceptions themselves, as well as their interpretations, are dependent on the existing conceptual apparatus of the perceiver as well as the psychic circumstances at the time of perception. This conceptual apparatus, the perceiving and thinking consciousness, is dependent in part on the symbols of ordinary language which has its base in the culture. So viewed, what is known at a given time is not identical with the actual world we know about; it represents what is known by persons in the particular set of historical and cultural circumstances.

The view of knowledge as not being absolute does not mean that all knowledge claims are equally valid. There are intellectual standards and procedures, argued about and agreed to within a community of inquirers, by which knowledge claims can be examined for their validity. At this time in history, these standards and procedures include but are not limited to those of the empirical sciences. The standards and procedures of the cultural and interpretive sciences and of philosophy and the critical sciences are equally as necessary in validating knowledge claims. The kind of knowledge claim each validates differs, however. Knowledge does not consist only of knowledge of details. Knowledge of broad tendencies which are cultural and historical in that they go beyond the immediate may be equally as true as knowledge of details. Thus, broad changes in the structure and dynamics of the family (not merely surface trends but basic historical trends), in society and in thought patterns underlying collective activity, provide a perspective and wisdom needed in understanding the problems families face and ways of helping them find solutions. Such knowledge does not come from the details secured in making surveys and performing isolated social experiments. The latter kinds of knowledge have their uses but they do not provide in-depth understanding of the family in social-cultural-historical context as the cultural and interpretive sciences do. Further false comprehensions in society and in the sciences and the professions themselves need correcting. Disclosing these false comprehensions is the work of the critical sciences.

Knowledge of the social world differs from knowledge of the natural world. Humans hold taken-for-granted beliefs and values about human nature and social life (unlike the objects of the study in the natural sciences). Knowledge of the social world, in effect, corrects our perspective on ourselves by providing insight. The use of such insights in practical action changes the structure and dynamics of social institutions as well as of individual thought patterns and actions. (Objects of study in natural science do not change themselves by understanding themselves.) Since human action has embedded in it the intentions and meanings of the actor, knowledge of human action requires interpretation of those intentions and meanings. While human actions have consequences, knowledge of relation between action and consequences must be quasi-causal (rather than causal laws) in that intentions and meanings of the persons involved are not determinate and, therefore, not fully predictable. Inquiry into knowledge of the social world and social action presupposes certain conceptions about human beings and their relations as well as about knowledge; implicit in such preconceptions are certain values.[62] Knowledge of the social becomes a political force since it changes the social world and the lives of individuals. The nature and direction of that change become moral issues to be resolved in the conception of knowledge itself as well as in its uses.

While knowledge for its own sake may be the concern in certain academic disciplines, society is mission-oriented; its members seek knowledge with the intent of unifying knowledge and action. Knowledge, discovered and created by humans, has its roots in the material conditions and the social life in which they live. Human beings, being action-oriented, seek knowledge for action in the satisfaction of human purposes and wants--purposes rooted not only in mankind as it is but in the infinite possibilities of what mankind can be. The philosopher, Habermas, has formulated a comprehensive theory of knowledge which distinguishes among basic human purposes and wants and the type of knowledge which each rationally requires.[63] According to Habermas, seeking to understand reality is linked to different means of social organization or systems of action: work, language, and power.[64]

In work, action is means-end oriented. A particular end (or goal) is sought and means are decided upon as instrumentally efficient for the accomplishment of that goal. Such purposive-rational action is oriented toward inanimate objects in producing the material basis of life although the orientation can be toward other human beings. Technical knowledge is sought in the determination of efficient means to produce the end in mind, i.e., to predict and control the consequences of action. Such technical knowledge is derived from the inquiry processes of the empirical-analytic sciences yielding knowledge of cause and effect (causal explanation). The kind of rationality used in work, instrumental rationality, rests in the truth of means-end propositions and the consistency of value systems for choice between suitable means.

In language, action is concerned with intersubjective understanding in ordinary communication. It is in this system of action where the cultural traditions of shared meanings and goals and values of living, active persons are interpreted, where reciprocal understanding between individuals, groups, or cultures is sought, where intentions and conventions are questioned for their appropriateness, and where moral conflicts are resolved. This sphere of action is one which is significant in the self-formation of persons and of social groups. Knowledge sought is the grammar of ordinary (natural rather than pure) language, i.e., the combination of language symbols as well as the interpretation of these symbols through actions and nonverbal expressions. It, therefore, includes knowledge which interprets the expressions of everyday life and social interaction in one's own culture (and that of others) as in literature, arts (distinguished from crafts), history, and the interpretive social sciences. Rationality in language as a means of social organization rests in reasons which lie in normative structures that mediate communicative action, e.g., in the mode of involvement in discourse, in systems of morality, in the process of socialization and individual and collective identity formation. The validity of communicative action lies not in the truth of propositions but in the *truthfulness* with which a participant "expresses his intentions in his actions" (i.e., does not deceive himself or others) and in the *rightness* of norms.

In *power*, the third means of social organization, the concern of action is for mature autonomy, i.e., for perceiving the self as the source of consciousness and of conceptualizing the nature of the world. The mature autonomy is free of dogmatism or unreflected consciousness (including dependence on others for determining one's beliefs and actions). Dogmatism is a matter of existing theoretical incapacity but it is also a matter of existing moral deficiency. It takes the form of false or ideological views upon which one rigidly or unreflectively depends. Such views are delusions and, because they are rigidified, they legitemate the existing interpretations of life and the existing social order by removing them from criticism. Liberation is a matter of new insights in interpreting life and the social order. For the individual or the group to free itself of dogmatism presupposes the will to be rational, to use reason. Reason undoes false views of the world and of one's self both in beliefs and in action. The concern, therefore, in this third system of action (emancipative action) is for a free and responsible existence, not dominated in knowledge and action by individual or collective unreflected consciousness of habit and fixed beliefs or of identification with the beliefs and norms of others. Not only is the concern for autonomy of the individual; it is also for freeing society from suffering self-imposed upon the society collectively by its members through self-deception or the deception of others (e.g., in manipulation).

Emancipation is accomplished through critique which reconstructs the origin or underlying basis of *particular* existing views and practices in order to perceive what they really are. Dogmatism is unmasked and a new, more reflective view is incorporated in belief and action. The rationality of critique is dependent upon the rationality of communicative action since discourse is necessary for probing views for truthfulness and rightness; it is also dependent upon instrumental rationality in the testing for truth of means-ends relationships in examining the consequences of existing beliefs and actions and in devising strategies for change. Critique is valid to the extent that it pragmatically relieves false and dogmatic views and the suffering caused by action based on such views. Knowledge which will aid in the unmasking of false or dominating views and practices is the focus of the critically oriented disciplines: critical social theory[65], psychoanalysis, and philosophy (as a critical discipline).

Problems or Questions With Which Home Economics Deals

To say that the problems with which home economics is concerned are the human problems of the home and family requires further clarification. Families have a variety of problems, some of which require the services of other professions, e.g., legal problems, medical problems, occupational problems, and others. The problems with which home economics is concerned are problems of the family as a family.

Understanding the nature of the problems of the family requires that we give some attention to the process of formulating problems. Without doing so we are likely to have conceptual and logical difficulties affecting where we focus attention in professional thought and practice. Following attention to the process of problem formulation, consideration will be given to areas of action in the family. Since humans have been presupposed to be beings of action (of acting with meaning and intention) and the family is a social system of action, it is useful to differentiate among categories of action according to the kind of rationality on which each is based. Doing so should help us understand the source and nature of problems families face when we next examine the family historically in its relation to society. The section on the family in historical-cultural context is brief but it will attempt to show why and how problems of the family must be viewed from the perspective of history and the culture rather than in a vacuum. Finally, in consideration of the problems with which home economics deals, an effort is made to draw together ideas from the preceding sections in implications for the major categories of problems of the family.

1. Formulation of problems. The word "problem" is used to mean different things. We are here concerned with human problems or, more specifically, problems of the family. In formulating problems of the family, it is important for the sake of reason that we not indulge in particularizing families. One way in which we do this is to personalize families by pointing to certain families

and their particular qualities. The problems of families of interest in identifying the focus of concern in home economics are not about the Smith family or some particular group of families. At the level of practice in home economics, the Smith family or some particular group of families, as client(s), may be of concern to the home economics practitian; first, however, we are seeking to determine the arena in which home economists should practice. We must give attention, therefore, to categories of problems which the family faces. When we focus on "the family," we are concerned with families in general as a particular kind of social unit, realizing that particular conditions may vary from family to family. We may also do another kind of particularizing in which we isolate the family from the social-cultural reality in which it exists as a social system. This form of particularizing leads conceptually to locating the family in a vacuum in which we ignore social problems or, at least, reduce social problems to a minor role in consideration. Ignoring social problems is to ignore the interplay of social processes with thought and action in the family; it also overlooks conditions creating difficulty for the family over which the family in the concrete situation has limited control. The point is that the process of formulating problems the family faces is one in which we must consider conditions beyond the circumference of the family.

Human problems occur in everyday life when concrete or probable conditions are contrary to conditions which should exist, i.e., when concrete or probable conditions are a cause or potential cause of human suffering. (Whether people seek help with such problems or not depends upon whether they recognize that problems exist, i.e., that conditions are not as they should be, whether they perceive themselves as unable to change conditions without help, and whether they have hope that conditions can be changed with the help available. Professional help can be conceptualized as helping with the identification of problems and their source as well as with the prevention of impending human suffering and the relief of suffering when it exists.) The formulation of human problems, therefore, is a process in which (1) some desirable state of human affairs is postulated and (2) conditions which prevent or threaten this desirable state of affairs are identified through the use of relevant evidence.

Following from the above, in formulating problems of the family, it is necessary to postulate some desirable state of affairs for the family and, through the use of evidence, to identify conditions which prevent or threaten this desirable state of affairs.

To postulate some desirable state of affairs for the family is to define what we mean by the "well-being of the family" and to identify the ends sought if we seek to "strengthen family life." This involves conscious determination of what the family should be. To some this seems messianic and it is if the determination is irrational or if it is imposed on families or family members without their understanding and acceptance. The point is, whether we are conscious of it or not, we do hold and communicate (not necessarily intentionally) to those we presume to serve some conceptualization of what the family should be; it is implicit in the way in which we define the family, its problems, the solutions to problems, the nature of the service we consider to be "helping" families, and the way in which we conduct ourselves generally as professionals. Frequently, as professionals, we are guilty of taking unto ourselves the taken-for-granted ideologies or false views which prevail in society or which dominate some powerful segment of society. This we do without consciously and seriously examining the views and, sometimes, without even realizing what they are. This way of conceptualizing what the family should be is irrational and our use of a view so derived in professional activity is dogmatic. What is needed is a conceptualization of desirable family life formulated by a rational process, open to rational and competent criticism in the cooperative spirit of seeking consensus, and agreed to as justifiable on intellectual as well as moral grounds. Such an undertaking is a different matter than merely looking sociologically at what the family is today or at any given time. In presupposing that values are subject to rational consideration in their formation and determination, our moral commitments are shaped by what society needs for human happiness. The family contributes to human happiness through development of mature autonomy and responsibility in individuals (in the care provided children and youth and in further development and maintenance of autonomy in adults) and through participation in the formation of a free society. If these are requisites to human happiness and if the family is essential in their concrete realization by carrying out certain functions or activities in certain ways, then our conceptualization of what the family should be is rationally determined by identifying those functions or activities and principles underlying the ways of conducting them.[66] We are then concerned as professionals with action in the family and in society which foster these requisites as ends. We have justified these ends in that, without their realization, human suffering results not only in the family but in individual lives and in other social spheres as well. To cause human suffering (by failing to prevent or relieve it where we can) is morally wrong; to prevent or relieve human suffering is morally right.

To some home economists, it is inappropriate to formulate the problems of the family with which home economics is concerned in terms of the formation of the individual and of society (including the formation of the family as a unit of society). According to them, such a way of formulating problems of the family places too much emphasis on the "internal" or the "mental" and ignores the physical and biological aspects of problems which families face. This criticism is not warranted for three reasons: (1) it fails to account for the thinking-acting capacity of family members, (2) it assumes that the mere passing on of information about physical and biological requirements (or even the material goods themselves) is morally justified, and (3) it ignores or oversimplifies the complexity of such problems and their solutions.

Problems concerning food, clothing, shelter, sex, and birth are perceived and dealt with by families with their own mental orientations which are historically-socially-culturally influenced. Solutions to these problems come in part through changing perceptions and conceptualizations of family members (by home economists), not by physically feeding families, dressing them, or housing them or by manipulative breeding. It is what families themselves do, i.e., their own action, with respect to the physical and biological aspects (as well as other aspects) of family life which is of concern. To be concerned with the actions of families, we have to be concerned with their perceptions, their conceptualizations, and their modes of thinking.

Conceptualizing help to families with problems regarding food and other physical requirements only in terms of passing on technical information about the physical objects (e.g., food) is subject to criticism on the grounds of what Freire has called "cultural invasion."[67] The invader (the information-giver) from his or her own historical-cultural perspective seeks to invade another historical-cultural situation and imposes his/her own system of values. Change in perspective and values regarding food, for example, has wider repercussions than changes in the production or intake of food; other areas of value regarding the self and the culture are affected also. Thus, mere information-giving is a messianic orientation which destroys the character of one culture and replaces it with another. The results are dehumanizing to the invaded. Further, the values and cultural life displaced may be superior in many respects to those replacing them, especially when a system of value determination by consensus is displaced by the technical reason involved in how to improve practices in satisfying physical needs. Without seeing the problems and solutions regarding physical needs of families from the historical-social-cultural context of the particular families, we take on an arrogant, messianic role as professionals.

As pointed out in the preceding section on presuppositions and theoretical background, perceptions and conceptualizations people have are socially-culturally influenced and do not change by merely having information. The way of thinking about the problem, including the relevant social-cultural ideas held by family members, can only be changed through the active transformation of thought by the family members themselves. Moreover, definition and solution of the family's problems concerning food, clothing, and shelter do not rest alone in lack of information about the physical entity. They lie in the economic system or economic factors, in social controls, in the morality and competence of producers and distributors of goods, in collective ideologies, and in other social factors. The problems and solutions concerned with adequate satisfaction of physical needs in any concrete situation are complex. In oversimplifying either the problem or the solution, we add to frustration and suffering of those we would seek to help.

To conceptualize the problems with which home economics is concerned in terms of physical entities, therefore, is to commit a fallacy in problem formulation. It is an irrational formulation of problems in that it deals only with the physical (or reified) part of the solution to a limited area of problems, not the whole of the solution and not the problem itself. Such linguistic and conceptual reification has been a difficulty with certain other professions, as Studer and Stea point out with respect to architecture.[68]

We have been examining the first part of the process of formulating problems of the family; postulation of a desirable state of affairs. The second aspect of problem formulation involves marshalling and considering evidence of conditions which prevent or threaten this desirable state of affairs.

Appropriate evidence comes from historical study of the modern family in social-cultural context rather than from detailed data from short-run social experiments which ignore historial evidence and the social-cultural setting in which the experiment is conducted. We are concerned with more than immediate consequences and more than isolated, manipulated variables when our interest is in the development of mature autonomy and responsibility and with change in social institutions. History interprets trends and events by revealing the underlying ideas (or conflicting ideas) and by explaining those trends or events, not by merely noting the obvious. Thus, we do not merely note the trend toward more women working outside the home or the trend toward "alternative forms of the family" but seek to interpret and explain those trends. History also relates trends to consequences. This means that, in addition to interpreting the trend, we look at its consequences. Such historical study can not be made in a theoretical vacuum; the historian who deals with the structure and dynamics of social systems must have adequate theoretical background. (Here "theory" is interpreted as both scientific and philosophic.) In terms of time span, history deals with long-range perspective going to the origins of the underlying meaning and historical explanation of trends and events and to their consequences. Thus, modern history of the family does not look only and separately at the family of the 1960's, the 1970's, and the 1980's as if they were discretely different, for history does not divide itself neatly according to the calendar. What happens in one decade is not necessarily or even likely to have root differences from what happened in the preceding one.

In summary, the process of formulating problems of the family requires that we postulate a desirable state of affairs for the family and that we make use of evidence from historical study of the family in its social-cultural setting. However, formulating problems of the family also requires attention to substantive conceptualization. We are prone to identify problems by their obvious manifestations but this leads us to deal only with symptoms and to not even identifying the underlying problem. We have posited humans to be beings of action and the family to be a social organization of interdependent members who engage in both individual and collective action. Since man, as a species, is what he makes of himself through his own action, suffering may be self-imposed through his action. The substance of problems of the family may become apparent if we examine categories of action in the family in conjunction with history of the family.

2. Categories of action in the family. It has been typical in home economics to categorize areas of action in the family according to activity regarding, e.g., food, clothing, housing, child-rearing, etc. However, this mode of classifying presents a major difficulty in helping us understand the relation between thought and act. Since action consists of an act embedded in thought which provides reasons for the act, it is appropriate to raise the question as to whether all acts have the same kind of rationality

underlying them. If not, then it would help us to understand breakdowns in the use of reason if we categorize action according to the kind of rationality entailed. Classifying by activities regarding food, clothing, housing, etc. does not provide clarity about the kind of rationality involved. In his comprehensive theory of knowledge, Habermas, who holds that knowledge and practice are united in everyday life, uses a classification of what he calls "knowledge constitutive interests."[69] This system, presented briefly in the theoretic background, is useful to us here. As indicated in the preceding section on presuppositions and theoretic background, families (as families) need to engage in work or technical action within the family, in communicative action, and in critique or emancipative action.

a. Technical (instrumental) action in the family. The family engages in work or technical action (also called "instrumental action" or "purposive-rational action") to control inanimate objects in the satisfaction of needs for food, clothing, and shelter. With a particular purpose in mind such as the production of a particular object or the reaching of a certain goal, action is undertaken to produce the object or reach the goal. While technical action is involved in providing the physical necessities of life, it is also involved in the production of articles which may have aesthetic value as well as usefulness, e.g., in the crafts which may be part of cultural and family tradition.

The exact focus of means used in technical action in the family varies historically and from one culture to another. For example, how to secure food for family needs may vary from producing it or getting it from existing natural sources to buying locally produced food to buying food produced and distributed from throughout the world but prepared for consumption at home to buying meals commercially prepared (and there are other variations and combinations). However, the end is the same, e.g., having adequate food for the family. Although the means used for securing food may vary, so long as one or more means is available without the complication of other factors, the technical rules can be used for solving the problem. However, many times, if not most of the time, there are complicating factors and merely applying technical rules for satisfying physical needs does not solve the problem. It is not enough merely to have food, clothing, and shelter to maintain physical existence. As already pointed out, needs and their satisfaction in these areas are historically and culturally interpreted. What kind of food, clothing, or shelter is perceived as needed and the standards to be met for "adequacy" or for the "good life" are culturally influenced. Symbolic interpretations which communicate meaning exist in the serving of certain foods on certain occasions, in the wearing of certain clothing, and in the design and furnishing of shelter. Further, within families, there can be the blind following of convention regarding these matters or there can be critical determination of the use or rejection of convention dependent upon the principle (if any) underlying the convention. Where social structures prevent the material conditions necessary for the family's satisfaction of physical needs, the social structures themselves must be critically examined and strategies for change devised and tried out.

While purposive-rational action is involved in the control of inanimate objects and conditions of nature, it may also be used in efforts to control human behavior in the family. By manipulating certain variables, certain beliefs and actions can be produced in other family members. When deliberate use of quasi-causal explanation (from the social sciences) is made in an effort to control the beliefs and actions of another individual or group (such as the children, spouse, or parent) for one's own purposes and without the knowledge of the other, such technical action is morally infantile since it exploits or seeks dogmatic domination of another (others).[70]

The family is engaged in much more than purposive-rational action, however, and it must be consciously so if self-formation processes of the individual and of society are to succeed. Our culture has been so dominated by instrumental reason in the application of techniques for technical control that other systems of action have been neglected.[71] This has been true in the family as well as in other social structures. In this sense, technical reason has become an ideology, a system of unreflected "one-dimensional" thought which is concerned only with how to reach given ends; the ends themselves are unexamined and the means are judged only for their efficiency in producing the given ends. The domination of technical or instrumental reason removes moral considerations from thought and discussion. One-dimensional thought thereby negatively affects the rational development of moral consciousness in the young and efforts among adults to resolve differences on the basis of rational argumentation and principle. Extending instrumental reason to interpersonal relations, manipulation of others by psychological means, intimidation, or force (economic, social, physical) becomes the rule; questions of morality become questions of strength and cleverness in deceit. The domination of thought by technical reason also legitimates the existing society by diminishing communicative competence in the formation and determination of critical standards and, therefore, the use of such standards in rational criticism of society.[72] It is important for home economists, therefore, to be critically aware of the nature and significance of other systems of action in the family.

b. Communicative action in the family. Survival of the individual in socio-cultural life, including the family, is dependent upon a flow of communication, an intersubjective or mutual understanding. Communicative action is necessary for understanding our own individual life histories and the cultural tradition to which each of us belongs. It is also necessary for reciprocal understanding of the traditions of other individuals, other groups, and cultures different from our own. Such communicative action occurs in ordinary language communication and involves interpretation of intentions, meanings, goals, and values of the participants.

As pointed out in the preceding section on theoretical background, the family plays an important role in interpreting the world to the growing child through linguistic symbols, grammatical constructions, and nonverbal expressions. As a social unit, family members also have intentions, needs, meanings, goals, and values; they, of necessity, must seek to understand one another and have countless occasions on which agreement or consensus can be sought on decisions affecting the family. The family also is an interpreter of the needs, intentions, and values of individuals and groups outside the family.

Interpretations in communication in the family (as in other social groups) are governed by rules. We determine when someone is angry or loving by rules which attach certain meanings to certain signs or symbols. We determine the substantive meaning of what a person says by rules which attach certain meanings to certain grammatical constructions and linguistic symbols. The conduct of everyday life in the family and by the family in the larger social-cultural context is governed by agreed-upon rules about what is appropriate or good. The family constitutes a significant part of everyday life where the agreed-upon rules are, first interpreted and obeyed and, at later stages of individual and group development, are questioned and re-formulated. Thus, the family is, even if unconsciously so, a highly important center for the young in learning the rules of interpretation and the rational processes of seeking consensus in determining the rules or values about what is good. Children who experience the consistent justification of what is socially expected of them in the giving of truthful and relevant reasons are far more likely to develop rational processes of value determination and to be able to commit themselves to standards of conduct than children who do not have such experiences.

Communication between parents and children is not the whole of communication within the family. Communication among adults is also necessary. Understanding another person, rather than taking for granted initial impressions of the needs, intentions, and goals of that person, requires ongoing interpretation. Individuals change and the roles to be assumed by adults in the family and in society change over time requiring re-interpretation of one another's meanings. There are value determinations concerning the conduct of family affairs and of relations between themselves in which adults participate.

c. Emancipative action in the family. As a social unit, the family is not exempt internally from breakdowns in communication due to dogmatic beliefs and their repressive influences or from strategic action in which some member of the family seeks to manipulate others through deception. Nor is the family exempt from external influences which confuse the family's efforts at developing communicative competence and which seek to deceive the family regarding matters of its own concern as a family.

Parents can use critique, as a dialectic working-out of situations, with children who, in their efforts at learning, do not express their intended meaning comprehensibly or genuinely (not recognizing their own real needs and wants) or when children engage in language acts which are not right in that they do not conform to socially recognized expectations. Critique can also be used in helping children come to understand themselves and their own actions when they use or manipulate people. Helping children to unmask the dogmatism in propagandistic devices and in certain social pressures to which they are exposed involves critique.

The family can be a forum for the critical appropriation of traditional ideas. For example, authority in the family (while its traditional meaning has changed historically) has one or more traditional interpretations which have significant bearing on the political relationships within the family and on the respective psyches of family members. The examination of the truth of beliefs in which the idea of authority is clarified and explicated and its consequences determined constitutes one step. The application of these beliefs to the embodiment of authority in the particular family is reflected upon to achieve authentic insight, i.e., to alleviate self-deception by making conscious what has been unconscious. Strategies and tactics for the exercise of authority in the family are then decided upon.

Confronting contradictions and conflicts of action within the family or in other social spheres also involves emancipative action if they are to be resolved morally without the use of force or "cheap" compromise. Through use of the process of critique, dialectic seeking of understanding of the particular conflicting actions involved (i.e., of their factual nature, their causes and their consequences) and the reflective application of this understanding to the particular situation can provide therapeutic self-knowledge to members of the family. This, in turn, can lead to prudent decisions about how to resolve the conflicting actions.

The practice of emancipative action in the family is necessary if the family is to provide a free or liberating social environment for its members. Such action seeks to bring about the conditions necessary for communicative interaction and for moral use of instrumental reason within or by the family group. Since it is educative in contributing to the formation and turning of the human psyche, this system of action also has broader social consequences.

3. The family in historical-social-cultural context. There are few modern historical treatments of the family in the United States. The present paper does not permit such a treatment, for this would be a major undertaking in itself. An attempt to summarize a history of the family from existing studies oversimplifies by losing the subtle connections between dominant ideas and movements in society on the one hand and between these ideas and movements in society and changes in the family, on the other. Nor does it permit adequate tracing of the human consequences of changes in the family. Readers are urged to study one or more modern histories of the family to gain perspective on this important area.[73] What is presented here is a very brief treatment of the family in modern history. The reciprocal relationship between the family and society has already been pointed out as has the relation between the family and the individual. Social movements and trends in the family, like individual actions, have underlying them certain ideational orientations consciously or unconsciously held. It is important, therefore, if we seek to get beneath the surface of the obvious in the history of the family to interconnect all of these: trends in the family, an explanation of these trends which lies in the processes of the social-cultural system, the ideas underlying these processes, and the human consequences (to the family, to individuals, and to society). Figure 1, dealing with one trend in the modern history of the family in our culture (loss of parental authority), shows the organization used although it can not show the relationship of one trend to

another. The points included in Figure 1 and in the text below are drawn largely from a modern history of the family by Christopher Lasch, Haven in a Heartless World.[74]

As Lasch points out, during the past hundred years the family has changed in size, in structure, in internal emotional organization, and in its relation to the world outside the family.

In size the family has become smaller. This reflects not only the change from the common practice a century ago of having elderly or dependent relatives living with the nuclear family; it also reflects the decreasing number of children in each household. Change in the size of the family can be attributed to industrialization, to rising standards of living, and to the feminist movement. After the Industrial Revolution and the growth of urbanization, the family became more dependent upon outside sources for its livelihood. Influenced by the advertising industry's "propaganda of commodities," families sought to live on a higher economic plane. Having large numbers of children in one family, once an economic asset in the help they provided in the family enterprise, became an economic disadvantage. In the choice between "higher standards of living" (economically defined) and having a large family, the former generally was the choice. Except among the wealthy, women had worked in the home-operated business or occupation. This was true in the agrarian family and in the pre-industrial family. With increased technology for farming and with the growth of industry which removed work from home-operation to factory or industrial center, women were left largely with domestic work of housekeeping and with child-rearing, the latter having earlier been shared by adults. With technology turned toward running the household, work there became less demanding and more mechanistic. Women, who were having more education than formerly, began to find domestic work of the household boring and, with the influence of the feminist movement, sought to find interest outside the home and to gain economic independence. The feminist movement also gave countenance to the idea that women who "stayed home and had babies" were victims of male chauvinism and women who worked outside the home were more "self-fulfilled." The movement of women into the labor force for various reasons led to a reduction in the number of children born, for conditions of work did not permit mixing work with child-bearing and child-rearing.

In addition to the desire for economic independence and the search for self-fulfillment, certain appeals in the propaganda of commodities became dominant ideals: self-interest and the obligation to enjoy oneself. Both men

Explanation

Domination of the family by technical experts and the consequent loss of confidence by parents

Denigration and distrust of authority throughout society
- -Social depiction of authority as incompetent (in literature, movies, comics)
- -Failure of authority to appeal to objective standards of right and wrong
- -Corruption of authority by authorities (use of psychological manipulation or force)

Loss of collective attention in society to rational discourse in formation and determination of values
- -Softening of explicit conflict (including conflict between generations)
- -Avoidance of rational argumentation about what is right in which appeal is made to moral principles
- -Narcissistic orientation which denies responsibility toward others and inhibits rational consideration of values

Underlying Ideas

Ideology of social control by technical experts:
- -Technical experts know better than anyone what to do.
- -All social relations are to be managed (controlled).
- -Scientific knowledge of cause-effect for prediction and control is the only dependable knowledge.

Permissive ideologies:
- -The child is naturally good and if left alone, will develop into a mature person.
- -Equal rights means the same rights for everybody regardless of attained competence or wisdom.
- -All social deviance is to be tolerated because the deviate is not responsible (due to background or mental sickness).
- -No one should have his conduct judged by someone else nor is he responsible for judging himself.
- -Authority and socialization necessarily consist of forbidding without justification.

Consequences*

To the family:
- -Weakening of family influence in mediating between the child and society
- -Growing gap between discipline and affection making authority take on negative meaning
- -Avoidance of explicit generational conflict needed for ego development of the child
- -Avoidance of strong emotions needed by child to develop love objects outside himself
- -Surface placidity hiding deep hostilities and frustrations
- -Corruption of authority taught in the family by deed and by interpreting reality

To individuals:
- -Deep-seated fears and hostilities in the young (manifest in suicides, depression, hypochondria, violence)
- -Failure to develop love-objects beyond the self
- -Failure to develop internalized standards of right and wrong
- -Submission to social rules as line of least resistance
- -Negative feelings in adults toward having children and toward responsibility of rearing them
- -Shifting of individual parent's responsibility for disciplining children to other sources

To society:
- -Loss of loyalty to moral consensus
- -Loss of objective standards of right and wrong
- -Conception of morality as technical control
- -Conception of law as empty of moral values (law only a means of forcing obedience)
- -Waning of public order and consequent public fear of violence
- -Taking over direct socialization of young from the family
- -Loss of family as source of social cohesion; creation of new forces of cohesion constricting of personal and political freedom

*Consequences to the family, the individual, and society are interrelated.

Figure 1. Loss of parental authority in the family in historical-social-cultural perspective (adapted from Christopher Lasch, Haven in a Heartless World: The Family Besieged. New York: Basic Books, 1977).

and women found that having children and taking care of dependent or elderly relatives in the home interfered with the realization of these ideals.

Having smaller families obviously made it possible to have a higher standard of living economically. Whether it increased the quality of emotional experience and the quality of cognitive, language, and moral development in offspring is open to question; these qualities have their source in conditions not bearing on size but on changes in the structure and emotional organization of the family and in the family's relation to the outside world.

Because they are so interwoven, historical changes in the structure of the family and in its emotional organization must be looked at together. These areas of change in the family have their genesis in two movements which merged in the development of American society: (1) the growth of the market economy which stood for free competition among those producing and distributing goods, and (2) the effort to create a homogeneous "Americanized" society. Underlying the latter movement was the idea of American society as a benevolent power from which flows the gist of all that is morally and intellectually sound. Underlying the movement toward growth of the market economy was the idea that liberation lies in individualism, i.e., in separation from "entanglements." Thus, a particular conception of an economic system came to be associated with the American way of life; in society, those who have the capacity and make the individual effort will "make it on their own." In a market economy, however, the accumulation of wealth through profits is necessary for the economy to succeed. The propaganda of commodities, spread through the advertising industry, is essential to making profits. In the propaganda of commodities, the highest form of personal satisfaction is held to be the consumption of commodities. Liberation of the individual comes through self-aggrandizement, i.e., the appearance of power and wealth, established by consumption of commodities, which shows that the individual is dependent on no one. In a society oriented toward consumption of commodities, everything is for sale and everything has its price. (It is not surprising, therefore, to find some home economists seeking to establish the value of the homemaker by placing a monetary value on various aspects of the "job description.") In such a society, ideas translate to technique; technique is devoted to control and to exploitation of "the market." While exploitation dominates the social processes, it is hidden under a surface of what appears as easy-going, benevolent management. Efficiency in meeting management's goals is what counts. Conflict over values is not manifest in direct confrontation where argumentation would require the use of principles as ideals; it is "managed" in a seemingly placid atmosphere by driving the conflict underground. Collective expressions of indignation at injustice are turned into personal complaints interpreted as "personal problems" requiring therapeutic treatment. Therapeutic treatment consists of techniques to improve the individual's adjustment to a benevolent society. The ideology underlying the market economy has permeated society so that what is described above is not reflective only of industry and business; it is reflective also of academic institutions, the church, government and politics, the various helping professions, and other corners of everyday life including entertainment and the media.

Domination of the organization of the economy and of political-social structures by the ideal and the forces of accumulated wealth together with mechanization and routinization of work and civic life appear to be alien to mankind, i.e., not something man would bring on himself. Although all of these conditions are man-made, the idea that they exist "out there" independent of human control permeates much of society. The social sciences have contributed to this ideology in their being patterned after the natural sciences. Society was held to be a "natural" organism, independent of human volition, with a life of its own to be understood by discovering universal laws of causal explanation. Having such causal laws presumably would make a technology of prediction and control of society and human affairs possible. Thus, makers of social policy, in the face of complex social relations difficult to understand, came to depend on the expertise of the social scientist and related technical experts for techniques of means-end control. Science was deemed to be neutral in its value orientations and this neutrality was presumed to carry over into technology, i.e., the use of science in human affairs. Yet technology does produce consequences and the expert's indifference about the consequences does not establish their neutrality. It was held that science dealt rationally with hard facts in which the emotions were to be held at bay as irrational biasing factors leading to error; therefore, emotions and rationality were held to form a dichotomy. Objectivity of science (including social science) was interpreted to mean that which dealt with observable manifestations. On the other hand, subjectivity consisted of the internal or "mentalistic" and was unreliable as a source of knowledge. Value determination was considered a subjective process engaged in by individuals; it was held to be a process loaded with emotion and, therefore, not subject to being a rational one. Values held by the individual were important (including those of the scientist as a person but not as a scientist), but the freedom of the individual with respect to values rested in his monologic determination of what was right.

With the beginning of the growth of the market economy, the family was turned to as a refuge. Relief was sought for deprivations felt in the psychic atmosphere of the outside world by having a world of private satisfactions in the family. Work and civic life were thus separated from private life. By keeping a state of tension between itself and the undesirable elements of the outside world, the family sought to provide both the private satisfactions needed by adults and the child-rearing conditions required for development of mature personality. Romantic love still had meaning in the expectations (not necessarily unrealistic) and loyalties in relations between the sexes. The organization of the family was such that parental authority was exercised and respected. Conflict was openly confronted; emotions were intense but not necessarily irrational. Socialization of the young was a significant function of the family. While there were certainly exceptions, generally the emotional climate of the family was a warm and nurturant one so that socialization (or authority) and love were experienced by children as coming from the same source.

The family came under attack from various groups including the "helping" professions and students of the family. One criticism of the family concerned its "privatism" on the grounds that the family was a form of "institutionalized selfishness."[75] The nurturant family was condemned as possessive, overprotective, and monopolistic.[76] Romantic love was scathingly pointed to as a delusion and "exclusive sex possession" destructive of individualism and, therefore, of personal freedom.[77] Use of parental authority was deemed oppressive and stifling of individual development; socialization of children would be better turned over to experts in agencies outside the family: the school, the kibbutz, counseling services, the church, or some other social group. Dissolution of the tension between the family and society occurred as the family was invaded by the forces and ideologies of a society oriented toward the market place. Consequently, there have been certain changes in the character of the family, in the relation of various members to one another, and in the development of individual personality in the family.

The authority of parents has been weakened and the exercise of authority is perceived as autocratic; discipline is considered antithetical to the rights of the child to be free from "entanglements." Open confrontation making clear the conflict between expectation of parents as transmitters of the culture and the child's action is avoided. The "helping" professions, having sought to professionalize parenthood, have developed in parents a fear of using the wrong techniques; parents have become unsure of themselves in the face of "expert" advice. Socialization of children has been turned over to other social agencies. Parents have adopted from society the domination of technical reason which crowds out the communication process and standards necessary for rational formation and determination of values. The scientization of politics has been accepted by the family in the politics of the family as well as in the determination of broader social policy.[78] Intense emotion is feared because of other fears: fear of rejection and fear of ridicule.[79] Instead, a safer course and one more serving of self-interest is to simulate affection, warmth, and interest in the other person as technical means for achieving one's own purposes. Parents, especially mothers, are perceived by their children as remote and cold although there are times when simulated love is perceived; relationships become unpredictable when contradictory messages are sent and received.[80] Fathers are perceived as indifferent, acquiescent, and fearful of intimate relationships.[81] Perceiving their parents as remote and weak, children manipulate them to serve their own needs.

As a consequence of the changes in the family outlined above, children do not accomplish complete ego development in growing up.[82] Proponents of socialization of children by impersonal forces outside the family, looking only at the surface of what goes on, have oversimplified the process of socialization and the development of internalized norms of conduct. One oversimplification has occurred in defining norms of conduct in terms of concrete forms of behavior to be used as rules to follow (rather than defining norms in terms of underlying principle). This oversimplification has led to another: underestimating the time and the mental struggle involved in the developmental process for an individual, in interpreting and assessing the values upheld in his culture and in working through with others the values worthy of supporting. Interpreting and internalizing principles of conduct require years of changes in modes of thinking and of interacting with others; they are not "mastered" in ten easy lessons by techniques X, Y, and Z.[83] Another oversimplification is the separation of the sources of love and discipline when their reciprocal effect coming from the same source is required in the development of the individual psyche.[84] Authority exercised in a social climate perceived as cold and calculating without genuine affection stunts the development of inner resources. Fearing lack of or loss of nurture results in fear of ridicule and of being judged, in pessimism about the future, in immediate gratification of wants, in fear of binding commitments, in narcissistic self-love.[85] On the other hand, love without discipline leads to normlessness and to perceptions of nurturant figures as weak and incompetent, and sometimes, as not caring enough "to take the trouble."[86] Historical evidence indicates that standards of conduct are internalized as the result of an orderly and predictable relationship of long-term duration with adults who provide both firm and reasonable guidance in a warm and nurturant climate for growing up.

Changes in the structure and in the emotional organization of the family have resulted in specific personality difficulties in children and youth. The process of developing love objects beyond the self is reversed so that narcissistic love results. Youth have deep-seated fears and hostilities, often unconsciously held. These are manifest in suicides, hypochondria, and various forms of social violence and are often carried over into adult life.[87] Standards of right and wrong objectified through the processes of cultural consensus are not developed. Instead the ideals underlying forces dominating social processes (the ideals of individualism and technocratic social control) are directly but very subtly imposed without reflection of the growing person concerning their meaning or concerning reasons to support them. Since these particular ideals, in reality, lead to normlessness, there is no internalized authority for right and wrong. Authority is perceived negatively as unjustifiable coercion and force. The orientation of moral conduct is one of immediate gratification of one's own wants through exploitation where necessary, of avoiding binding commitments and loyalties to others, of concern only for "me", of fear and resentment at being judged (even by oneself).

Changes in the structure and emotional organization of the family and their effects on individual members have brought about other consequences to the family. With freedom defined as absence of constraint, the ideology of individualism and nonbinding commitments has made the family and the relationships within it unstable. Loyalty to a sexual partner has been exchanged for immediate sexual gratification in "nonentangling" alliances. Without the capacity to love beyond the self, sexuality has become a matter only of instinctual release. Marriage and the nuclear family are under attack and "alternate forms" of the family are commonplace. Thus, the composition of the family over time is unpredictable in the concrete situation. In pessimism about the future, hopes for one's own family in the years ahead are lost and energy is spent in "living for now." Provisions are not made for the next generation in the development of that generation's inner resources or in the conservation of economic and natural resources. The "entanglements" of responsibility for children and for elderly kin are refused or passed on to other social agencies.

For those who think that these changes have nothing to do with food, clothing, and shelter of the family, it would be wise to consider the implications. If the future is perceived pessimistically, if immediate gratification of wants and living for now are the concerns followed in action, if continuity of human relationships is avoided, what kind of action is taken relative to nutrition for oneself and one's children? What happens with respect to choice and maintenance of housing? What is the interest in clothing and what are the effects of this interest on the purchase, use, and care of clothing? What has happened to aesthetic contemplation, aesthetic standards, and aesthetic expression in all of these areas? What has happened to appreciation of cultural and historical interpretations in each of these areas? What has happened to norms of social conduct in each area? What has happened to standards of cleanliness and sanitation in the home as well as in public areas outside the home? What happens to the management of resources?

Society is also affected by the changes which have occurred in the structure of the family and in its emotional organization. The social process of moral consensus in the culture is lost as is loyalty to that process; collective action necessary for determining what is good for all of us is broken down with monologic determination of conduct in the ethic of survival. Public order diminishes, public violence increases. Religion and the morality of law, both concerned with public stability in norms of conduct, are lost (although the church and the legal system remain). With the weakening of the family, the major source of social cohesion is lost for the family served to transmit the cultural norms and meanings (ordinary language) which bound the society together. Without social cohesion, all forms of conflict increase. In efforts to make our society hold together, new forces of cohesion are created through social policy. With social policy controlled by special interest groups, forces of social cohesion created are constricting of personal and political freedom.

Changes have occurred in the family in the relation of the family to the outside world. A century ago the family was somewhat isolated both physically and socially. Physically, the family lived in a single-family dwelling and, except in cities, some distance away from other dwellings. The trend in family housing is toward mutliple-dwelling units where space between individual family dwellings is minimal. These physical changes in dwelling unit and space have reduced privacy and also diminished the family's ability to mediate between the outside social world and growing children. Self-control of the family's own actions is reduced by the regulations placed upon multiple family dwelling. Family conflict is pushed underground in an effort to remain low-key in the presence of outsiders or it is made public. Many forms of aesthetic expression are suppressed for the same reason.

Socially, the family was a private sphere a century ago; family matters were "private matters" shared within the family in self-determination and self-evaluation. Tension between the family and society enabled the family to mediate the beliefs and norms of the outside world as they impinged on the family. However, this privacy has been encroached upon, not only by housing arrangements referred to above, but by the mass media, by the advertising industry, by public policy and by the therapeutic orientation of the "helping" professions, and even by the church. At the same time that the family has been upheld as a needed refuge for private satisfactions, it has been condemned for "privatism" and many of its functions have been taken over by the state and other social agencies, e.g., the schools and the legal system. Tension between the family and society has decreased because the family has gradually and unreflectively adopted the beliefs and norms which dominate society. This means that the family now takes for granted society's appeal to shame (fear of ridicule and fear of being judged), to self-interest, and to the duty to enjoy oneself.[88] The family now mirrors the ideologies collectively held in society: freedom as individualism, self-fulfillment as the consumption of commodities, society as an organism independent of human control and intervention, human affairs as subject to technocratic control, and emotions and values as irrational. Action in the family is directed, whether consciously or unconsciously, by these underlying ideas.

The ideology of individualism (absence of constraint) is reflected in sexual relations, in child-rearing, in the use of resources, in withdrawal from collective action based on consensus, in loss of loyalty to persons and institutions, and even in the degree of mastery of language and in its use. Self-fulfillment through the consumption of commodities underlies preoccupation with making a living (in order to consume), in placing commodity value rather than human value on activities of the family, in "impulse buying", in reducing moral problems to "consumer problems", in engrossment with the appeal of brand names and advertising slogans, in the throw-away of useful goods in disregard of future resources. Belief in society as an organism independent of human intervention is perhaps reflected most in the family in the failure to take action in seeking to change society, i.e., in what is often labeled as "apathy." However, it is shown more subtly in another way which is probably more insidious: in the upholding of reality as the standard to live by (whatever exists in reality is good and to evaluate reality is "unrealistic" since being realistic and being idealistic are held to be mutually exclusive). Acquiescence to overly constrictive social controls in private matters, to bureaucracy, to corruption in any area of society (including industry and government) is the mode because "that's the way things are." The technocratic orientation is shown in efforts to control other members of the family as well as others by manipulation, deceit, and force, in preoccupation with technical knowledge in seeking help from others, in the absence of cooperative discourse and collective action for determination of values, in the language used (e.g., something is good if it is good or efficient for something). The ideology of the irrationality of emotions and values is evident in the loss of aesthetic contemplation, in acting with cool detachment instead of spontaneous joyousness or righteous indignation, in the treatment of value judgments as emotive reactions based only in personal wants and likes.

There is a continuous thread throughout the modern history of the family. It is the gradual weakening of the family as a source of private satisfactions, of personal loyalties, of stable, nurturant guidance of children in their development as persons, and of social cohesion. This has occurred in the United States as a result of social processes dominated by the ideals and the underlying ideas of the market economy and technocratic social control. That these ideas and ideals are taken for granted without recognizing other options has become a general fact. In a society characterized by the dominance of technical rationality and appeal to individual self-fulfillment, self-indulgence, and the fear of being judged, we can not expect certain other things to thrive, e.g., moral consensus that it is right to fulfill the needs of others as well as one's own. Problems of the family have their source in problems in society but the suffering caused by the plight of the modern family is felt beyond as well as within the family.

The weakening of the family over the past century is not without numerous exceptions. For example, there are families who have moved away from urban centers and sought to become largely self-sustaining (the flight to privatism). There are others that, somehow without retreating into privatism, have been able to maintain self-direction, to recognize the falsehoods in ideologies commonly accepted in society, to provide a source of private satisfaction and happiness and a stable, nurturant socialization of children. Whether these latter families are headed by adults whose inner resources are mature enough to live in a way counter to the prevailing mode is not known; this seems a reasonable hypothesis. The family is resilient; there are deep emotional attachments to the idea of home and family in spite of attacks upon the institution.

There is currently much interest in the family among the professions, in government, and in the general public. However, these interests are contradictory as meetings of the recent White House Conference on Families demonstrate. There are those who argue for family self-control and self-direction until that direction and control run counter to their own limited perception of rightness; then they seek to legislate their own value orientations as family policy. There are others, including many professionals who work with the family, who unreflectively mirror and uphold the ideology of individualism with its appeal to the shame culture.[89] Neither of these groups appears to look beneath the surface of their positions; both are technocratic in orientation. What is lacking is the cooperative attitude and the communicative competence for reaching deeper understandings (about the plight of the family and its problems) and consensus on what actions are right to take in seeking to help the family. In many cases, perhaps unintentionally, many professionals appear to use "service to the family" as a means for keeping their own professions alive when, in fact, their efforts at technical assistance undermine the family still further. Many professionals have unreflectively adopted from society collective ideologies which cause human suffering. Perhaps a place to start in helping families is for us who are professionals to recognize our own dogmatisms and false views, including the contradiction of helping and exploiting.

4. Implications for the problems of families with which home economics deals. Having postulated a general desirable state of affairs, having examined categories of action where the state of affairs is effected in the family, and having considered historical evidence regarding the state of the family in

our society, our interest now is in drawing the fruits of our thinking together in implications for the family.

Having begun with the presuppositions that human striving for happiness is a natural fact and that causing or ignoring human suffering is morally wrong, we then established the necessity of (1) mature ego identity, and (2) a free society for human happiness. We also established the reciprocal relationship of these two necessary conditions: that personality development of mature ego identity and formation of a free society each require the other. We had also presupposed that humans are what they make of themselves through their own action, under conditions which they do not choose. In this connection we explored Habermas' categories as outlined in his theory of knowledge constitutive interests: (1) rational-purposive action or work, (2) communicative action, and (3) emancipative action. This we did in order both (1) to determine how these categories of action are useful in understanding the family as a center of collective as well as individual action, and (2) to examine the significance of each of these categories of action in studying the condition of the family as shown in modern history of that institution.

We are now ready to postulate a desirable state of affairs for the family if it is to contribute to development of mature ego identity and the formation of a free society.

(a) For the family as a whole there should be:
  - a sense of self-control and self-direction as a family
  - a sense of intimacy
  - privacy or sanctuary
  - a sense of permanence in human relations

(b) For the adult man and woman, there should be a reciprocal, genuine, loving relationship in which romance (as chivalry and adventure) is active and expectations are realistic, and in which there is a sense of understanding and binding commitment.

(c) For children, there should be a stable environment provided by adults in which genuine nurturant qualities are experienced in conjunction with educative authority (in which needs as defined by children themselves do not determine all that their education is to be).

(d) For any other members of the family, should there be any, there should be a sense of belonging, of being understood, of having personal significance and autonomy in the family.

(e) For all members of the family, there should be:
  (1) a system of communicative action within the family which enables both understanding (of one another and of cultural meanings and norms) and the development of consensus about norms of conduct.
  (2) a system of work or purposive-rational action which manages resources of the family and provides the physical requirements of the family to meet goals and standards established through communicative action.
  (3) a system of emancipative action which enables the family and its individual members to use reason
    - in enlightenment about existing dogmatic beliefs, false views, and exploitation which cause human suffering
    - in developing consciousness of the common interest of those involved
    - in determining the circumstances surrounding the concrete case of imposed suffering
    - in developing strategies most likely to produce consequences consistent with common interests (given the existing circumstances) and according to the risks those involved are willing to take
    - in engaging in the political struggle to change the dogmatic belief, the false view, or the exploitation.

In the above outline, (e) differs from the other conditions stated in that it provides the processes by which other conditions are effected. Conditions stated are not achieved in isolation from one another for each, in the concrete situation, impinges on the other. Nor are they accomplished by extraordinary activities of the family unless the family is withdrawn from collective social action. They are inherent in the way everyday life of the family is conducted.

We have seen in the historical study of the family in our society that the plight of the modern family is such that the desirable state of affairs outlined above does not currently prevail. The contemporary family in our culture therefore faces problems which need to be solved although the problems may not be consciously formulated by particular families themselves. Below are suggestions as to what some of those problems are:

Recognizing its (the family's) own significance as a social institution

Becoming critically aware of the individual's need for lasting nurturant relationships with others

Realizing the significance of sexuality as more than instinctual release

Realizing the significance of the culture and the importance of critical transmission of the culture to children

Regaining and maintaining a major role in the socialization of children

Developing a sense of confidence about making judgments of what to do in family affairs

Realizing the significance of communicative action in the family and in social processes outside the family

Developing competence in communication for understanding and for consensual action

Regaining and maintaining privacy

Being critically aware of social forces which affect the family, of their underlying ideas and ideals, and of their consequences

Being critically aware of the misuse of technical reason within the family and in society

Being critically aware of ideologies collectively held in society

Realizing that society can be improved through human action and being willing to participate in emancipative action

Providing adequately for physical needs of the family (a different problem for families at the poverty level than for those more affluent)

Implementing nurturant values in work at home (including pride in quality of accomplishment)

Changing working conditions outside the home to make them nurturant of the family

Appreciating the value of aesthetic contemplation and of aesthetic expression to the human psyche

The list above is intended as illustrative and not exhaustive; undoubtedly other important problems of the family are missing from the list.

The problems have been stated in such a way that they may seem to be objectives or goals and, therefore, all that needs to be done (if they are acceptable) is to find means to reach them. That is not the intent. These are problems in the sense that they reflect perplexing and troublesome situations, especially at this time in the history of our society. Their form is not unlike the form of problems in other professions: curing cancer, creating a just legal system, or formulating ethical social policy. As problems, they are problems of *what to do* or, since it is assumed that doing some things is better than doing others, *what should be done*.[90] The ends must be clearly defined and formulated. For example, regaining and maintaining a major role in the socialization of children requires determining the nature of socialization desirable and what the role of the family should be. The existing conditions in which the choice of action is to be taken must be determined as accurately as possible. Using the same problem as example, conditions now existing with respect to the family's socializing children must be determined, for these conditions are not open to choice and it is essential to know what factors must be dealt with in making the best choice of what to do. Then, given the existing conditions, strategies for reaching the ends defined and formulated must be developed and accepted by those who risk the consequences of action. Treating the problems as if they were objectives requiring only techniques to reach them eliminates highly important areas of ideational clarification for understanding, of knowledge of the existing circumstances, and of consensus in value commitment before formulating and agreeing upon strategies. Treating the problems as technical problems creates forced blindness in action among those who must live with the consequences of their action.[91]

While the problems listed as illustrative are particularly significant at this point in the history of the family, they are still problems which are perennial in nature. Of course, many perennials do not live forever so that problems formulated in the profession must be re-examined in historical-cultural context to determine their significance for families and for home economists who seek to help families.

Lest there be readers who are upset (or, perhaps, pleased) that food, clothing, and shelter are not mentioned in the problems listed and think that those areas of home economics would be "done away with," a few sentences are in order. If they do not see the implications for these areas in the problems listed, then they do not understand what has been said in the line of reasoning from Part I through this section. Formulating problems as has been done here *does* mean that each of the areas mentioned would need to be more than techniques of how to do certain things (prepare a certain food, plan a diet, design a plan for furnishing a room, etc.). They need to address the problems families face in these areas and, as already pointed out, these are problems which lie in the structure of society and in social-cultural conditions. It is the source of the problem in society which impinges on the family's interpretation of its needs and its ability to satisfy those needs. An earlier illustration showed that the problems of nutrition for the family are not merely how to plan meals which are biochemically adequate. Similar points can be made about housing and clothing.

The Mission of Home Economics

Following the preceding examination of categories of action and problems of the family, a statement of mission appearing in an earlier publication becomes relevant to our line of reasoning:

> The mission of home economics is to enable families, both as individual units and generally as a social institution, to build and maintain systems of action which lead (1) to maturing in individual self-formation and (2) to enlightened, cooperative participation in the critique and formulation of social goals and means for accomplishing them.[92]

In terms of "service to families" (our earlier undifferentiated statement), the educative and political processes involved in that service becomes apparent. The service is of such a nature that it is to help families help themselves; it is not to provide prescribed ways of acting through technical expertise. Families need to develop confidence and competence in facing their own problems and to become self-directing in their own actions. Yet many families need help because they do not always accurately or fully perceive the nature of their problems or, when they do, they lack the understandings needed for solutions. Further, because contemporary society imprints its collective false ideas on the family, family members need help in recognizing and critically examining ideologies which dominate their action (often unconsciously). Many times the solution to problems which the family has lie in society itself and social action beyond the immediate family is required; then professionals can help both by providing opportunities for families to engage cooperatively in public discourse for understanding and for collective action and by serving as leaders in public critique of ideology and of forces of exploitation. Service to families is educative in that it helps people transform their own ways of thinking and acting. It is political in that

(1) the family itself becomes a political unit questioning the legitimacy of social processes used in making basic decisions which affect the family and (2) the profession does not remain politically neutral about those same social processes of decision-making.

"Well-being of families" as a concern of home economists becomes identified with systems of action in the family which contribute (1) to the development of mature autonomy and responsibility of individuals and (2) to the self-formation of the family and of society as free and democratic social structures.

The Subject Matter of Home Economics

It is appropriate to remind ourselves, in considering the subject matter of home economics, that we are concerned with the subject matter of the profession and not with the content of home economics education curriculum (although there may be implications for the latter).

The subject matter of home economics is not identified by its substantive focus, i.e., we can not tell what home economics subject matter is because of what it is about. The futility of distinguishing among fields of intellectual endeavor by substantive focus has been recognized since Aristotle. What distinguishes among fields of study is the set of questions which those in each field seek to address. Earlier, in Part II, it was pointed out that the questions addressed in a profession, as distinguished from those in a discipline, are a certain category of problems which members of society have. It was pointed out also (in Part II) that the subject matter required in a profession is that knowledge necessary for formulating and solving those problems. There is, therefore, no unique body of knowledge which can be called home economics (and this is true also for other professions).

Historically, home economics has been dominated by the instrumentalist view of using scientific knowledge to control natural and social conditions. Said Ellen H. Richards:

> We are aware that social forces like natural forces have their laws which can not be suspended by our fiat, but as natural forces, clearly understood, may be directed into other than natural channels and made to do man's will, so most surely social forces may be deflected from one direction to another when sufficient knowledge is at hand.[93]

So conceptualized, home economics was considered an applied science. However, Mrs. Richards also recognized that the home has an ethical dimension.[94] While "Mrs. Richards' Creed" (distributed at the 1903 Lake Placid Conference) contained in the statement of what home economics stands for: "The utilization of all the resources of modern science to improve the home," it also contained reference to "The ideal home life", "The freedom of the home from the dominance of things and their due subordination to ideals", and freeing "the spirit for the more important interests of the home and of society".[95] The content of these latter statements of "What Home Economics Stands For" as well as what constitutes *improvement* of the home are not matters which, in intellectual procedures, lend themselves to determination by the methods of science. However, in keeping with the intellectual views of the time, science was perceived as concerned with improving the human condition. Mrs. Richards viewed the work of the home as engineering, both mechanical and social.[96] On more than one occasion, she spoke out against the limitations of a technical orientation. For example, she said of the cooking schools: "they should not teach how to make a living, but how to live",[97] Perhaps teaching "how to live" was only an unfortunate choice of words for that, too, is a technical orientation.

It may well have been that a bias among some early home economists toward instrumental action and applied science led to the emphasis on aspects of family living concerned with controlling nature (in food, clothing, sanitation, and shelter) and with techniques of the household crafts. When child-rearing and family relationships have been included, they, too, have tended to be based on technical knowledge with concern for how-to in child-rearing (witness the current emphasis of "parenting techniques"), how-to family relationships, and even how-to in sex relations.

On the other hand, there were warnings against being technically oriented in the early as well as the more recent history of home economics in this country. Marion Talbot's paper at the 1902 Lake Placid Conference included comments about differences "in meaning given to the term 'home economics'" in colleges and universities as she referred to "(e)xtremes of technicality and theory".[98] Thomas Wood, also at the 1902 Lake Placid Conference, said: "When we strive for ends too near ourselves, we lose perspective and balance, the saner judgment.... There is constant danger in these days...of being submerged in the technique and mechanics of like".[99]

Paul Miller, in 1960 cautioned:

> ....(O)nce the choice is made (that home economics is to be classified as professional rather than liberal studies) home economics runs the risk of classification as a technology.... (I)n a technology it is specific as to ends and the rules which govern the application of the means. We may blur home economics within and without the university by ascribing too quickly the category of a technology.[100]

While technical knowledge may be useful in producing certain objects or goals, it does not help to determine whether the objects or goals are worthy of production. Further, it ignores large areas of problems contributing to deterioration of the family as a social unit, to individual suffering, and to cultural breakdown in communication and value determination.

It was established earlier that the family plays a critically important role in the lives of its members and in the larger society as a unit of communicative action. It is a serious fault in home economics to neglect areas such as the role of the family in development of competence in ordinary language, interpretation of the world to children, in the use of language to reach understanding, and in the achievement of consensus on values on practical decisions of what to do. These constitute areas significant in the self-regulation of the family as a social system and in the development and maintenance of individual identities among family members.

It is also serious to neglect the role of the family in emancipative action. Emphasis on instrumental action in the family in the subject matter of home economics in effect removes from criticism the unreflected consciousness of habit, fixed beliefs, and dogmatic attitudes of family members. It also removes from criticism societal views which are dogmatic or social practices which are repressive. It ignores the fact that the structure and forces of modern society generate very deep conflicts and contradictions which negatively affect the family and individuals.

Subject matter of the profession of home economics must include areas bearing on the family's problems concerning both communicative action and emancipative action as well as problems concerning material needs solved in part through purposive-rational action. The various systems of action are interrelated in everyday life. Engaging in purposive-rational action in the family involves intersubjective understanding of the social situation surrounding work--both the social situation in the family and in the larger social-cultural context. Practical discourse (i.e., discourse about what should be done) is involved in the division of labor, in the choice among means to the given ends, and concerning standards in the technical process itself. Further, purposive-rational action may contribute to deterioration in the quality of human life since goals or ends are not examined for their worthiness; family members can engage in critical evaluation of the moral significance of both ends and means in their own purposive-rational action. Taken from the perspective of the contribution of instrumental action to the other two systems, strategic action is necessary to bring about material conditions required for communicative interaction and for liberation from repressive or immoral social structures and forces. Therefore, it is not recommended that the three systems of action be used as divisions of subject matter in home economics for their interrelation could well be lost. What must be done is to make sure that home economists, through their professional education, understand the problems of families in relation to each of the systems of action.

In the subject matter of home economics, there must be an understanding of the relation among the individual, the family, and social-economic-cultural structures and mechanisms. This must include an understanding of the developmental process of individuals and the historical process of self-formation of social structures (of which the family is one). To understand humans as beings of action, there must be attention to knowledge from the cultural sciences (including the humanities, historical and interpretive social sciences) which aim at interpretation of meanings communicated and aid in communicative interaction (including the conditions necessary for consensual action). Included in this area would be an understanding of the nature of values and of moral action. Knowledge gained through the critical study of social and political philosophy, critical theory, and critical philosophy is needed. This latter includes understanding the nature and function of critique in the conduct of everyday affairs.

It is quite possible that the existing specializations in home economics could remain. What would change is the professional aim of some of the specializations, the definition of problems to be dealt with, and the scope and organization of subject matter. Another thing that would change as a result of the preceding modifications is the existing isolationism among specializations which creates fragmentation of knowledge. Such fragmentation unrealistically narrows the perspective on the complex nature of problems families face and on the solutions to those problems; in narrowing perspective, problems and their solutions are oversimplified and out of touch with reality.

Part IV.
HOME ECONOMICS EDUCATION: A Conceptualization

Since home economics education is concerned with both the professions of home economics and of Education, it would be appropriate to include analyses of both as background for the conceptualization which is the purpose of this paper. However, unlike the situation in home economics, there already exist excellent conceptual studies of Education.[1] Therefore, beyond the preliminary analysis of Education (together with home economics) as a personal service profession in Part II, only a brief outline of the concept of education will be presented here as further background for the conceptualization of home economics education. The analysis will be of the concept of education rather than the profession of Education and will be less detailed than that for home economics since readers can go to other sources for further clarification and justification. It should be pointed out, however, that the presuppositions and theoretic background presented for home economics in Part III are equally relevant for Education. In Education, too, we hold certain views of the individual, of society, of the family (as an influence in the education of students and in conceptualizing the school's relation to the home), and of knowledge and knowing. Further, the social forces and collective ideologies in our society that have affected the family in the past hundred years have also influenced Education.

Following the brief statement about education, attention will be turned to fulfilling the intent of the paper, i.e., dealing with certain questions about the nature of home economics education. In Part I, it was said that we are concerned with clarifying and justifying a conceptualization of home economics education: of what we seek to do, of what questions are significant, of what knowledge is appropriate, and of what kind of inquiry needs to go on in the field. In Parts II and III and in the brief statement (to follow) about education, I have attempted to provide the background of concepts and the rationale for what will now be proposed as a defensible conceptualization of home economics education. The basic issues underlying this conceptualization should now become clear and specific issues we face within our own ranks and in our present relations with other areas of Education should come into focus.

The Concept of Education[2]

In previous sections of the paper, "Education" has been used to designate a profession. While the profession of Education engages in the practice of certain organized processes which are called "Education," it is well to keep the two categories somewhat distinct from one another. Otherwise, we make two assumptions which may not be warranted: (1) that the only education which a culture affords is what professional educators (in Education) provide and (2) that what those in Education practice is always worthy of being categorized as education.

It was during the nineteenth century, according to Peters, that the very generalized meaning of education came to be more clearly differentiated.[3] To that point in time, it was common to speak of educating animals and plants as well as people. However, in the nineteenth century, *education* and *training* were distinguished from each other. "Training" came to be used to refer to certain activities with animals and plants and to a certain type of activity related to humans in which the goals were very limited and specific as compared with the goals of education. Education is concerned with the development of an educated person, not merely with the acquisition of specific skills or the mastery of certain habits or conventions in living (as in training).

If education is concerned with the development of an educated person, then it is necessary to make explicit what is conceptualized as an educated person. In using a conceptual scheme or system to help us distinguish the educated person from the uneducated one, we do not simply make an arbitrary list of characteristics of each; instead we identify a framework of multiple categories of logically relevant criteria (within which more precise characteristics could be listed). Peters points out that in the concept of being educated or of becoming an educated person, there is the logical implication that something of value is developed, that people are somehow better in that their sense of what is worthwhile matures.[4] It also implies the development of knowledge and understanding as well as the development of wholeness in perspective.[5] While the reader can go to Peters' work for a justification of the framework of desirable qualities which serve as criteria to distinguish the educated person, this framework of general criteria is presented briefly here as background for part of our reasoning concerning home economics education.

1. In the development of commitment to what is worthwhile, the educated person has the capacity to engage in activities for reasons internal to the particular activity. That is, he/she is able to adopt a non-instrumental attitude toward activities. For example, whether the activity is cooking, conversing with someone, painting a picture, studying philosophy, reading a book, or practicing the profession of home economics, each is pursued because there are certain features in the activity itself which make it worth doing. The activity is absorbing and interesting for the actor. Concentration on the activity leads to exploration of knowledge about it and the seeking of this understanding also carries with it spontaneous enjoyment. Standards in the conduct of the activity are developed out of pride and pleasure in the activity's being done well. Such a non-instrumental view is in contrast to the instrumental attitude which asks "Where does doing this activity get me?" The instrumental attitude is concerned only for the activity as a means to something else; something is good only if it is good for something beyond itself. It is the technological or rational-purposive orientation described earlier. To have the capacity to adopt a non-instrumental attitude to what we do does not preclude also, on some occasions, pursuing activities for their instrumental value. What is important is that the actor not be the "one-dimensional man" identified by Marcuse and referred to in Part III in the discussion of rational-purposive action in the family.[6]

Justification of commitment to a non-instrumental attitude toward activity as a quality of an educated person (and, therefore, a goal of education) may be made on several grounds. (a) Justification of what we do only by instrumental rationality is really not to justify at all for each end produced remains to be justified instrumentally in terms of another end; there is no point at which the actor comes face to face with the value of any end. Even in instrumental activity, the educated person realizes that there must be end points which require justification in terms of their intrinsic value. The educated person has "knowledge of the good" which sensitizes him/her to standards in the conduct of an activity: aesthetic standards, intellectual standards, moral standards and others pertinent to the particular activity. He/She cares about these standards and is committed to them. (b) Development

of a non-instrumental attitude toward what one does is part of the process of developing mature autonomy or ego identity. Attention to the actual features of an object or of what is done develops reflective capacity and the inner resources for pondering what is known or what can be known and for examining one's own life and actions. To be concerned only instrumentally for the use we can make of things and of persons in the satisfaction of our own wants is egocentric. Such egocentrism is characteristic of the beginning phases of development but not of more mature stages. There is, therefore, a contradiction in concepts in the educated person (who has developed a mature autonomy), on the one hand and on the other hand, the immature person with incapacity to adopt a non-instrumental view toward what he/she does.
(c) An educated person makes use of more than one kind of rationality. The rationality of cause-effect or of means-end is one type of rationality and an important one. However, as has already been pointed out, there is also the rationality involved in intersubjective understanding: reasons which lie in normative structures that mediate communicative action. Further, the combinations of the rationality of intercommunication and means-end rationality in emancipative action involves more than instrumental reasoning. To confuse the process of moral and political judgment with the process of judging means to ends and confusing standards of rightness with standards of truth reflects lack of being educated in both intellectual and moral realms. This justification borders on development of both knowledge and understanding and the quality of wholeness of perspective to be examined below.

2. The educated person is a person with knowledge and understanding together with the emotions appropriate to the kind of understanding. Thus, while he/she may be skilled in certain worthwhile pursuits, to be educated requires more than the know-how knowledge of skills; it also involves "knowing that." It is important that the skills of language (both written and spoken) be mastered so that the person's range of experience can be extended beyond his/her own direct, concrete experience and so that expression and interpretation can be articulate and controlled in communication. Knowledge differs not merely in subject matter but in the modes of awareness by which various things come to be known, e.g., aesthetic, historical, linguistic and communicative, mathematical, moral, philosophical, religious, scientific. The educated person develops an awareness which differentiates among these; he/she does so in a way which also develops concern for the values underlying

them, e.g., "respect for truth and for persons, sensitivity to suffering and to 'significant' form."[7]

Within each mode of awareness, there are different levels of knowledge and understanding which are distinguished not in terms of quantity but according to complexity and qualitative differences: (a) knowledge of specific information (specific facts, specific works, specific views), (b) understanding of the principles and theories which support the knowledge in (a) and ability to interpret experience in the light of these principles and theories, and (c) understanding of the intellectual traditions by which both (a) and (b) are acquired and can be criticized.

For most people, the criterion of having knowledge and understanding to be an educated person is so obvious that it may seem unnecessary to justify it. However, the criterion as outlined above indicates the desirability of certain kinds of knowledge and understanding: (a) knowledge and understanding based on reason and (b) a breadth of knowledge and understanding.

(a) The argument for knowledge and understanding based on reason lies in the nature of active knowing and understanding. To claim to know cannot be an arbitrary claim; it is a claim that something is true or right and that the knower has reasons or grounds to support his knowledge claim. He/She does not know something because some person or some group says something is true or right; the person or group believed must have some rational basis for determining truth and rightness. Further, that person or group can be in error for truth is never final in attainment. There are procedures and standards in the various intellectual traditions which serve as the basis for rational discussion of how certain knowledge was acquired and by which it can be assessed and criticized. These procedures and standards are public and are themselves subject to public assessment and criticism; they are not matters of private preference or arbitrariness. Humans find life unintelligible without following the demands of reason. Not only is there lack of understanding without the use of reason, what is called "knowledge" is inert for it cannot be used in interpreting everyday experience and in ordering and directing one's life by some discriminating system of conceptual schemes.

(b) To hold that an educated person is characterized by a breadth of knowledge is not to say that he/she cannot be specialized in some area of knowledge. However, it does hold that he/she must not be a narrow specialist. This criterion can be justified, in part, on grounds having to do with the organization of what one knows in ways which transcend both (1) overly limited substantive areas and (2) singular modes of awareness.

It is commonplace in academic or educational circles to recognize different substantive areas in terms of different fields of study such as the visual arts , biology, history, language, music, philosophy, physics, or political science. It is also commonplace to expect of the person being educated that he/she be able to link certain areas of substantive knowledge. There is often also recognition that there are different forms of knowledge, each involving different kinds of awareness inherent in acquiring the particular form of knowledge. However, this recognition often becomes overshadowed by the positivistic perspective which recognizes only analytic-empirical science, mathematics, and logic as reliable knowledge. The positivistic perspective has been criticized on rational grounds already referred to in Part III.[8] However, its effects often remain with us in irrationally and unknowledgeably limiting appreciation of the intrinsic value of being aware of different forms of knowledge.

At a very general level, we can distinguish between poetic forms which appeal to our emotional awareness without making logical sense and forms of awareness which appeal to our sense of rational justification.[9] Several forms of knowledge appeal to rational justification: those empirical forms which appeal to factual justification or our sense-experience and to logic, those which are analytic and appeal to man-made rules concerning the use of symbols (e.g., linguistic, mathematical, or behavioral symbols) and to logic, and the form commonly called "values" which appeals to knowledge of the good and right and to rational consensus (which, in turn, also requires knowledge concerning the use of symbols, empirical knowledge, and logic). It is an error to classify fields of study according to single forms of awareness, e.g., to classify science as purely empirical. While science does appeal to sense-experience, it also is concerned with man-made rules in the use of symbols and with values which must be observed in the practice of science.[10] The arts, while they do appeal to the emotions, may also appeal to our sense of value, not only aesthetic but also moral in being a commentary on social conditions.[11] Not only does the educated person have developed a conceptual system which enables him/her to discriminate among forms of awareness; he/she also recognizes to some degree the forms of awareness which various fields of knowledge employ. This latter is a corollary to recognizing and using the forms of awareness appropriate to interpreting life situations and to being an active participant in life.

There is an arbitrariness and a type of stupidity in interpreting life experience or in responding to it from an awareness which is only poetic, only empirical, only analytic, or only value or which is only scientific, only philosophic, only religious, or only aesthetic. To be discriminating in one's own interpretations and judgments, it is necessary to have some complexity in the various modes of awareness. Without this, the individual's own options in life are curtailed and life, in its interpretation and living, becomes one-sided. As John Ciardi, the poet, wrote for business executives, "An ulcer, gentlemen, is an unwritten poem."[12] The concern for breadth of knowledge is also related to the next criterion: wholeness of perspective.

3. An educated person has a wholeness of perspective. Sometimes, among educators, there is use of the term "education of the whole man." The meaning of "wholeness of perspective" or "the whole man" needs clarification; this is attempted briefly here in terms of (a) the developmental process, (b) the linkage of forms of knowledge, and (c) the development of a global set of views.

(a) In the process of development toward mature ego identity, there are simultaneous and necessary processes of cognitive development, linguistic development, interactive development, and affective and motivational development.[13] There is a sense in which the various dimensions of development are dependent upon each other. However, as pointed out in Part III, cognitive, linguistic, and interactive competences are developed through the existing structures of thought, language, and action in which the individual participates while affective and motivational development is dependent upon the person's being able to interpret his/her own needs within these structures. Failure to develop affect and motivation adequately results in distorted personality. The educated person develops emotionally in the passions which motivate him/her as well as in other dimensions. These involve the "intellectual passions" to which Polanyi refers which include commitment to a value of truth irrespective of its utilitarian benefit.[14] This passion for truth does not make life easy; it may be painful, difficult, and unexciting to free our minds of prejudice and error but, for the educated person, this is a motivational necessity. It applies not only in areas of factual knowledge and mathematics but also in knowledge of the good and the right. Development of emotions and motivations, therefore, also involves growth beyond the egocentric motives of early childhood. There is development of sensitivity to the needs of others and to the individual qualities of others. Judgment of the moral behavior of others and of one's own action is made from a breadth of understanding and not on the basis of perception limited both by oversimplified conceptual apparatus and by prejudicial inadequacy in the use of reason.

(b) The educated person links together what he knows; he/she does not believe or act on the basis of a fragment of knowledge as ground for belief or act. This brings us back to the use of reason; but reason concerning belief or action cannot be empty of substance so it also brings us back to the forms of knowledge referred to above in defining and justifying breadth of knowledge and understanding. A wholeness of perspective requires a breadth of knowledge but it requires more: this breadth of knowledge is not inert but an understanding and attitude which freshly and creatively make linkages in interpreting life situations and in making choices and judgments and acting upon them. Life situations can seldom be accurately interpreted from a purely psychological, purely economic, purely social or cultural, purely political, purely biochemical, purely technical, or other fragmented view. Understanding persons, individually or in groups, as well as interpreting and assessing problems involves a multi-sided perspective; otherwise, we distort the interpretation or assessment. The complexity of solutions to everyday problems which the family faces and the need for a multidisciplinary perspective in finding such solutions has already been pointed out.

(c) In Part II, reference was made to the global set of views which the professional holds toward human individuals and human society. Such a global set of veiws is not peculiar to professionals for some global view of the world is held by every person as a product of life-experience in society. A global view consists of the taken-for-granted conceptions of what the world "out there" is like. It is "commonsense" knowledge ("what everybody knows") constructed individually but supported in social settings which depend on shared assumptions. However, such a global view of the world is not necessarily consciously examined (although it may be) and, with many persons, there is not even conscious identification of what that view is. Such a belief system shapes how persons, individually and collectively, interpret the world and their actions as well as the actions of others. It serves, therefore, as a basis for determining and justifying actions. Sometimes this belief system is an ideology, i.e., a belief system which is unjustifiable because it is false or distorted. Yet the person who has a false or distorted system of beliefs which guide his/her interpretations and actions does not recognize that it is unwarranted or false without an attitude of critical consciousness.

The educated person is conscious of the global view which dominates his/her society. He/She remains critically aware that his/her own belief system as well as that which dominates society may be an ideology. Since, for the educated person, truth is never final, he/she critically examines the fundamental beliefs comprising a belief system, not to prove their truth but to determine their falsity. The sets of assumptions which comprise different sets of views do not necessarily have the same status; some are more valid than others. Conscious awareness of one's own belief system and of that which dominates society requires being able to rise to sufficient height to gain a wholeness of perspective, i.e., to "climb out" of the morass of the taken-for-granted in order to see it for what it is and to probe with depth of interpretation and criticism.

In summary, the educated person is one who exercises the capacity to adopt a non-instrumental attitude, who has knowledge and understanding based on reason and broad in scope, and who has a wholeness of perspective. Education consists of both the processes by which these qualities are developed and the conduct of these processes in substantive areas of knowledge and understanding logically relevant to these same qualities. For example, developing the capacity to adopt a non-instrumental attitude can only occur through processes involving forms of reasoning other than means-end rationality. Further, these processes must occur in the substantive examination of objects or activities for their intrinsic value. To illustrate, a wholeness of perspective is not developed without processes involving (1) the analysis of life situations for their multiple facets and for the relationships among these facets and (2) the spontaneous linking together of different kinds and forms of knowledge acquired. Again, these processes must occur in substantive areas not only from various disciplinary fields but in the substantive ideas concerned with thinking and knowing. How and why certain beliefs are false, forms of knowledge, and the origin of knowledge itself must become a part of the substantive content of education.

The conceptualization of education presented so far emphasizes goals regarding the individual. However, as pointed out in the presuppositions in Part III, the individual does not develop into a mature person except in a free society. Education is a historical and social process; it goes on through interaction of teachers with students and students with each other, all of these interactions being within the actual conditions of the larger social organization and climate of the school and of society.

As a social interaction process, the relationship is a reciprocal one of one distinctive, conscious, experiencing subject to one or more other conscious, experiencing subjects. As a conscious, experiencing subject, each is an individual center of thinking, believing, feeling, and acting associated with his/her own distinctive physical body. As a person, each is, at least potentially, a rational, moral human agent. The educator belongs to the same order as the educatee. To change this subject-subject relationship to one of subject-object (or thing) relationship where one subject controls or manipulates the other as an object is to create an authoritarian relationship. This authoritarianism may be created by either educator or educatee. To be authoritarian is to make determinations (about what is true, right, or valid) on behalf of others without rationally justifying those determinations. For education to be a social and historical process, it happens in a community of subjects. To treat one another as conscious human agents is not only to have empathy for one another but to submit oneself to the understanding and judgment of the other(s) by submitting one's reasons for examination and criticism and to expect the same of the other subject(s). Therefore, the educator, by definition, in teaching provides reasons for his/her beliefs, feelings, values, and actions for students to understand and to evaluate.[15] Moreover, out of respect for the student as a subject, there is not only empathy but the same expectation of the student to provide reasons to justify his/her beliefs, feelings, values, or actions in terms of their truth, validity, or rightness. Since education is concerned with developing the student's capacities, effort will be made to improve the student's ways of interpreting and acting upon the world by appealing to impersonal principles and conditions of rational thinking under conditions which also make clear that his/her views and needs are worthy of consideration. Improvability, however, is not limited to students' views and actions, for, as already pointed out, the teacher submits to the same principles and conditions. It is the possibility of improvement or growth which makes education a historical process; neither teacher nor student, as a conscious subject, rests historically.

A difficulty arises in connection with forms of social authority existing in the school and in the larger society (but influencing the educational process). Whatever these forms of authority may be, they are perceived in the existing conditions by both the source(s) of authority, by teachers, and by students although not necessarily in the same way by all persons. The actual social situation with its authority relations may be misinterpreted widely by those involved in the situation. In an educational system which is bureaucratic and organized with industry as a model, those authority relations form a vertical pattern which is misinterpreted as the way things "naturally" are. It is essential, in the interest of the subject-subject relationship, for the teacher and students (and others where involved) to discuss the underlying nature of the authority relations which exist in the particular concrete situation. This will often be a discussion of authority relations existing within the particular classroom in which some persons involved do not perceive the class as a community of subjects (correctly or incorrectly). It may also be a discussion of authority relations in the particular school or particular community or other social organizations perceived as preventing the subject-subject relationship in the educational process. Sometimes those involved in the educational process (educator or educatee) have a systematic misunderstanding of the underlying rationality of society (i.e., of social institutions) as causal, natural forces which cannot be changed. Therefore, the discussion is one which should focus not only on conditions as they are but on conditions as they might be. Where actual conditions are contradictory to attainment of or growth toward autonomy on the part of those involved, this is a contradiction between what on the surface may appear to be a subject-subject relationship and what the intrinsic nature of such a relationship is.[16] In the process of education, such a contradiction is subjected to critique and political strategies to change conditions are formulated (through discussion and consensus) and undertaken.

The above conceptualization of the educational process translates the definition of a free society (in Part III) into the social and political organization of the school. It means that the social organization of the school is such that basic decisions about what is right and just would meet with the agreement of all those affected by these decisions if they were able to participate on a free and equal base. This does not mean that authority relations in the school consist of students completely determining choices of curriculum or learning activities; there is no assurance that they can or will choose freely, i.e., that the choice is genuine. Choosing freely requires insight into what the options are and a critical awareness of the secondary as well as primary consequences of choosing the various options. Neither is there assurance that choices will be in the student's own interest or that they will not damage others, i.e., would not meet with the enlightened agreement of those involved. Interest in something can not exist when one knows little or nothing about it. Recognizing the worth of certain knowledge or certain activities can not occur without exposure to that knowledge or those activities. Education involves the development of new interests and exposure to new values than one already has.

There is sometimes the notion that democracy or freedom requires that students vote on classroom or school policy or on activities to be undertaken. Voting is a procedure not essential to the democratic experience nor does it necessarily create a free and democratic experience. Majority rule may represent the needs of a powerful group at the expense of the weak or the needs of a numerical majority at the expense of needs of the minority. Voting can impose unenlightened irrational decision of the majority on an enlightened, rational minority.[17]

The points made above about procedures such as mere selections or choosing and voting were in the interest of further clarifying the social and historical process involved in education.

What Home Economics Education Seeks To Do

As a field which is both part of home economics and part of the profession of Education, home economics education bears logical (not merely administrative) relationship to both. Nowhere is this more essential in its conceptualization than in its aim; what home economics education intends to accomplish must be consistent with the mission or general aim of each of the two professions of which it is part.

First of all, as a profession, home economics education is concerned with service to aociety in which professional action is based on commitment to some mission of value to society and on a depth and scope of understanding relevant to that mission. It is not concerned merely with disciplined intellectual endeavor although disciplined intellectual endeavor is involved in home economics educators being competent to provide service. As part of home economics and of Education, the nature of action is professional service, as distinguished from the service of a business or a skilled or unskilled trade.

Second, like the larger profession of home economics and that of Education, home economics education is a personal service profession. What it seeks to do, therefore, is to bring about changes in the personality of those served since professionals in neither home economics nor Education act upon the bodies of clients but upon the latter's mental or conceptual structure. Moreover, home economics education seeks to change persons, not by professionals who act as the change agent, but by communication (which, by definition, is two-way). This communication between professional and client is one of search, of mutual enlightenment, of critical reflection in which a problem is adequately defined and its solution sought. It draws upon and makes use of the knowledge held by the client as well as that by the professional.

Home Economics Education as Part of Home Economics

Because home economics education is part of home economics, its service is directed toward solving problems of the family as a family. Problems of the family as a family are concerned with suffering brought about by the family's inability to engage adequately in areas of action which define its role as a primary social institution. These areas of action include: (1) action in rational-purposive production or procurement of the physical entities required by the family for the good life, (2) communicative action within the family and with social groups outside the family for understanding and for consensus in defining the good life, i.e., in the formation and determination of values and goals, and (3) emancipative action in freeing individuals, the family, and society from dogmatic beliefs and from social forces which are dominative or exploitative. Adequate engagement of the family in these systems of action contributes to the development of individuals with mature ego identity (capable of happiness and of contributing to the happiness of others) and to the evolution of society toward a free society. While the problems of the family arise in the structure of the family, in its emotional organization, in its cognitive-linguistic-moral climate, and in the nature of its relation to the world outside the family, modern history of the family indicates that these difficulties have their origin in problems or conditions of society. Home economics education, therefore, must provide service which seeks a broad social consciousness and critical awareness of conditions in society that historically damage the family's ability to act in the interest of human happiness.

A statement was made earlier (in Part III) that home economics is educative. This would mean that *all* specializations within the profession would be educative in nature, i.e., that home economics education is not the only sub-profession in home economics which provides service that is educative. It is appropriate, therefore, to make some initial distinction between service of home economics education and educative services in other home economics specializations.

Historically home economics education has been practiced through the schools, public and private. Association of home economcs education with the schools identifies it not only with a particular agency but also identifies the nature of its educative service. Teachers of home economics in the schools are concerned with curriculum both in the sense of (1) a whole body of courses or educational activities in various areas provided over years of school attendance and (2) a body of courses or educational activities in home economics. The former requires joint consideration with teachers in areas other than home economics and at different levels (e.g., junior *and* senior high school). The latter requires consideration within the home economics department or unit of the school. Long-term development of students (as clients) over years of schooling can and should be of concern. This concern needs, therefore, to focus not only on substantive content of home economics but on substantive content and educational processes which foster development of the student's (1) cognitive modes of thinking, (2) his/her linguistic competence, (3) his/her interactive competence, and (4) his/her emotional and motivational maturing. In these efforts at development of the students, home economics education can not replace efforts of the family in the same direction; it supplements. Without such efforts in the school, development may be retarded because schools can not avoid fostering some mode of thinking, using and expecting some competence in language, having some form of interaction among students and between students and teacher, or having students' emotions and motivations enter in some way to the emotional structure of the school and classroom. Without such efforts, schooling is not education.

Home economics education, in being associated with the schools, has the opportunity of providing continuous educative service to the same persons over a long period of time, especially in the education of youth.

Other sub-professions in home economics *are educative* in the sense of changing the conceptual, interactive, or motivational perspective of clients, i.e., of helping people to help themselves in one or more of the systems of action in the family. However, they do not provide this service through schooling but through other agencies or through private practice. The time involved in professional-client contact is usually shorter and not likely to be on a day-to-day basis as in home economics education. As a consequence, the opportunity for helping with long-term development, especially of the young, is more available to home economics education than to professionals in other home economics professions.

A second difference between the educative service of home econics education and that of other home economics professions lies in the scope or range of family problems involved. In home economics education, the concern is for the full range of these problems although fulfillment of this concern need not be vested in a single practitioner or teacher. On the other hand, educative service in the other home economics professions is likely to be limited in scope to certain categories of problems (although this limited scope of problems is still to be dealt with from a crossdisciplinary perspective and not from the limited perspective of *a* root discipline).

There are other differences between the educative service in home economics education and that in certain other home economics professions which influence the tasks each sets for itself. One lies in the motivation of the client for coming to the home economics professional. Unlike the situation, e.g., in family counseling, clients do not usually enroll in home economics education because they seek immediate help on their own specific problems related to the family (although they may have such problems). They enroll because learning about the family is deemed of general interest or concern. This point leads to the most significant distinguishing feature of home economics education.

The service provided through home economics education is to help each client become a better educated person in his/her thought; language, feelings, or motivations, and action concerning *the* family, not merely his/her particular family (although the latter results also). With certain other home economics professions, the educative service concerns the client's (or clients') perspective regarding his/her (or their) particular family. Thus, home economics education is concerned with developing understanding, values, and a breadth of perspective with which the student (as client) will perceive and act upon conditions and problems of the family (including his/her own family but not limited to it). It is not concerned with solving immediate problems regarding the family although such problems (real or hypothetical but not necessarily personal) may well be used as a vehicle for concrete confrontation with reality in developing the understanding, values, and a breadth of perspective regarding the family. This does not remove the action and problem-solving orientation associated with the profession of home economics; home economics education is concerned with action (action involved in educating) and with the problems of the family. What is distinctive is that it seeks less to solve specific immediate problems directly than to develop the capacities of students (1) to define problems of the family in historical-social context and (2) to participate in enlightened and reflective solutions to those problems. Problems of the family do not remain static and solutions to the family's problems at any point in history are not immediate. Home economics education is concerned with developing conceptual systems which transform the individual's way of viewing the family and its relation to society and to the culture. These systems of concepts are themselves transformed in the process by which the person develops toward maturity, a process in which he/she changes in the kind of reason upon which beliefs, value judgments, and actions are justified.[18] With greater cognitive and communicative competence regarding the family, with more mature moral consciousness, and with realizing adequate interpretations of one's own feelings and motivations, the individual is both (1) wiser and happier in his/her own family life and (2) more capable of interacting with others in behalf of well-being of the family and of social evolution toward a free society.

Home Economics Education as Part of Education

Because home economics education considers itself to be concerned with education as part of the profession of Education, its aim is not one of merely training people in skills and how-to knowledge for attaining specific goals or producing specific objects. Its aim is concerned with the development of (1) values other than instrumental, (2) a breadth of knowledge based on reason, and (3) wholeness of perspective. This can be seen in examining each of the three systems of action in the family for the kinds of learning needed.

In the procurement or production of physical objects or conditions needed by the family, technology and skill are involved (including skills of management). However, even in such areas as cooking or satisfying the need for food by "eating out," there are intrinsic values. Knowledge and aesthetic appreciation in the area of cookery can make the activity itself or the product itself have value other than the instrumental value of providing food to eat. People who eat only to satisfy physical or animal hunger have not really become civilized about food. The same can be said about people to whom housing is nothing more than animal shelter or to whom clothing is nothing more than covering for the body. However, intrinsic values in such activities or products develop with depth of understanding, with sensitivity to their aesthetic dimensions, with having standards for doing them well, with comprehending the historical and cultural interpretations associated with them, with recognizing their potential contribution to human happiness or human suffering. The linkage of knowledge about producing the objects and conditions required for satisfaction of physical needs with other knowledge and appreciations enables a person to recognize intrinsic values in the objects or conditions and in the activities of producing them and to have a broader perspective on their meaning. Intrinsic values do not develop from mere know-how as can be observed in people who are technically skilled but who lack pride, satisfaction, and responsibility in what they do. Breadth of perspective does not come from skill alone but requires breadth of knowledge.

Competence in communicative action in the family is more than the exercise of skill from knowledge of techniques of listening, speaking, reading, and writing. While these skills are necessary, they are not sufficient for communicative competence. There must be increasing ability to recognize the logical form or structure of thought expressed in communication as well as the content. Many misunderstandings and problems in human interaction arise, for example, when listeners or readers do not distinguish statements of fact from statements of meaning or statements of value from statements of mere attitude. Ability to recognize the kind of reasons given to support a belief or act requires looking beneath the obviousness of the content to the form of the argument. There must be the ability to say something comprehensible together with the intention of communicating something truthful so that the one who speaks and the one who hears can share the same knowledge. The speaker must be sincere about what he/she says so that he/she can be trusted. Further, what is said must be normatively right not only according to rules for the correct use of language but also to reciprocal agreement about the presupposed norms for validity or correctness of what is said (e.g., norms of truth, moral norms, aesthetic norms, logical norms, etc.). Communicative competence leads to true consensus: reciprocal understanding, knowledge which is shared, mutuality of trust, and harmony. It requires engaging in speech action on the basis of principles rather than on the basis of personal wishes or in fulfillment of a particular role. There must be the capacity to recognize competing interpretations of the needs of those who participate or are affected by action taken and of taking these into account within the communicative process. Conflict, where it exists, is admitted into the communicative process as are the emotions which conflict generates. Participants with mature adult identity are able, through consensual procedures for resolving conflict and through structures of communication which remove the intrapsychic and communicative barriers, to reconstruct new identities in the conscious resolution of conflict. Thus, communicative competence in the family requires more than technical knowledge and instrumental values; it requires a breadth of knowledge of the nature of communication and hermeneutic understanding, sensitivity to one's own motivations and the emotions and motivations of others, knowledge of the nature of consensus and of the conditions required for consensus, and the ability to recognize the moral principles involved in a concrete situation.

All communication and interaction in the family are not separated from the productive or instrumental activity of the family's work. Work done in the home in the interest of the family provides opportunity for parents to interpret not only the standards and intrinsic values of the work itself but the historical and cultural meanings attached to the particular work. In members of the family working together on some tasks, there is also opportunity for discourse about other matters of concern where knowledge can be shared and understanding developed and where concerns can be aired and value issues can be explored. The emotional climate of the home is created and expressed, in part, through the productive activities of work. (It is appropriate to note here that in her study of home economics curriculum guides of a few years ago, Dorothy Lee found dualisms between work of the home and enjoyment, between work in the home and freedom, between the ordinary productive activities of daily living in the home and social value.[19])

Emancipative action in the family is not based on following a set of techniques nor is its central value perspective an instrumental one nor is its knowledge base narrow in perspective. Not only does it require kowledge of the work (technical action) necessary within the home, but an appreciation of the relationship of communication and of emancipation to that work. The relationship of communication in the family to work in the development of understanding, in transmitting cultural norms and meanings, and in seeking consensus on values has been dealt with above. Emancipative action needs to take the relationship of these two systems of action in the family into account. However, there are some subtleties regarding emancipation and work in the family which deserve further treatment.

One of the prevailing ideologies of our time is that the family exists as an organization to serve the corporate production enterprise.[20] The home is a place to store, service, recycle, and even train people for their occupations. The family is expected to be a good consumer in the interest of keeping the corporate production system going and its adult members (at least) must take part in this externally-managed system in order to consume more. The locus of power in our society rests in the corporate enterprise system. Not only does the family seek to live up to an image of itself which the corporate enterprise system has imposed in subtle as well as obvious ways. It is the image itself, not necessarily consonant with the needs of the family, which takes on value as a symbol of social acceptability rather than intrinsic values of aesthetic, social, intellectual, and nurturant enjoyment in the activities and products of work within the home or the physical comforts such work provides. As Dorothy Smith shows, work in the home has become trivialized.[21] Further, the dependence of working-class families on the economic realities controlled by the corporate enterprise system creates a situation in the family where money earned becomes a controlling value. The dependence on employment influences the structural relations in the family (e.g., who is superior in having needs and wants fulfilled) and the emotional climate (where there are anxieties and points of breakdown). All of this about the family's relation to the corporate enterprise system has been said in order to make a point about emancipative action in the family. That point is that one area of ideological beliefs which the family needs to face and to recognize as false concerns the system of concepts and values which the corporate enterprise system has forced upon the family and the work of the home.

Other areas of ideology collectively held in our society and vital to the welfare of the family were pointed out in the section on modern history of the family. These included, for example, the ideology of individualism as freedom and the ideology of social control by experts. There is no final list of ideologies of which the family needs to be conscious. Instead, they need to be critically aware of such ideologies whenever and wherever they exist. Ideologies come into being when the social conditions which exist at a given time are generalized to be universal across space and time (the way things are is the way they always have been and the way they are supposed to be).

The ability of the family to be emancipated from such dogmatic beliefs and from acting in accordance with them is dependent upon a breadth of knowledge. It is also dependent upon the development of modes of thinking which are hermeneutic in the sense of interpreting (1) ways in which we systematically misunderstand ourselves and suffer from such misunderstanding, and (2) the historical conditions which lead to these false views or comprehensions. Emancipation also depends upon developing a mode of thinking which is critical, not in the sense of mere negativism but in the sense of examining the claims to validity which views or beliefs have rather than passively adopting them. Such a critical awareness *does not presuppose* the falsehood, distortion, or exploitative nature of beliefs and actions but it *does assume their possibility*.

The last several paragraphs have been an exploration of what is involved in education concerned with the family's being able to engage in the systems of action it needs to maintain if it is to relieve and to avert human suffering. It should be obvious now that this education involves the development of values other than instrumental, a breadth of knowledge and understanding rather than mere know-how, and a wholeness of perspective rather than "tunnel vision" or insight which is fragmented.

Questions Significant to Home Economics Education

As pointed out, fields of study are distinguished from each other by the questions which determine the focus of tasks those in a particular field set for themselves. There are two sets of questions which must be addressed in home economics education: (1) those concerning the problems of the family *as a family* which are the center of attention and activity in home economics and (2) those concerning the educational program giving attention to these problems. There are also two other sets of questions which follow determination of (1) and (2) above. Those concern the professional education (pre-service and in-service) needed by home economics educators and the qualities needed by teachers to be admitted to the profession. These latter two sets will not be addressed here.

Questions Concerning Problems of the Family

Problems of the family were addressed in Part III. As indicated in distinguishing home economics education from other home economics specializations, home economics education is concerned with all of these problems rather than a specific segment of them. In designing educational programs, however, all of the problems can not be given adequate attention in one year nor will all of the problems be meaningful to students at all stages of their development.

Questions Concerning The Educational Program

In keeping with the principle of rationality in presenting a conceptualization of home economics education, I have sought to submit the reasons or justification of that conceptualization for understanding and evaluation. However, this was done by developing the complex line of reasoning to which the conceptualization of home economics education is a conclusion; it was not done by first taking a position and then rationalizing it. It would be hoped that consideration of the questions below be interpreted in light of that rationale.

Some of the questions below have already been addressed in part in preceding sections of the paper although some, involving implementation of concepts or principles in preceding sections, have not been given direct attention. The questions suggested here are not exhaustive but they are fundamental to thinking through the nature, the content, and the organization of an educational program of home economics in the schools.

1. If the conceptualization of education is acceptable, then just what should we be seeking to do in a program of home economics education in the schools? Should we be concerned with having people reach a particular destination in their knowledge and skills regarding the family? Or, should we be concerned, as Peters has said, that they travel with a different viewpoint?[22] To travel is to journey through, to move from point to point, situation to situation. To travel with a different viewpoint, in the context above, is to move through life with a different mode of regarding any subject of thought, a mode which becomes increasingly that of an educated person, a mature person. In home economics education this would mean a mode

of regarding the family, a mode of deliberation and action regarding the family. Our reasoning, from certain presuppositions and from the concept of education lead us to the latter.

If we accept the latter as the goal or purpose of a school program in home economics education, what does this mean regarding the nature of objectives and their role in curriculum? Are objectives to be specific overt behaviors regarding the family which serve as points external to educational activity but toward which that activity is directed as a means for accomplishing them? Or, are objectives to be concerned with more than overt behaviors, e.g., with modes of thinking, with interactive development, with competence in communication in matters concerning the family? Further, are objectives such as the latter to serve not as ends of educational activity but as ends of deliberation intrinsic to the educational activity? For example, if we consider an educated person to be, among other things, one who supports his beliefs and actions regarding the family with reasons which are warranted, what is the role of objectives? Do we set up objectives such as "recognizes rules of logic which apply to inductive inference" that are beyond the learning activity itself and toward which that activity and evaluation activities are directed? Or, do we (teacher and students), using the broad objective, deliberate the worthwhileness of what is going on in educational activities on the basis of whether these activities have intrinsic to them the attitude and practice of giving reasons to justify beliefs and actions? Education is consistent with the latter in nature and function of objectives: training is consistent with the former.

2. What educational processes are consistent with students developing a different viewpoint to guide their deliberations and actions regarding the family? These educational processes include not only learning activities but also activities in which the student viewpoint is assessed or evaluated, for these latter, too, can be educational. Does developing a different viewpoint consist of being filled with knowledge about what some different view is? Or, does developing a different viewpoint require engaging in mental activities which incorporate ways of thinking and substance of thought in which a different viewpoint evolves? The first consists of a passive person obtaining inert knowledge; the second is consistent with our presuppositions about human beings, about knowing, and with our conceptualization of education. What is the relationship of teacher and student in these processes and of students to each other? This question was dealt with at the end of the section

on education; the relationship in all cases should be one of subject to subject. The relationship may not be initially perceived that way by students but it should guide the motivations and actions of the teacher. This relationship does *not* mean that teacher and student are the same in understanding and competence or even that they have the same roles. It means that each recognizes the other to be equal as a thinking, feeling, acting person, that they come from the same order, being united by a common rule of obligation for honor and respect.

3. What is to be the substantive content of the program? As a part of home economics, home economics education is concerned, as has been said, with problems of the family *as a family*. The substantive content of the program, therefore, must address these problems. Substantive content is organized around problems of the family both for helping students (a) to conceptualize the form and substance of such problems and (b) to develop commitments, understanding, and a global view for deliberative action in seeking solutions to problems of the family. This does *not* mean that students are schooled in answers to the problems. It means that they give consideration to the systems of concepts, the kinds of values, the feelings and motivations, and the processes and standards of rational thought which enable them to be critically aware of problems as they arise and of ways of seeking their solutions through deliberative action in the particular concrete situation in which each must be solved.

Problems of the family, as has already been pointed out, involve cross-disciplinary study. Substantive content of the home economics program in the school, therefore, draws together knowledge from several disciplines, not only the scientific disciplines but also the hermeneutic disciplines of history and the humanities, and critical philosophy. The content is not only empirical in nature; it deals also with meanings, with values, with feelings and motivations, and with how various forms of knowledge are derived and verified. In focus, the substantive content centers not only on that which is relative to substance of problems of the family but also on that which concerns the processes and standards of knowing.

4. How is educational experience in the home economics program to be organized, i.e., who is to study what when? It would be naive and dogmatic to prescribe a particular way. Granted that professionals planning programs must make decisions about such things, in their search for improvability of the program, various ways will be tried and improved upon. There are too

many factors in a local school situation which will enter this kind of planning, including joint planning with other departments in the school (about which more will be said later). What follows are two basic principles for use in deliberation about the organization of educational experience and which follow from earlier deliberations in this paper.

The capacity of persons to learn something depends, to a large extent, on their respective stages of psychic development. It is not that the child has not yet been filled with as much information as the adult or that his/her container for such information is smaller. It is that he/she has different ways of viewing the world, of viewing himself/herself, of interacting with others, of accepting something as true or right. There are also different levels of competence in communication, differences in ability to conceptualize and reason, differences in emotions and motivations, as well as differences in the degree of differentiation of abstract concepts. These differences are not quantitative but qualitative differences which need to be taken into account in organizing educational experiences in the program.

Second, while the above concern psychological factors to be considered in developing a program of educational experience, there are also logical factors. Some things can not logically be understood unless certain others are understood first, i.e., some concepts are fundamental to understanding others. The value of something can not be recognized without first understanding its nature. Linking together what one knows comes with the opportunity to do so after at least some things are known. Even complex concepts develop through a logic of experience and this development is encouraged with a logical organization of experience (as distinguished from experience which is fragmented and lacking in logical sequence).

Third, while program and curriculum planning are necessary, there is also danger that the plans be too rigid (or, more importantly, that they be perceived and used as rigid formula for educational activities). There is, or ought to be, a spontaneity in learning in which a line of thought exploration may go in unexpected but relevant and significant channels. To curtail this kind of spontaneity on the part of student or teacher because it is not in the plans diminishes the passions and excitement of learning and of teaching. One of the best times to learn to examine what one believes by appropriate processes and standards is when the need obviously arises in making a claim (orally or in writing) to truth, rightness, or truthfulness.

5. What position do we take on the differentiation of program or curriculum which sets up certain areas of study for the "able" students and other areas of study for those "less able"? The former students are often referred to as "college-bound" while the latter are considered likely drop-outs. In this differentiated curriculum, areas of study appropriate for the former are considered to be science, mathematics, English, social science, and sometimes other areas patterned after the "basic disciplines." On the other hand, appropriate areas of study for the latter are considered to be home economics, typing, arts (as crafts), vocational education. This places home economics with the technical subjects (i.e., subjects based on know-how).

There are many flaws with this differentiated curriculum. (a) It makes schooling an instrumental activity in the "preparation" of students for some distant future; however, education is concerned with what is happening to students at the time they are engaged in educational activity. While what happens to students at the time of the activity does have future consequences, when education is viewed as reconstruction of present experience instead of preparation for the future, the student is better able to direct his/her own life in future experience. If education were looked upon as living now, fewer students would have the view of waiting out the period of compulsory schooling to begin living. (b) Such a differentiated curriculum is based on the assumption that educators (including counselors) are infallible in their judgment of what students are capable of becoming. It behooves us to remind ourselves that both Thomas Edison and Albert Einstein were considered by their teachers to be failures in school (and we could make the list of misjudgments much longer, even if we did not include those for whom expectations by the school became a self-fulfilling prophecy). It is common knowledge that for many students, school is "irrelevant" because what is to be learned is not concerned with life and living. This brings us to a flaw in the disciplined-centered curriculum which is erroneously presumed to be more intellectually demanding. (c) By setting up an entire curriculum with dividing lines between the disciplines, knowledge is fragmented, and the student is not engaged in educational experience which links areas of knowledge together. Yet this ability to make linkages in knowledge in interpreting life experience and in action in life situations is needed in everyday action.

As Martin has so clearly pointed out, organizing knowledge into separate disciplines is not a given; it is one way of organizing knowledge which man has worked out but it is not the only way. The disciplines are not "the whole of life" and they should not be viewed as "the whole of education."[23] It is the problem orientation in curriculum which draws knowkedge from multiple disciplines for use in interpreting life and in understanding life problems and in solving them. Such is the orientation proposed for home economics in the schools.

Home economics educators who take a position against the rigid and unjustified differentiation of curriculum for college-bound and non-college-bound students must do so on the basis of more than a defense mechanism. Many have resented having the less able "dumped" in their courses but the resentment has often been irrational or unjustified. Often home economics in the schools has been merely know-how knowledge or shallow in its content and undemanding in its pursuit.

This question regarding the differentiated curriculum leads us to another significant one to be addressed.

6. For whom is home economics in the schools appropriate as education? This question concerns not only the "type" of student but also age and sex.

It has already been pointed out that the family is a primary social institution highly significant in the (potentially) continuous psychic growth of its members and in its interaction with society. Considering the family in this way, the viewpoint which *any person* holds concerning the family and the relation of its well-being to social conditions is very important. Not only are most persons members of some particular family; the interpretation of experience and engaging in action bearing on the *family in general* by the educated individual is important for the family and for society. However, as shown in the modern history of the family in our society, this viewpoint is not necessarily a mature viewpoint and, if adopted from a collective social viewpoint, it is full of contradictions, of unwarranted beliefs, and of irrationalities. It is the evolving of that viewpoint into one that is more mature and more justifiable which is the concern in home economics education. Therefore, students of all "types" and of both sexes need to be involved in developing a system of conceptual understanding, of value consciousness, and of critical awareness of social conditions and ideologies bearing on the family. This is not an altogether new viewpoint in home economics education; we have become so ahistorical in perspective on our own field that we incorrectly assume that home economics in the schools has always been for females and that its perceived value has always been for "less able" students. Home economics in the schools, three to four decades ago, was perceived by educators (in general) as an important part of the general education for all students.

In terms of age, it must be recognized that the stage of development of students influences what can be learned.[24] The concrete orientation of students prior to junior high school and even sometimes in junior high school would make unrealistic the expectation of developing complex concepts based on reason. The capacity to interpret life experience has not been developed to the point of discriminating (a) among persons on the basis of the individuality of each or (b) between reflecting and following expectations. Language development, like all symbolic development, is limited prior to high school. Home economics education (as conceptualized here) is best placed in the school at the level of adolescence and adulthood. Here both interest and comprehension can be more favorably awakened and built upon.

7. What should be done to keep from infringing upon the rights and obligations of parents of adolescent students in educating their own children for family life? This is not a technical question but a value question although, obviously, some means will need to be implemented.

First, it must be said that many times, if not most times, when parents have objected to what the schools were doing in the area of understandings and values regarding the home and family, they have been justified. They have objected to their children being taught techniques (how-to knowledge) in interpersonal relation, sex "education," child care, values clarification, and other areas out of the context of any complexity of conceptual understanding. They have also objected to the presumed value neutrality in which this how-to knowledge has been taught for they have recognized that there is the hidden value orientation of individualism and upholding of the corresponding narcissistic personal qualities. They have also objected to trivia in the home economics curriculum, e.g., eight different ways to fold the dinner napkin, the length of skirts this year, or a detailed list of the characteristics of chocolate pudding; at the same time, these same parents have not considered the family or action in the family (including work) to be trivial. In answer to our question, it is important, first, that what is done in the program can be justifiable educationally (intellectually and morally). This demands that we be more self-critical about the purposes and content (both subject matter and processes) of the home economics program in the schools.

Further, it is necessary that home economics educators see themselves as potential colleagues with parents and with the family rather than as adversaries. While some parents are indifferent about their child's education, most are not. While some parents have viewpoints about the family which are immature, this is not necessarily true. Parents, too, may seek to clarify and to judge the justifiability of a viewpoint with which they have been struggling. The whole area is one for enlightened discussion between home economics educators and parents of youth. This does not mean resorting to the practice of surveying or making "needs assessments," as they have been called. In such techniques, there is no communication which involves enlightenment of all participants and efforts at consensus. No amount of statistical support for stated objectives or for statements of curriculum content (which may be interpreted and misinterpreted in dozens of ways in a survey) can be called rational justification for what is included in the program nor does it contribute to reciprocity of understanding and mutual agreement.

Knowledge Appropriate to Home Economics Education

To ask what knowledge is appropriate to home economics education is really to ask at least three questions.[25] To ask what knowledge is appropriate for a professional field which uses knowledge from many disciplines is to imply selectivity; so we can ask what is the criterion for selection? Since all knowledge is about something, we also need to ask, given the criterion for selection, what is the substantive content of that knowledge? Since knowledge has form as well as substantive content, we also must ask with what form or forms of knowledge are we concerned? The conceptual basis for considering these questions for home economics education is in earlier sections of the paper so that the reader may find this section to be redundant. However, brief statements will be made here to bring the earlier conceptualizations specifically to bear on home economics education.

The criterion for selection of knowledge in a professional field such as home economics education is its purpose in professional practice. We require knowledge which would enable us to provide competent service in the education of youth and adults concerning problems of the family, the latter interpreted through conceptualization of home economics. This statement is empty unless we bring to it clear and justifiable conceptions of education and of home economics with its concern for the problems of the family. Interpretation of the criterion, therefore, lies in the preceding sections of this paper.

Given the criterion for selection what is the substantive content of the knowledge appropriate to home economics education? It is possible here only to describe that content; addressing it in detail would require many volumes.

This knowledge includes understanding of what it means to educate and of the intrinsic values possible in education in addition to any instrumental values which may accrue. It involves knowledge needed for a conceptualization of humans as conscious, potentially rational and moral agents, as persons of action who create their own future by their actions under conditions which may not be of their choosing or under their control. It also involves knowledge of the nature of human striving for happiness. It includes knowledge of human development and a conceptualization of the improvability of human thought and action. Understanding is needed of the interrelationship of the culture and the individual and of the social structure and processes by which the individual develops in language, cognition (including logic), interaction, emotions and motivations. Understanding is also needed concerning the structure of society and of social forces which historically affect the individual including those hidden forces which seek to dominate or distort human thought and action. Active understanding is needed of the nature and role of reason and of processes and intellectual norms in the use of reason. These understandings are needed in order that knowledge in areas of more specific educational activities, such as those involved in curriculum (including instruction) and evaluation, can have greater depth and clarity and can be used with critical reflectivity.

Knowledge in home economics education also must include a clear and justifiable conceptualization of home economics. The nature of the field in which we seek to provide professional education needs to be as clear to us as to people who educate in other areas such as mathematics, social studies, or music. We need to be able to distinguish our field from others in the school as well as to point up areas of common interest. There is also need for (a) knowledge which helps to develop a conceptualization of the problems of the family as well as (b) knowledge which helps to develop a system of concepts and values into a viewpoint for confronting and solving these problems.

The family must be understood not in isolation but in historical-social context. Such an understanding is derived not from the approach of a single discipline, e.g., biology, sociology or psychology, but from a cross-disciplinary approach. The understanding must not be merely a scientific one but also a philosophic and historical one. It must provide an understanding that the family, as a group, is made up of humans characterized by action, within the family and with the world outside the family. The understanding sought differentiates among systems of action within the family (purposive-rational, communicative, and emancipative), of their underlying rationality, and of their relationships. Further, the understanding sought in home economics education must reflect the relation of action within and by the family to the historical development of the individual self, of the family, and of society. It needs also to reflect effects of social-cultural influences on systems of action in the family. It needs to provide a critical awareness of irrational forces within individuals in the form of dogmatic and distorted beliefs and of distorted and dominating forces in society which affect the family and its role in human development and in contributing to human happiness.

It is unnecessary to point up again that knowledge as outlined above must come from across disciplines. This does not mean that the home economics educator is a master of many disciplines; it means that *selected* knowledge from various disciplines is brought to bear on the concerns of home economics and education. With this task, home economics educators should have the assistance of those in other specializations of home economics and of those in Education.

What forms of knowledge are appropriate to home economics education? Empirical knowledge, from the hermeneutic-interpretive sciences and selected knowledge from the analytic-empirical sciences, both including scientific theories, is needed. Such knowledge is needed wherever the concern is for knowing what is the case. Analytic knowledge, dependent on following certain logical rules, is also needed. This knowledge concerns agreed-upon meanings and conventions including the intellectual traditions for validity and verification. Otherwise, what is called "knowledge" is empty of meaning and the claim to know can not be justified. Knowledge of what is of value, of what is good and right is also a form of knowledge needed. Without this form of knowledge, objective evaluations can not be made and decisions about what should be done are based on habit, impulse, and the immediate gratification of one's own felt needs.

Kinds of Inquiry Appropriate

To engage in inquiry is to search for knowledge. To the inquirer, knowledge acquired through this search is new. For knowledge to be original in the sense of its existence for the first time, it must be new for everybody and not merely new for the inquirer. In the distinction made in Part II between the pure disciplines and the professions, it was pointed out that knowledge generation differs. In the pure disciplines the orientation is toward the production of original knowledge while in the professions the emphasis is on the organization of existing knowledge. It is important to examine what this means in relation to inquiry, especially in relation to original inquiry.

If knowledge is original when it is new to everybody, originality may occur in inquiry either by producing new bits of knowledge or it may occur in the organization of existing knowledge into new patterns, i.e., new relationships which no one has seen before. This exists in the empirical sciences in the construction of new theories. Einstein was a physicist but he did not contribute to knowledge in physics by performing experiments; his contribution was through the construction of theories which threw new light on existing pieces of knowledge. In professions such as engineering, medicine, or architecture, existing knowledge is organized to provide original solutions to problems with which the profession is concerned. In both the construction of new theories in science and in the formulation of original solutions to problems in the professions, the task is neither an easy one nor an intellectually unrespectable one. The point is that contribution to the profession in home economics education (as well as home economics and education) would be far more significant through inquiry which engages in the organization of existing knowledge than through many (perhaps most) of the efforts at producing new pieces of knowledge. The latter often are ill-conceived and reflect lack of existing knowledge (upon which the production of new knowledge depends); further, the results make no contribution to the solution of problems upon which the profession bases its purpose of existence. Problems in the profession go unsolved because they are approached piecemeal when the solution lies in the organization of knowledge across disciplines.

To seek to organize existing knowledge across disciplines toward the solution of problems in the profession requires some knowledge of the modes of inquiry used in the various disciplines. Otherwise it would be easy to select as "knowledge" that which does not meet the intellectual standards of acceptability in a particular discipline. For example, what is called "history" may have a poverty of history and what is called scientific knowledge may be unscientific. This does not require mastery of all of the modes of inquiry; it only means being able to distinguish among them and to discriminate between what is disciplined thought and what is undisciplined.

To engage in producing new pieces of knowledge, it is necessary to master one or more modes of inquiry. (Knowledge of modes of inquiry is also useful in teaching when students are taught to engage in inquiry as a means of learning.) Because home economics education is concerned with service to humans in which changes in the person are to occur, and because the content of this education is largely about humans, it is important to recall the presuppositions and background concepts concerning knowledge and knowing. Knowledge of the social, we said, is different from knowledge of nature. Because humans are sentient and act with purpose and meaning, unlike natural objects lacking in such qualities, their actions are not universally predictable. For this reason, the mode of inquiry in the analytic-empirical sciences (concerned with natural objects) has a less useful role in our profession than the hermeneutic and interpretive sciences. The latter would contribute to our understanding of people and to our recognizing and dealing with difficulties in communicative action in the family and in education. Philosophic inquiry is also needed in our profession to uncover and criticize the hidden assumptions, meanings, beliefs, and values in our practice (including our research practice) as well as those in the society (which both affect and are affected by education). Philosophic inquiry would also help us in the analysis and clarification of concepts basic to our own practice.

Home Economics Education and Social Studies

With the study of the family being study of a social group and with the concern for viewing the family in historical-social-cultural perspective, the question often arises as to whether home economics education is not involved in the same area of curriculum as social studies. This question is often prompted by the assumption that curriculum, especially at the secondary school level, is to be organized according to disciplines or according to broad-fields that constitute a branch of knowledge, e.g., natural sciences, social sciences, mathematics, etc. The disciplines approach to social science is more fragmented than the broad-fields, the latter synthesizing knowledge from disciplines such as psychology, anthropology, government, sociology, and others in addressing significant social issues. The National Council for the Social Studies, in at least one report of curriculum suggestions, even upheld the idea that social studies content need not be limited to the social sciences.[26] If we define social studies as a broad-fields approach to the study of social issues, is there overlap with home economics education as conceptualized in this paper?

There is great variation from school to school, from time to time, as to what is included in social studies curricula just as there is in home economics curricula. What is true in particular schools is dependent upon what is done there. We are concerned here with comparing a conceptualization of social studies with a conceptualization of home economics education. In making this comparison, the question of "sameness" of the two fields can be answered negatively, I believe, the nature of the difference depending in part upon several factors. These include the definition of "social issues," what issues are addressed, what conceptual areas of knowledge are brought to bear on the issues, the intellectual perspective with which issues are explored, and the depth (which is dependent in part on time spent) with which issues concerning the family (if any) are examined.

As ordinarily used, "issue" refers to a point of contention or debate on which people take affirmative and negative positions. Social issues, then, would be points of contention about social conditions, about impending acts on the part of members of social institutions, about certain forms of social organization, or other similar matters. In social studies, particular social issues become the organizing feature of curriculum, with these issues grouped as to focus, e.g., issues in American democracy, issues regarding industry, the individual, and the culture, or issues regarding equality in contemporary America. In the latter category, e.g., particular issues might be whether women have equal rights with men in contemporary America (a conceptual and factual issue), whether they should have equal rights (a value issue), or whether the federal government should insure equal rights and, if so, in what areas (a value issue). In the area of the family, there might be consideration of such issues as whether the family has become an anachronism in American society (factual and value issues), whether the family has lost authority in modern history (factual issue), whether the condition of the present family with respect to authority is a desirable one (value issue), and so on. Students would presumably clarify the issue, take positions on the issue (presumably with appeal to knowledge beyond what they already have), and following debate or examination of different positions, seek to draw some conclusion. In drawing conclusion, efforts may or may not be made to reach consensus. When curriculum is organized around issues, the tendency is to select issues with current appeal because they are real to students and are of greater interest to them. It is possible, however, that any contemporary social issue be examined in historical context to trace its origins. Further, selecting social issues with current appeal does not mean that the specific issue, will not be placed in broader context in its exploration.

If the above is a fair reflection of the focus on social issues in social studies, how does such a conceptualization compare with that of home economics education developed in these pages? Certainly both are interdisciplinary or cross-disciplinary.

One difference lies in the scope of social concerns with which each deals, social studies being concerned with a much wider range of social concerns than those which are the center of home economics education. Study of concerns about the family and the social conditions impinging on it can be given only brief attention in a social studies curriculum in which other areas of social issues must also be dealt with. In home economics education, the entire focus of attention concerns the family. (This special attention has been justified over the years on grounds that the family, as a significant social institution in which most people participate for most of their lives, deserves at least as much thought and knowledge through education as other arenas of action in which people engage). The difference in amount of attention to the family in the two fields can not help but influence the potential depth of study, the breadth of understanding which can be developed, and the degree of integration into a viewpoint. For example, understanding of the various systems of action in the family, of their inter-relationship, and of the effects of social conditions on the family's ability to conduct these systems of action for the well-being both of its members and of society is very involved conceptually. It requires confronting everyday realities involved in performing the work of the home, in engaging in communicative action, in uncovering ideological beliefs and dominating forces and subjecting them to critique. Developing intrinsic values related to work and communicative action in the family is not done by just thinking and talking about the issues; these activities must be experienced. Recognizing the value of the family in the lives of its members may be emotionally felt from personal experience but not adequately conceptualized without a study of the processes and stages of development toward mature identity. This conceptualization requires extending the experience of students beyond that they have had individually.

The above examples are given to illustrate how congested the social studies curriculum would be if it gave as much attention to the family as does home economics education. They also serve to illustrate two other points. (1) There is a difference in what social studies seeks to do that is relevant to the family and what home economics education seeks to do. Social studies has a socio-civic concern and home economics education has a socio-personal concern in the family. The former seeks to develop a social understanding of the family and one's relation to it as a citizen. The latter seeks to develop an understanding of the family's potential for ill or for good of the individual person and of society and the influence of social forces on this potential. (2) It might be said that social studies is more abstract in its consideration of the family than home economics education which seeks to immerse students in the reality of experience through which systems of abstract concepts and values are developed.

There could be another significant difference between the two fields and this concerns the intellectual perspective with which knowledge about the family in relation to society is viewed. The concept of home economics education presented here places limits on the acceptability of knowledge from the positivistic social sciences (in presuppositions and in the statement regarding knowledge appropriate to the field). With some exceptions, dependent upon universities of colleges attended, most social scientists in this country have been educated in the tradition of positivism. In such cases, there would be a very different way of looking at human behavior (in isolation from intentions or meanings of the actor) and at values (as subjective emotive reactions). There would be a difference in drawing upon philosophy as a background discipline for positivists define philosophy, except for logic and philosophy of science, as an arbitrary view rather than a critical discipline.

Differences in the actual content of the two would be found because of the differences pointed out above although there is a conceptual and, perhaps, a value orientation shared in social studies and home economics education.

What is desirable in those schools having social studies (and many schools do not have such a broad-field approach in their curriculum) is for teachers in the two fields to work together, in mutual respect, to clarify and define those parts of the curriculum for which each is responsible. There is too much to be learned for quarreling over "turf"; there is more than enough for both fields with the differences in orientation. Certain courses in social studies could well be used as background for students to have had before studying certain problems of the family. Further, certain courses in home economics might provide conceptual background for use in the study of social issues. Setting up rigid boundaries between the two fields is not in the interest of education; conscious crossing over of flexible boundaries deliberately recognized and agreed upon by both can enhance the education of students.

Home Economics Education and Vocational Education

The question of the relation of home economics education to vocational education has been raised often in recent years in connection with programmatic goals and content, with organization for administrative purposes in local schools, state departments of education, and teacher education programs, and with the planning and interpreting of federal legislation for distribution of federal and matching state funds for vocational education.

Home economics education in the schools became associated with vocational education in this country with enactment of the Smith-Hughes Act in 1917. The language of that act was less restrictive than that of more recent legislation so that fields in which there were disparate viewpoints could then be associated for purposes of financial support. Historically, certain interpretive viewpoints have become dominant and the meaning of key concepts such as employment, work, vocation, and education has become obscured.

To compare home economics education and vocational education in order to see if the former is part of the latter, it is necessary to have an adequate conceptualization of both. A conceptualization of home economics education has been developed in this monograph. What is needed is a reasoned conceptualization of vocational education in which underlying concepts and presuppositions are made explicit and clear. However, as Walsh has pointed out, there is no agreement about the basic purposes of vocational education.[27] While there have been books and countless articles written on vocational education, there has been, to this writer's knowledge, no in-depth analysis for a conceptualization of vocational education by vocational educators; there are some done by others which address singular aspects.[28] For purposes of comparing a conceptualization of home economics education with a conceptualization of vocational education, it is necessary, therefore, to draw from analyses of current concepts and practices in vocational education which have been made. While I have known and worked with vocational educators for many years, and had many opportunities for hermeneutic interpretation of their language and action, for the sake of objectivity, I choose to document from other sources.[29]

There is no question of the need and the value of education which enables people to be employed in worthwhile activities and, in being so educated and so employed, to develop a genuine sense of autonomy and personal dignity and (in the spirit of democracy) the perspective of being worthy of equal consideration in the determination of basic decisions which affect them. It is human beings whose capacities are to be developed through any form of education and it is human beings who are to live and be employed in the realities of a society which they help to construct or change. What we are concerned with in an intellectually and morally justifiable conceptualization of vocational education is consistency with the above principles (as we were in home economics education).

In analyses of the realities of language and action in vocational education certain points emerge: (1) an unrealistic conception of social realities,[30] (2) the presence of an underlying ideology, governing action by vocational educators and transmitted to students, which elevates the technical aspects of work to domination of all reflection,[31] (3) stratification of society into classes both in education and in the larger society,[32] and (4) encapsulation of vocational education within the larger educational community of professionals and students.[33] Each of these points will be examined in order to compare with the conceptualization of home economics education.

(1) An unrealistic conception of social realities is reflected in the reasons often given to justify vocational education, e.g., relief of unemployment and poverty, reduction of the "youth problem" (juvenile delinquency, teenage pregnancy, poor mental health of youth). It is easy, from a perspective used in natural science, to view human acts and conditions as the immediate consequence of particular manipulable causes and, thereby, to predict and control acts (such as delinquent ones) and conditions (such as unemployment and poverty). Such a perspective, however, ignores qualitative differences between human subjects (individually or as collective members of society) and natural objects such as iron, protein, or blood. Humans, individually and collectively, construct subjective interpretations of reality which shape their own actions. This subjective consciousness is influenced historically by the social world

and the nature of social interaction in which each person participates from birth. Such human acts as those in delinquency can not be controlled by a social experiment in which enrollment in vocational education is the experimental variable; there are historical social causes (including those impinging on the family) which constitute the larger social reality in which social pathologies occur. There are also social realities concerning the social and economic control of those who work or who seek to work by other powerful forces generated in a society organized around the corporate enterprise system. For example, what is the relation between the Chrysler Corporation's decision to continue making large cars for greater profits (when the public was seeking fuel-conserving models) and the threat of massive unemployment if the Corporation "folds?" Oversimplifying social realities can not make for an intellectually and morally defensible conceptualization of vocational education.

(2) Ideology as systematic misunderstanding in our everyday commonsense conception of society has been defined earlier in the paper. The ideology governing thought and action in vocational education, and transmitted to students, is that the rationality of society as it now is (i.e., technological or cause-effect, means-end, manipulate to control) constitutes a social condition frozen in time. It, therefore, removes from conscious consideration the possibility of other social options and the criticism of the existing rationality. Technological rationality is not of and in itself wrong or oppressive when it is used in intellectually appropriate realms of activity. It becomes oppressive, however, when it is used in the realm of social activity such as in education or in other social organizations. Here it removes from consideration the rationality of communication and of ethics and it distorts the subject - subject relationship to a subject - object one.

Communication requires not only the learning of symbols (linguistic, mathematical, etc.); it also requires learning ways of interacting with others as conscious, potentially moral agents. This system of human action has been dealt with in earlier sections of the paper as has its relation to work; it would be redundant to repeat it here. To assume that the whole institutional framework of society is some aspect of the technical or production process (means-end) is to eliminate the role of communication in work.[34] It also reduces all human action in the family, religion, politics, and other social organizations to one form of self-generation: work. In a corporate enterprise system, work is of value only when it produces capital. So not only is the rationality of communication for understanding and for consensus on values neglected, all other institutions are placed in an inferior role in society to the production system of corporate enterprise.

The technocratic ideology influences conditions within the professional group of vocational educators and through them it influences students and society. As a consequence, the capacity for communicative competence and self-criticism within the professional group of vocational educators is in danger of not being well developed. This, in turn, influences the development of communicative competence and reflectivity in students.

It is fair to say that vocational education is not the only part of the profession of Education which holds and transmits this ideology for it is currently the prevailing system of beliefs at all levels of formal education. There are some signs of its exposures and diminishing influence, however.[35]

(3) Vocational education has contributed to stratification of society. It has done this through its movement in recent years to a dual educational system (with vocational schools separate from other comprehensive schools) and to upholding a differentiated curriculum in the comprehensive school. Different socio-economic classes and different races are directed to each on the presumption that they are predestined for different kinds of futures. (A criticism of this point was made earlier in one of the questions which home economics education must address.) Stratification of society (other than in education) is also encouraged by this presupposed certainty of the destiny of different classes and races of students; their differences in education help to create their destiny. This occurs through reproducing from one generation to another the existing inequalities of society by (a) failing to develop the rational capacities and critical reflectivity of certain classes of students and by (b) removing the inequalities of the existing socio-economic system from criticism. In a democracy, the commitment is to equal opportunity of its members in (a) having their various needs considered and (b) in having their motivations and their capacities for reflective thought and action developed.

(4) The encapsulation of vocational education is seen by some as the result of the elitist notion that vocational education necessarily involves a lower order of intelligence and a less demanding level of learning. This fallacious notion has its roots in the separation of the life of reflection and the life of work or service to others, the separation of thought and action, and the dichotomy of theory and praxis. However, the encapsulation of vocational education is, at least in part, the result of its own action in insulating itself from the rest of the educational community. This it has done at all levels of education, according to Kirst.[36] What lies at the root of this insulation is not known but its consequences to the range of interests, breadth of knowledge, and scope of perspective in vocational education, in light of Points 1,2, and 3 above, is obvious.

The above points concern vocational education as it is, not as it might be or, perhaps, as it should be. What they reflect is the need for a more justifiable conceptualization than that which operates in practice. The same points could be made about some aspects of home economics education if the collective beliefs and practices were analyzed. The conceptualization of home economics education presented here is of what it might be and not what it is (as indicated in Part I).

If vocational education is to be conceptualized in terms of its present practice, can home economics education as conceptualized in this paper be rationally construed as part of it? The answer, of course, is "No." However, it is necessary to keep the issue open from the standpoint of considering any field and group of professionals as improvable. There are persons in vocational education who construe their respective fields as part of general education, e.g., in industrial arts, in certain aspects of business education, and in home economics education. If vocational educators are to remove the capsule in which vocational education has been placed, and if vocational education is to make good on its claim to make education more relevant by contributing to the education of students beyond technical training for work, a conceptualization needs to do certain things. First, it must make sure that underlying presuppositions are not ideological and that the underlying concepts of persons (of their possibilities and the processes of their development) are adequate and coherent. Second, it must make clear a conceptualization of education and the categorial relation (not administrative) between general education and vocational education. In light of potential changes in social and economic systems, there is need to conceptualize vocation in a way which does not make it anachronistic or ideological. If this is done, we would need to re-assess whether home economics education is related to vocational education and, if so, how.

Concluding Comments

Home economics educators have sought to have the home economics program in the schools be too many things to too many people. (1) It was to be a program of education for formulating and meeting problems of the family. (2) It was to be a program of crafts in which know-how and values of cookery, sewing, home decorating, and the like could be learned. (3) It was to be a program of short-term technical training for certain "occupational clusters." (4) It was to be a program of special education for the handicapped and disadvantaged in which they were to master certain skills in living (personal grooming, personal buying, taking care of one's own clothes, following certain amenities or conventions in eating, dressing, etc.). (5) It was to be a comprehensive program in which homemaking skills in foods, clothing, housing, interior design, and housekeeping, were to be interwoven with management and consumer knowledge and skills and with understanding (a) the family as a social unit and (b) the dynamics of relationships in the family. It was to be education (1) for adults, (2) for secondary school students, (3) for out-of-school youth (brought back to school), (4) for elementary school children, (5) for community college and vocational school students. Sometimes it was education for girls and women only, sometimes for both sexes.

Novelty and revisionism have characterized the approach to conceptualization of the field in recent decades together with "compliance with federal legislation." It is time that priorities be rationally determined and that those in the field be both more modest by not claiming or trying to do so much and more presumptuous by doing well what they seek to do. It is time that the determination of what is important to do be made in light of the realities of social conditions and needs of the family to fulfill its necessary role in human happiness. This means that we must look beneath the superficiality of appearances with more than common sense knowledge and that we cease to be ahistorical in our view of individuals, the family, and society. If we are not willing or can not do this, then we should not call our field home economics education. If we can not do what we do in ways which contribute significantly to the historical development of an educated person, then we should drop education from our claim and from the name of the field.

The conceptualization presented here suggests some changes. It would place more emphasis (1) on the family as a source of the improvability of persons as individuals and of the human condition generally and (2) on conditions in society which need to support the family in its efforts and, in contemporary society, which need to change in order to do so. It would place less emphasis on immediately utilitarian know-how knowledge and more emphasis on developing the conceptual systems and rational capacities of students. It would, therefore, place less emphasis on the skills or crafts of homemaking as central to the good life in the family but it would not eliminate them. They would be recognized as possible services various members of the family could perform but imphasis would be placed on their intrinsic values for persons interested in performing them and on their nurturant values for the family. It would eliminate occupational training as part of home economics education not because such training is necessarily undesirable but because the purposes, the processes and content of the two are categorially different. At some point we have to be intellectually honest with ourselves about this matter; such honesty is not a matter of mere opinion but a matter of conceptual adequacy and rational competence. To define life in the family as an occupation, as has been done in some circles in recent years, narrows the conception of the family to being nothing more than a center of production process. The family as a center of communicative action and of emancipative activity is completely ignored. It would eliminate the comprehensive program which has been a lamination of courses from six or seven areas with little or no integration among them and little or no depth in any of them. This type of program is anachronistic in meeting the educational needs regarding the family in contemporary society if indeed it ever did.

The program would be of equal value to males and females. However, efforts would be concentrated at the secondary and adult levels, the latter including community colleges. The program would be appropriate for all students regardless of whether they are advantaged or disadvantaged, college-bound or not in secondary school, and, among adults, college graduates or high school drop-outs.

The proposed conceptualization of home economics education would require a different program of education for those who enter the profession. It might also require a different set of criteria than we have commonly used for admission to the profession. It will also demand some conceptual re-education of ourselves; unless we are very rigid persons, we should find this exhilarating. It has been pointed out by students of intellectual history that theories which do not get improved in twenty years become dead and fade from the scene. It is symbolic of our own intellectual aliveness when we improve our own systems of concepts and perspective regarding the professional field.

Notes

Part I

INTRODUCTION: An Approach to Conceptualization of Home Economics Education

1. Christopher Lasch, Haven in a Heartless World: The Family Besieged. New York: Basic Books, 1979, p. xix.
2. Two little books by John Wilson may be helpful. Language and the Pursuit of Truth distinguishes among empirical, analytic, value, and attitudinal statements showing the link between meaning and language. Thinking with Concepts shows how our interpretation or the meaning of something is more than mere language usage, that it stems from the person's whole "conceptual equipment," and suggests some tools for rational exploration of the way in which we conceptualize. Both are published by Cambridge University Press.
3. John Wilson, Thinking with Concepts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963, p. 15.
4. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. 2, No. 2. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970.
5. Seymour B. Sarason, "An Unsuccessful War on Poverty?" American Psychologist, 33, 831-839, (1978).
6. Robert Perrucci, "Engineering: Professional Servant of Power," American Behavioral Scientist, 14, (1971), p. 505.
7. Terence Ball (ed.), Political Theory and Praxis: New Perspectives. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977, p. 7.
8. See, e.g., John Wilson, Language and the Pursuit of Truth.
9. Denis Goulet in "Introduction," Paulo Freire, Education for Critical Consciousness. New York: The Seabury Press, 1973, p. vii.

Part II

HOME ECONOMICS EDUCATION: A Preliminary Analysis

1. Sigmund Nosow, "The Nature of a Profession: Home Economics a Particular Case," in The Field of Home Economics: What It Is. Washington, D. C.: American Home Economics Association, 1964.

2. A discussion of this point appears many places. Three writers (at least) in The Discipline of Education, edited by John Walton and James L. Kuethe, in distinguishing Education from the disciplines, characterize it as a profession. See R. S. Peters, "Comments" (on Walton's paper entitled "A Discipline of Education"), pp. 17-22; Bernard Bailyn, "Education as a Discipline: Some Historical Notes," pp. 125-139; Everett C. Hughes, "Is Education a Discipline?" pp. 147-158.
3. See, e.g., Howard S. Becker, "The Nature of a Profession," in Nelson B. Henry (ed.), Education for the Professions. Sixty-first Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Part II. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962, pp. 27-46; Amitai Etzioni (ed.), The Semi-Professions and Their Organization. New York: The Free Press, 1969; Everett C. Hughes, Men and Their Work. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1968.
4. Paul Halmos, The Personal Service Society. London: Schocken, 1970.
5. In addition to the references cited in Footnote 2, see, e.g., Alvin M. Weinberg, Reflections on Big Science. Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1967, pp. 145-163.
6. The term "interdisciplinary" is used in both a broad sense and a narrow sense. In the broad sense in which it is used here, it refers to all non-disciplinary approaches in knowledge (research or teaching). The narrow sense of the term is inappropriate here since that refers to integrating parts of two or more disciplines into a new discipline, e.g., psychology and physics into psychophysics. More precise terminology would be to call the concerns of mission-oriented fields "cross-disciplinary" and "transdisciplinary." Cross-disciplinary work uses concepts and methods of two or more disciplines to solve a problem or set of problems. Transdisciplinary work involves concepts from a number of disciplines, e.g., concerned with the study of man, for the purpose of formulating an over-arching framework from which to approach selected problems. See Joseph J. Kockelmans, "Why Interdisciplinarity?" in Joseph J. Kockelmans (ed.), Interdisciplinarity and Higher Education. University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1979, pp. 123-160.
7. Alvin M. Weinberg, op cit. Also see Joseph J. Kockelmans, op cit.
8. Paul Halmos, "Sociology and the Personal Service Professions," American Behavioral Scientist, 18, (1975), p. 592.
9. Paulo Freire, Education for Critical Consciousness. New York: The Seabury Press, 1973, p. 105.

10. See Freire's analysis of the role of the Extension (Service) agronomist in Education for Critical Consciousness, pp. 93-164. Also see Halmos, "Sociology and the Personal Service Professions" (Footnote 4, Part II).

11. See Footnote 6, Part I.

12. For a detailed discussion of what is involved in practical reasoning, see David Gauthier, Practical Reasoning: The Structure and Foundations of Prudential and Moral Arguments and Their Exemplification in Discourse. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963.

13. Seymour B. Sarason, op cit.

14. See, e.g., Robert Reiff, "The Control of Knowledge: The Power of the Helping Professions," Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 10, 451-461, (1974); Geoffrey Vickers, "The Changing Nature of the Professions," American Behavioral Scientist, 18, 164-189, (1974); Adam Yarmolinski, "What Future for the Professional in American Society?" Daedalus, 107, 159-174, (Spring 1978).

15. This perspective in understanding human action is presented in detail in the literature of phenomenology and interpretive science. See Richard J. Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory. New York: Harcourt Brace, Jovanovich, 1976, pp. 117-169; Michael Phillipson, "Phenomenological Philosophy and Sociology," in Paul Filmer et al., New Directions in Sociological Theory. London: Collier-MacMillan, 1972, pp. 119-163; Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," Review of Metaphysics, 25, 3-51 (1971).

16. For an elaboration on this point, see, e.g., Richard J. Bernstein, op cit. pp. 51-114; Brian Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1975, pp. 49-69; Alasdair MacIntyre, "The Idea of a Social Science," Supplementary Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 41, 95-114, (1967); Charles Taylor, The Explanation of Behavior. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964; George Henrik von Wright, Explanation and Understanding. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1971.

17. A critical analysis of the moral implications of applying social science to the conduct of human affairs may be found in the following references, among others: Jurgen Habermas, Theory and Practice. Translated by John Viertel. Boston: Beacon Press, 1973; Jurgen Habermas, Toward a Rational Society. Translated by Jeremy J. Shapiro. Boston: Beacon Press, 1970; George Lukacs, Class and Class Consciousness. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1971; Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man. Boston: Beacon Press, 1964.

18. The interpretive sciences are the historical-hermeneutic sciences. Habermas, who uses the term "science" in the German sense of systematized knowledge instead of the more limited interpretation we commonly place on it, includes the humanities in the interpretive sciences. I have separated them here because that meaning is not common in our culture.

19. Paul Halmos, "Sociology and the Personal Service Professions," op cit., p. 592.

Part III

HOME ECONOMICS EDUCATION AS A PROFESSION AND A FIELD OF STUDY

1. In sociological study of the professions, types of vocations are conceptualized as being on a continuum from non-professional to professional status on the basis of their characteristics. Semi-professions are those vocations which have some of the characteristics of a profession but lack certain essential qualities. See Amatai Etzioni (ed.), The Semi-Professions and Their Organization, op cit.
2. Shirley G. Larson, A Hypothetical Moral Obligation to Define Clearly the General Goal of Home Economics: A Philosophical Analysis. Ph.D. Dissertation. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1974.
3. Proceedings of the Lake Placid Conference on Home Economics, 1899, p. 5.
4. Proceedings of the Lake Placid Conference on Home Economics, 1900, p. 33.
5. "Editorial: The American Home Economics Association and the National Crisis," Journal of Home Economics, 9, (1917), p. 141.
6. Mary E. Sweeney, "The President's Address," Journal of Home Economics, 13, (1921), p. 385.
7. Effie I. Raitt, "The Nature and Function of Home Economics," Journal of Home Economics, 27, (1935), p. 267.
8. Edith C. Rowles, Home Economics in Canada. Saskatoon, Saskatchewan: Modern Press, no date.
9. AHEA Constitution and By-Laws, Journal of Home Economics, 45, (1953), p. 525.
10. Home Economics: New Directions, A Statement of Philosophy and Objectives. Washington, D.C.: American Home Economics Association, 1959, p. 4.
11. Earl J. McGrath and Jack T. Johnson. The Changing Mission of Home Economics. New York: Teachers College Press (Columbia University), 1968.

12. Marjorie Brown and Beatrice Paolucci, *Home Economics: A Definition*. Washington, D.C.: American Home Economics Association, 1979.

13. *Proceedings of the Lake Placid Conference on Home Economics*, 1899, p. 4.

14. Henrietta I. Goodrich, "Suggestions for a Professional School of Home and Social Economics," *Proceedings of the Lake Placid Conference on Home Economics*, 1900, p. 33.

15. Ellen H. Richards, "The Social Significance of Home Economics," *Journal of Home Economics*, 3, (1911), p. 123.

16. *Ibid*., pp. 118 and 123.

17. Effie I. Raitt, *op cit*., p. 267.

18. *Ibid*., p. 268.

19. Katharine Alderman, "Expressing Our Philosophy," cited in Keturah E. Baldwin, *The AHEA Saga*. Washington, D.C.: American Home Economics Association, 1949, p. 88.

20. Jeanette A. Lee, "The Search for Unity in Home Economics," Paper presented at Workshop of Southern Regional Home Economics Administrators, Atlanta, Georgia, 1963, p. 3.

21. *Proceedings of the Lake Placid Conference on Home Economics*, 1902, pp. 70-71.

22. *Ibid*., p. 71.

23. *Ibid*., pp. 70-71.

24. Helen Atwater, cited in Keturah Baldwin, *The AHEA Saga*, *op cit*., p. 81.

25. *Home Economics: New Directions, A Statement of Philosophy and Objectives*, *op cit*., p. 4.

26. Jeanette A. Lee, *op cit*., p. 2.

27. Selma F. Lippeatt and Helen I. Brown, *Focus and Promise of Home Economics: A Family Oriented Perspective*. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1965, p. 4.

28. *Ibid*., p. 7.

29. Effie I. Raitt, *op cit*., pp. 267-268.

30. *Ibid*., p. 268.

31. Paul Halmos, "Sociology and the Personal Service Professions," *op cit*., p. 587.

32. Henrietta I. Goodrich, "Standards of Living: Introduction," *Proceedings of the Lake Placid Conference on Home Economics*, 1902, pp. 36-37.

33. *Ibid*., p. 36.

34. *Home Economics: New Directions, A Statement of Philosophy and Objectives*, *op cit*., p. 5.

35. Cited in Robert Clarke, *Ellen Swallow: The Woman Who Founded Ecology*. Chicago: Follett Publishing Company, 1972, p. 168.

36. Thomas D. Wood, "Some Controlling Ideals of the Family Life of the Future," *Proceedings of the Lake Placid Conference on Home Economics*, 1902, p. 29. Italics are not in the original; they are placed here to emphasize the relation between desirable personality development of individuals in the home and the evolution of society.

37. Benjamin R. Andrews, "Psychic Factors in Home Economics," *Proceedings of the Lake Placid Conference on Home Economics*, 1907, p. 152.

38. Margaret Justin, cited in Keturah Baldwin, *The AHEA Saga*, *op cit*., p. 80.

39. *Home Economics: New Directions, A Statement of Philosophy and Objectives*, *op cit*., p. 5.

40. Alice A. Chown, "Effect of Some Social Changes on the Family," *Proceedings of the Lake Placid Conference on Home Economics*, 1902, p. 32.

41. Caroline L. Hunt, "Revaluations," *Proceedings of the Lake Placid Conference on Home Economics*, 1901, pp. 79, 82, 89.

42. *Ibid*., pp. 81,83,84.

43. Lita Bane, cited in Keturah Baldwin, *The AHEA Saga*, *op cit*., p. 79.

44. Caroline L. Hunt, *The Life of Ellen H. Richards*, Washington, D.C.: American Home Economics Association, 1958, p. 141.

45. Ellen H. Richards, "The Social Significance of Home Economics," *op cit*., p. 125.

46. Effie I. Raitt, *op cit*., p. 266.

47. Katharine Alderman, *op cit*., pp. 88, 89.

48. Home Economics: *New Directions, A Statement of Philosophy and Objectives*, *op cit*., p. 10.

49. AHEA Constitution and By-Laws, *Journal of Home Economics*, 45, (1953), p. 525.

50. Effie I. Raitt, *op cit*., p. 270.

51. This is a phrasing used by Freire in *Education for Critical Consciousness*. The view expressed here is not peculiar to Freire for others with phenomenological orientation or those who are critical theorists could be cited. However, his presentation on pages 3-20 of the above reference is an especially clear one.

52. Paulo Freire, *op cit*.,

53. Jurgen Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1979.

54. *Ibid*., p. 78.

55. Human society as a system of self-preservation does not necessarily hold under all conditions. When the dominating forces in society seek to have utopian ideals realized and to dissolve existing ideologies, society can not be conceptualized as concerned only with self-preservation. While the concern is for preserving society as a system, the system itself is to be changed.

56. This is a basic tenet of critical theory. See references in Footnote 65.

57. Jurgen Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, *op cit*.

58. *Ibid*., p. 91.

59. *Ibid*., p. 91.

60. This is a phrase used by Erich Fromm in *The Art of Loving: An Inquiry into the Nature of Love*, published in New York by Harper & Brothers, 1956. However, Fromm has been criticized for reducing Christian love to sympathy-love and romantic love to sentimental love. See John H. Schaar, *Escape from Authority: The Perspectives of Erich Fromm*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961, pp. 136-137, 141.

61. The role of physical things in human thought and in "at-homeness" in the world is indicated by Hannah Arendt in *The Human Condition* (published in Garden City, New York by Doubleday Anchor, 1958). See especially, pages 81-88.

62. See, e.g., Isaiah Berlin, "Does Political Theory Still Exist?" in Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman (eds.), *Philosophy, Politics, and Society*, Second Series. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962; Richard J. Bernstein, *op cit*.; Alasdair MacIntyre, *Against the Self-Images of the Age*. New York: Schocken, 1971; Alan Ryan, "'Normal' Science or Political Ideology?" in Peter Laslett, W. G. Runciman, and Quentin Skinner (eds.), *Philosophy, Politics, and Society*, Fourth Series, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972.

63. Jurgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*. Translated by Jeremy J. Shapiro. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971.

64. *Ibid*.

65. There are numerous references on critical social theory. In addition to those by Habermas cited above, see, e.g., Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory. New York: The Seabury Press, 1972; Trent Schroyer, The Critique of Domination: The Origins and Development of Critical Theory. Boston: Beacon Press, 1973; Albrecht Wellmer, Critical Theory of Society. New York: Herder and Herder, 1971. The educative role of critical theory is presented in Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed. London: Scheed & Ward, 1972 and in Paulo Freire, Education for Critical Consciousness, op cit.

66. Many students of the family (including some home economists) hold the ideological notion that all historical change is progress. Therefore, when historical evidence is used to show more favorable conditions in the family at an earlier time than now exist for the contemporary family, holders of the ideology are quick to assign to the use of historical evidence the motive of nostalgia. It is not nostalgic to seek to re-create certain conditions which existed in the past because they are more desirable. If so, all efforts to regain physical health in times of illness are mere nostalgia as are efforts to regain peace in time of war.

67. See Freire's essay on "Extension of Communication" in his Education for Critical Consciousness.

68. Raymond G. Studer and David Stea, "Architectural Programming and Human Behavior," Journal of Social Issues, 22, 127-136, (1966).

69. Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, op cit.; also Jurgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, op cit.

70. According to research in developmental psychology, moral consciousness develops from a self-centered orientation in which others are manipulated, through various other orientations, to a consciousness based on reflective principles in which the needs of all are interpreted. A mature moral consciousness is different, therefore, from that of a young child. See the work of Lawrence Kohlberg, e.g., in "Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization," in D. A. Goslin (ed.), Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969 or in "Continuities in Childhood and Adult Moral Development Revisited," in P.B. Baltes and K.W. Schaie (eds.), Life-Span Developmental Psychology. New York: Academic Press,

1973. Also see the early work of Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1932. Jurgen Habermas draws from the theoretical work of Piaget and Kohlberg, among others, in his essays on "Moral Development and Ego Identity" and "The Development of Normative Structure" which are included in his Communication and the Evolution of Society, op cit.

71. See Max Horkheimer, The Eclipse of Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1947, and Herbert Marcuse, op cit.

72. Jurgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, op cit.

73. A number of references could be listed as claims to historical study of the family. However, many are dealt with sociologically from "a poverty of historical thought," as Lasch remarks in his reviews of a number of such histories. (See his reviews in New York Review of Books 22, 33-38, (Nov. 13, 1975); 22, 37-42, (Nov. 27, 1975) and 22, 50-54, (Dec. 11, 1975). Family history needs to deal with more than surface effects of society on the family by studying the modes of thought and feeling within the family. Two books which do this in part are Edward Shorter, The Making of the Modern Family. New York: Basic Books, 1973; and Fred Weinstein and Gerald M. Platt, The Wish to Be Free: Society, Psyche, and Value Change. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. A modern history of the family in the United States which not only interprets social change in terms of underlying ideas but also traces the effects on the patterns of thought and feeling in the family as well as on family structure is one by Christopher Lasch, Haven in a Heartless World: The Family Besieged, op.cit.

74. Christopher Lasch, Haven in a Heartless World: The Family Besieged, ibid.

75. See, e.g., Kenneth Keniston, The Uncommitted: Alienated Youth in American Society. New York: Dell Publishing Company, 1960, 1962, 1965.

76. See, e.g., Margaret Mead, Coming of Age in Samoa. New York: Morrow, 1949.

77. Besides Mead, ibid., see Geoffrey Gorer, The American Family. New York: Norton, 1948; Margaret Lantis, "The Symbol of a New Religion," Psychiatry. 13, 101-113, (1950).

78. The "scientization of politics" is a term Habermas has used in describing the domination of the political process in determining human goals and values by the empirical social sciences and social technology.

79. Melanie Klein, "The Oedipus Complex in the Light of Early Anxieties," in Contributions to Psycho-Analysis, 1921-1945. New York: Basic Books, 1964.

80. Theodore Lidz, et al., "The Intrafamilial Environment of Schizophrenic Patients: II. Marital Schism and Marital Skew," American Journal of Psychiatry, 114, 241-248, (1957); Melvin L. Kohn and John A. Clausen, "Parental Authority Behavior and Schizophrenia," American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 26, 297-313, (1956); Lyman C. Wynne, "Communication Disorders and the Quest for Relatedness in Families of Schizophrenics," American Journal of Psychoanalysis, 30, 100-114, (1971).

81. See references listed in Footnote 80.

82. Primitive phatasies, fears, and anger the child has about his/her parents go unchecked in real life. Failure to experience a clearly nurturant relationship and competent authority with both parents causes the child to fail in the search for his own identity and to be narcissistic in his outlook. The interactive process in which the child engages with its parents (as a result of historical changes in the family) is such that not only are psychosexual and motivational development affected but cognitive and linguistic development as well. The concept of ego development is treated in analytic ego psychology, (e.g., Erikson), in cognitive developmental psychology, (e.g., Piaget, Kohlberg), and in the symbolic interactionist theory of action (e.g., Mead). In his essay on "Moral Development and Ego Identity," Habermas has built upon the conceptions common to these three theoretical orientations in developing a comprehensive theory of communicative interaction in which the child grows.

83. There has been a great deal of emphasis in Education in recent years on values development through a set of techniques (e.g., the work of Sid Simon). Evidence from developmental psychology as well as from clinical observation indicates that two or more decades are required for the individual to work through the process of development to a mature ego identity.

84. See, e.g., Bruno Bettelheim, Children of the Dream. New York: Free Press, 1969. The kibbutz was an attempt to relieve the family of conflicts arising from the child's experience of having affection and discipline from the same source.

85. The ego does not develop beyond the incorporation of distorted images of others (as distinguished from what those persons are in reality) so that there is no genuine relation to others. See W.M. Brodey,

"The Family as the Unit of Study and Treatment: Image, Object, and Narcissistic Relationships," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 31, 69-73, (1961) as well as the references in Footnote 80.

86. The development of moral consciousness is a process of self-construction in which both conceptions and emotions change. These developmental changes are a result of the growing child's interaction with a social environment that presents rules, standards of conduct, value principles. See, e.g., Elliot Turiel, "Developmental Processes in the Child's Moral Thinking," in Paul H. Mussen, Jonas Langer, and Martin Covington (eds.), *Trends and Issues in Developmental Psychology*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969.

87. See Melanie Klein, *op cit*.

88. This illustrates "being carried along" unreflectively with the ideas and conditions of society without critical consciousness of the possibility of correctable flaws in society itself.

89. See Michael Flude and John Ahier (eds.), *Educability, Schools, and Ideology*. London: Halsted Press, 1974; Paulo Freire, "Extension or Communication," in *Education for Critical Consciousness*, *op cit*,; Christopher Lasch, *Haven in a Heartless World*. *op cit*.; C. Wright Mills, "The Professional Ideology of Social Pathologists," in I. Horowitz (ed.), *Power, Politics, and People.* London: Oxford University Press, 1963.

90. In two previous publications I have called such problems "practical" problems (*Home Economics: A Definition* and *A Conceptual Scheme and Decision-Rules for the Selection and Organization of Home Economics Curriculum Content*). In an earlier section of the present paper I have also done this but the use of the term may be confusing because the term "practical" takes on a different meaning than that of Habermas in referring to the practical life of communicative action. In referring to "practical problems," the meaning is one of moral concern, i.e., moral questions.

91. This blindness comes from the reliance on techniques without ideational clarity, without voluntary choice of goals in the existing circumstances, and without realization of the consequences of the techniques.

92. Marjorie Brown and Beatrice Paolucci, *Home Economics: A Definition*, *op cit.*, p. 23.

93. Ellen H. Richards in Proceedings of the Lake Placid Conference on Home Economics, 1902, p. 7.

94. Ellen H. Richards, "The Social Significance of Home Economics," op cit.

95. Proceedings of the Lake Placid Conference on Home Economics, 1904, p. 31.

96. Ellen H. Richards, "The Social Significance of Home Economics," op cit.

97. Ellen H. Richards, "Domestic Economy in Public Education," New York College for the Training of Teachers, 1889. Cited in Caroline L. Hunt, The Life of Ellen H. Richards, op cit., p. 105.

98. Proceedings of the Lake Placid Conference on Home Economics, 1902, p. 21.

99. Thomas D. Wood, op cit., p. 30.

100. Paul A Miller, "Higher Education in Home Economics: An Appraisal and a Challenge," Paper presented to Meeting of the Division of Home Economics of the American Association of Land Grant Colleges and State Universities, Washington, D.C., November 15, 1960, p. 9.

Part IV
HOME ECONOMICS EDUCATION: A Conceptualization

1. See, e.g., Paulo Freire, "Education as the Practice of Freedom," translated and edited by Myra Bergman Ramos, in Paulo Freire, Education for Critical Consciousness, op cit.; Jon Hellesnes, "Education and the Concept of Critique," Continuum 8, 40-51, (1970); R.F. Dearden, P.W. Hirst and R.S. Peters (Eds.), Education and the Development of Reason. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972; R.S. Peters, The Concept of Education. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967; R.S. Peters, Education and the Education of Teachers. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977; Israel Scheffler, The Language of Education. Springfield, Ill ; Charles C. Thomas, 1960.

2. I have drawn very heavily from the work of R.S. Peters and Jon Hellesnes in this section although there are many other sources of the ideas expressed here.

3. R.S. Peters, Education and the Education of Teachers, op cit.

4. Ibid.

5. *Ibid*.
6. Herbert Marcuse, *op cit*.
7. R.S. Peters, *Education and the Education of Teachers*, *op cit*., p. 29.
8. See references in Footnote 62, Part III.
9. John Wilson, *Language and the Pursuit of Truth*, *op cit*.
10. Richard J. Bernstein, *op cit*.; Abraham Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry*. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1964.
11. Ernst Fischer, *Art Against Ideology*. Translated by Anna Postock. London: Allen Lane, Penquin Press, 1969; Northrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism: An Essay on the Social Context of Literary Criticism.* Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1971: Herbert Marcuse "Art as Form of Reality," *New Left Review*, 74, 51-58, (July-August, 1972).
12. John Ciardi, "An Ulcer, Gentlemen, Is an Unwritten Poem," in Robert A. Goldwin and Charles A. Nelson (Eds.), *Toward the Liberally Educated Executive*. New York: The New American Library, 1960.
13. Jurgen Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, *op cit*.
14. Michael Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy*. New York: Harper & Row, 1962.
15. Israel Scheffler, *op cit*.
16. Jon Hellesnes, *op cit*.
17. For a discussion of some of these points, see John Wild, "The Need for a Philosophy of Democracy," in Hwa Jol Yung (Ed.), *Existential Phenomenology and Political Theory, A Reader*. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1972.
18. Jurgen Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, *op cit*.
19. Dorothy Lee, "Discrepancies in the Teaching of American Culture," in George D. Spindler (Ed.), *Education and Anthropology*. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1955.
20. There is a documentation and analysis of this ideology in Dorothy Smith, "Women, The Family, and Corporate Capitalism," *Berkeley Journal of Sociology*, 20, 56-90, (1975-76).
21. *Ibid*.
22. R.S. Peters, *Education as Initiation*. London: George G. Harap, 1964.
23. Jane R. Martin, "The Disciplines and the Curriculum," *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, 1, 23-40, (1969).

24. A great deal has been published on education in relation to the developmental level of students. Many of these publications, however, are based on theories of single aspects of development (e.g., cognitive development or moral development) rather than on a more comprehensive theory which construes the various lines of development as interdependent. This more comprehensive theory is attempted in Jurgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, op cit. However, the relation to education is not presented there.

25. There is a fourth question and that concerns appropriate ways of deriving knowledge for the field. This question, however, is addressed in the next section on modes of inquiry which are appropriate.

26. National Council for the Social Studies, Social Studies Curriculum Guidelines. Washington, D.C.: NCSS, 1971.

27. John Walsh, "Vocational Education or Short-Run Training Program?" in The Planning Papers for the Vocational Education Study, Publication No. 1. Washington, D.C.: The National Institute of Education, 1979.

28. See, e.g., C.A. Bowers, "Emergent Ideological Characteristics of Educational Policy," Teachers College Record, 79, 33-54, (1977); Arthur G. Wirth, Education in the Technological Society. Scranton, Pa.: International Textbook Company, 1972; Arthur G. Wirth, "Issues Affecting Education and Work in the Eighties: Efficiency versus Industrial Democracy," Teachers College Record, 79, 55-67, (1977).

29. I would like to document with a greater number of analyses of vocational education than I have. My access to these materials is limited although I have used a number of more general references to document some points. In addition to the references listed in Footnote 28 above, I have drawn heavily from The Planning Papers for the Vocational Education Study, Publication No. 1, op cit.

30. Lester C. Thurow, "Vocational Education as a Strategy for Eliminating Poverty," in The Planning Papers for the Vocational Education Study, Publication No. 1, op cit.

31. Peter Berger, Brigitte Berger, and Hansfried Kellner, The Homeless Mind. New York: Vintage Books, 1974 (see pp. 26-34); C.A. Bowers, op cit.; Alvin Gouldner, The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology, New York: Seabury Press, 1976; W. Norton Grubb, "The Phoenix of

Vocational Education: Implications for Evaluation," in The Planning Papers for the Vocational Education Study, Publication No. 1, op cit.

32. John T. Grasso and John R. Shea, "Effects of Vocational Education Programs: Research Findings and Issues," in The Planning Papers for the Vocational Education Study, Publication No. 1, op cit.; W. Norton Grubb, op cit.

33. Michael W. Kirst, "Research Issues for Vocational Education: Compliance and Enforcement of Federal Laws," in The Planning Papers for the Vocational Education Study, Publication No. 1, op cit.

34. Paul Ricoeur, "Work and the Word," in Hwa Jol Yung (Ed.), Existential Phenomenology and Political Theory. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1972.

35. This statement is based on the increasing number of published articles and books which are critiques of this ideology in education. See, e.g., C.A. Bowers, op cit.; Michael Flude and John Ahier, Educability, Schools and Ideology, op cit.; Barry M. Franklin, "Education for Social Control," History of Education Quarterly, 14, 131-136, (1974). There are many other references which could be cited.

36. Michael W. Kirst, op cit.